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The National Graphical Association (NGA) typified the British model of craft unionism 
with substantial positional power and organisational strength. This study finds that it 
relied upon, and was reinforced by, the common occupational bonds that members 
identified with. It concludes that the value of collective identity warrants greater 
attention in the debate over union renewal alongside theories around mobilisation 
and organising (Kelly 2018), alliance-building and social movements (Holgate 2014).  
Sectionalism builds solidarity through the exclusion of others. Occupational identity 
is vulnerable to technological change. This model neglects institutional and 
‘associational’ power, eschewing legal protections in favour of collective bargaining 
and ignoring alliance-building in favour of sovereign authority. The development of 
large conglomerate unions has placed membership unity over sectionalist solidarity 
but membership and its density in workplaces have fallen (Trade Union Statistics). 
This thesis concludes that the capacity for strategic choice by union leaders depends 
upon the union’s leverage with employers and its ability to mobilise collective action 
within and beyond the workplace. These rely on strong collective identity of workers 
as demonstrated by the NGA in its 1980 national printing campaign. 
The series of employment laws, launched in 1980, has constrained strategic options 
available to union leaders but the thesis argues that the technology and non-union 
labour rather than new laws were the critical factor in the NGA’s defeat in the 1983 
Messenger dispute. The loss of positional power exposed the weakness of 
associational (or coalitional) power when the NGA looked to the TUC and union allies 
for aid. 
It argues that the forces that had made the union organisationally strong prevented 
it from taking alternative routes to survive or to transform itself in the face of 
fundamental technological change. Yet this should not lead union strategists from 
paying more attention to the value of sectional occupational identity in the 
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Britain’s trade unions are among the oldest in the world. They have a long and 
complex history (Clegg 1985, Cole 1924, Flanders and Clegg 1954, Hutt, 1962, Hyman 
1975, Webbs 1896), with a matrix of organisational models and attitudes towards 
relations with employers. Workers are mobilised into unions around a common 
cause and shared interest and the boundaries of their union membership are based 
on the occupations and sectors covered – the clue is in the title, trade union. The 
number of unions has declined through amalgamations1 a process that has placed 
broader membership unity ahead of occupational identity and with it, as the study 
will explore, more emphasis on political and associational power. 
The decades immediately after the Second World War witnessed fierce argument 
over trade union reform (Barrett, Rhodes and Beishon 1975, Donovan 1968). It was a 
period in which unions, for good or bad, were at the centre of economic life and 
national politics and when union leaders were household names. Conservative 
governments led by Margaret Thatcher from 1979, however, launched a new 
offensive against union power (Dorey 1991, 1995). This coincided with wider 
developments in global capitalism, while the British governments’ economic and 
industrial relations policies profoundly influenced the direction of industry 
restructuring and societal change. The 1980s were marked by industrial unrest and 
high unemployment in which the powerful battalions of trade unionism were 
ultimately diminished and union membership fell. This study looks back at this 
turning-point in the fortunes of trade unions with a focus on the role of sectional 
collective identity as the basis for organisational strength. 
Much has been written about trade union decline, the causes and the possible 
options for renewal (Freeman and Pelletier 1990; Hyman 2007; Boxall and Haynes 
1997; Frege 2003, 2004; Undy, Fosh, Morris, Smith and Martin 2011; Undy 2008; 
	
1 TUC statistics 
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Metcalf 2005; Bryson, Ebbinghaus and Visser 2011). The debate has included the 
scope and capacity for unions to make strategic choices and the options available to 
them including models of mobilisation and identity. The capacity of unions to take 
and implement strategic decisions – and the choices they make – is influenced by the 
industrial, political and legal environment, the nature of the leadership and the 
democracy of each union (Hyman 2007). The legal framework covering organised 
labour has swung between restriction and reform, repression and regulation 
(Donovan 1968, Wedderburn 1986, 1987, Fosh and LIttler, 1985). Trade unions have 
responded in a variety of ways - confrontation, containment and compliance - at 
different times, with varying results.  
This thesis focuses on the National Graphical Association (NGA) and the way this 
union sought to deal with fundamental technological change and the introduction of 
legislation that outlawed its traditional approach to disputes. In 1980 the union 
embarked on a national campaign for advances in pay and hours for members 
before the forces of hostile legislation and economic depression set in (Gennard 
1990). In 1983 the union faced Eddy Shah, a maverick employer who bypassed union 
involvement using new technology, non-union labour, the police and the new 
employment laws. This was the first real test of the Government’s approach to trade 
union reform and the first measure of trade union resistance to the laws (Dickinson 
1984, Gennard 1984, 1990, Marsh 1992).  
This doctoral research has uncovered archives from the time including confidential 
correspondence between government departments and with the police. 
Conservative Party papers and the minutes of the NGA National Council have been 
opened. Together with a range of newspaper accounts, Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
and NGA records, photographs and ephemera, the research builds up a 
comprehensive account of the contrasting disputes. 
The thesis examines the extent to which the union’s success in the 1980 dispute 
strengthened the “aura of uncontestability” (sic) of the NGA and led to failures to 
fully assess the changed circumstances by 1983 (Gennard and Hayward 2008: 4). It 
uses case studies to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the sectional nature 
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of the union. The strong collective bond members had to the union proved a key 
ingredient in the manner the leadership directed its 1980 campaign and in its 
outcome. Such features left it vulnerable, however, in conducting itself in the 1983 
dispute. The principal participants have been interviewed including activists and 
union officers. Despite the defeat in 1983 and the chain of events that followed, 
most union participants interviewed largely stand by the strategy and action taken. 
They believed if it had not been Shah who used the new laws against them, it would 
have been another employer soon after. They spoke more freely about ways the 
union evaded the full impact of sequestration and the organisation of the picket line 
in ways previous accounts were unable to capture.  
The employer, Eddy Shah, interviewed for this research, remains proud of the role 
he played in utilising new laws to aid his determination to bypass union restrictions. 
He was, and remains, an independent figure and refutes any suggestion that he was 
part of a government-inspired conspiracy. 
The literature on the Messenger dispute includes a contemporary account by Mark  
Dickinson (1984) entitled To Break a Union. His detailed study highlights the pivotal 
significance of the dispute but he was unable to interview Shah himself and it was 
too soon for him to access government, police and union archives. This thesis fills in 
many of the gaps and tests Dickinson’s conclusions that the dispute was a crusade 
against the NGA by the employer with the union let down by the TUC and the rest of 
the labour movement. Gennard wrote The implications of the Messenger Newspaper 
Group dispute (1984) and History of the NGA (1990) in which he highlights the critical 
role the dispute had in establishing the authority of the new employment laws, with 
all their impediments and restrictions for unions. He sought to play down the defeat 
for the union and felt other employers would draw back from following Shah’s 
example, but he warned about a divided trade union movement and a climate in 
which “small unrepresentative employers push their own economic advantage at the 
expense of the best traditions of British industrial relations (Gennard 1984: 19)”. This 
study will reflect on these conclusions. 
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Other scholars who have considered the significance of the Messenger dispute 
include McIlroy (1991: 70-71) who believed the police response banished the mass 
picket. Evans (1985: 147) argued the Messenger dispute showed how the police and 
courts could break a union financially and physically. Dunn (1985: 99-102) highlights 
the impact of the dispute on secondary action and the closed shop while Fosh and 
Littler (1985: 14-16) summarised the importance of the outcome for industrial 
relations and union power. 
McIlroy and Lloyd took different views on the dispute in Marxism Today (February 
1984). McIlroy saw the defeat as a betrayal by the TUC despite the strong ground on 
which the NGA stood. Lloyd disagreed, arguing that a fight over the closed shop was 
wrong although he acknowledged how the NGA established “one of the most 
complete and successful forms of workers’ – or more accurately, union – control in 
the country (p.33)”. The nature of NGA power and these arguments about its 
defence are weighed in this thesis.  
Other literature to cover the 1983 Messenger dispute does so as part of its role in 
heralding subsequent events; for example,  Bain (1998), Richardson (2003) and Lang 
and Dodkins (2011). Goodhart and Wintour chart the launch of Shah’s Today 
newspaper in Eddie Shah and the Newspaper Revolution (1986) and stress his role as 
“interloper” able to “unlock the door to the newspaper of the future (p.x1v)”. A 
similar line is taken by Andrew Neil (1997) and this is an aspect considered in the 
case study in Chapter 8. 
The significance of the dispute in 1983 is now overshadowed by the conflicts that 
followed, when unions were banned from Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in January 1984, the miners’ strike of 1984/5 and the battle at 
Wapping between the print unions and News International. The sequencing of these 
events has led to the conclusion that the Conservative Government had a pre-
determined course of action (Lyddon 2009) and that there was a planned step-by-
step onslaught on union power (Dorey 1991, 2014). It is possible, however, that the 
strategy was more opportunistic, with government building new layers of 
regulations rather than the careful enactment of a premeditated programme. 
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Moreover, and critically, there is a need to take into account the strategic choices 
taken by union leaders at the time. 
 
Union fortunes 
Trade union membership contracted	substantially through the 1980s and 90s, 
falling from around 13 million in 1980 to 7 million in 2000. The number of unions 
halved during the same period2. Subsequently, the rate of membership decline 
stabilised and in recent years has shown small growth. Scholars (Undy 2018, Murray 
2017, Ibsen and Tapia 2017, Lévesque 2010, Heery 2003, Dörre, Holst 2009 et al) 
have written about the nature of trade union decline and possible options for union 
renewal. Craft unions were undermined by the decline of their ‘craft’ but there 
appears to be an assumption in the literature around union renewal that the 
organisational model exemplified by unions such as the NGA has had its day. This 
research studies the nature of this model, its strengths and weaknesses. 
The UK transformation of employment relations was one of the most dramatic shifts 
of power in a wider development of neo-liberalism around the western world 
(McIlroy 2011). This research traces the fortunes of the NGA, now absorbed, along 
with many other sectoral unions into Unite the Union. This large, conglomerate 
union is now central to the future of British trade unionism but consistent 







2 Government and Certification Officer figures 
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Figure 1.1 Unite the Union membership – source TUC 
Unite is a combination of unions, some in diminishing sectors or occupations. Yet the 
issue is whether its decline can be attributed exclusively to industrial change. This 
study questions the nature of collective identity and whether large general unions 
offer the common bond developed by many of their component parts. The research 
examines the legacy of craft unionism and what lessons they may hold for unions 
today and for the future. Has the large general union approach lost what has been 
described as ‘social capital unionism’ (Jarley 2005, Hyman 2015), and ‘relational 
unionism’ (Saundry and McKeown 2013) in which sustained membership contacts, 
with union reps and with each other, generate strong social networks that mobilise 
workers in times of need and sustain unions in periods of relative calm, a key feature 










































































Figure 1.2 Largest unions – source TUC (excludes NEU) 
 
Britain’s trade union movement has developed into a few large unions with 
numerous smaller ones dedicated to particular sectors and professions. The latter 
have much in common with former craft unions in seeking to maintain common 
identity and bonds around the occupation (Bain 1970, Spoor 1967). Some 
occupational or craft unions that survive retain powerful industrial leverage and are 
willing to use it;  in the rail industry for example (Darlington 2012, McIlroy 1990). 
Others have strong occupational or professional identities and loyalties, such as in 
health, education and the creative sector. These unions have managed to sustain 
and even grow membership in a manner the large general unions have not. For all 
the hostile environment, many niche unions have survived well building a 
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Figure 1.3 Unions based upon a narrow occupational identity – source TUC 
 
A sense of identity is clearly an important aspect of building an effective 
membership organisation and although recognised by scholars from the Webbs 
(1920) to Hyman (1975) it has not featured strongly in the debate over union 
renewal such as the focus on mobilisation theory (Kelly 1998) and social movements 
(Simms, Holgate and Heery 2013). 
 
The research project and my own experience 
In 1981 I was elected as the youngest full-time officer of the NGA. I had been an 
apprentice compositor and ‘served my time’ to become a ‘journeyman’ in the 
printing trade and a member of the powerful craft union. Like those before me, I was 
‘educated’ by the Father of the Chapel (FoC) and other members about the role, 
values, customs and importance of the union. When I joined the NGA, it was 
stressed that I was joining a privileged society. The union had been involved in my 
selection as an apprentice and the chapel had already intervened on my behalf to 
ensure I attended college to fulfil my apprenticeship qualifications (Lee 1979). The 
union supported me when the firm closed and made sure I got transferred to 
another company to finish my apprenticeship. This was a typical experience for craft 
print workers in the way the union intervened in the labour market and assisted 
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By the time I was ‘banged-out’ (the noisy and masculine ritual that accompanies the 
completion of an apprenticeship) the proud traditions and customs of the union 
were being undermined by fast-changing technology. These developments coincided 
with the election of the Thatcher Government that had a central aim of curbing 
trade union power. The NGA’s control over labour in the national newspaper 
industry made it a particular target in such a project. 
In 1980 the NGA took the initiative and launched a national campaign to win 
substantial rises in minimum pay and a reduced working week. As an FoC in a 
commercial printer in Gloucester, I led actions to press the employer to improve the 
national agreement. The union successfully set employer against employer and 
achieved significant improvements for its members. The action came just ahead of 
the advancing storm. Government economic policies deliberately squeezed the 
monetary supply which led to a steep rise in unemployment (Matthews and Minford 
1987). I became an elected full-time officer and most of my time during the first few 
years was spent handling redundancies and factory closures. At the same time 
technology in printing was advancing rapidly and new businesses were emerging 
unaccustomed or unwilling to accommodate trade union restrictions (Cockburn 
1983). I was proud of the traditions of the union, its collective sense of solidarity, its 
discipline around a repertoire of industrial tactics that supported members even in 
small businesses as well as workplace power in larger ones. But these methods of 
operation were under threat from technological change and political action. 
 
The Messenger experience 
The Messenger dispute was not only a major challenge to the NGA and its closed 
shop control of the labour supply but it was the first major test of the Thatcher 
Government’s new employment laws (Dunn 1985). Shah was the first employer to 
pursue legal action using the new legislation that led to large fines and sequestration 
of the union’s assets (Fosh and LIttler 1985). The research reviews the conflict using 
newly available documentation, visual representation and interviews with the key 
participants. The conflict tested the Government’s espoused policy of non-
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intervention in industrial relations. The study considers why the NGA chose to 
escalate a dispute with an employer of only a few of its members and one who was 
able to circumvent its traditional industrial tactics.  
The unprecedented legal action Shah took against the union threatened its very 
survival and without wider backing from the trade union movement the NGA backed 
down. The study argues, however, that the laws were not the critical factor in the 
union’s defeat. The union’s traditional industrial tactics were beaten by a self-reliant 
employer who was able to utilise new technology operated by non-union labour. The 
business was able to bypass secondary action by the union and, aided by a police 
force strengthened by the government for the purpose, produce newspapers 
without the NGA.  
The study will argue that the factors that made the NGA a powerful collective force 
hampered its ability to take decisions that might have avoided the defeat. Those 
factors, however, can provide lessons for unions in building membership support. 
The study examines the characteristics that limit the capacity for strategic choice and 
determine membership growth or decline. It re-evaluates the craft union model for a 
modern age. Hyman (1975) for example, acknowledged that unions were not class 
organisations, uniting all workers, but were established on narrow trade interests. 
This sectionalism has been discussed by scholars as to whether it builds or weakens 
wider class solidarity (Barou 1947, Bain 1970, Hobsbawm 1978, Kelly 1988, Lane 
1974) and is a feature running through trade union histories3.  
To help analyse the issues drawn from the NGA case studies, the thesis uses a 
theoretical framework of trade union power resources. This will highlight the range 
of resources unions can deploy, especially a craft union such as the NGA. It will help 
demonstrate how the changing circumstances of the early 1980s in technology and 
	
3 Examples used for this study include: the history of the Brushmakers Union (1847); Bakers’ Union 
(1977); National Union of Boot and Shoe Operators 1874-1957, Fox (1958); London Society of 
Compositors, Howe and Waite (1948); hosiery unions, Gurnham (1976); agricultural workers, Groves 
(1948) and Wynn (1993); shop workers, Hoffman (1949); Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Draughtsmen, Mortimer (1960); Blacksmiths, Tuckett (1974); Typographical Society, Musson (1954); 
National Graphical Association, Gennard (1990); Graphical, Paper and Media Union, Gennard (1990); 
National Association of Local Government Officers, Spoor (1967); Association of Correctors of the 
Press, Shane (1954); Transport and General Workers Union, Coates and Topham (1991). 
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legislation led the union’s leadership to seek new ways to lever influence with 
limited success. 
Research Questions 
This research sets out to answer the following questions: 
• What factors underpin positional and organisational power and how did the 
changing environment of the early 1980s impact upon them? 
• What was the NGA’s capacity for strategic choice and how far did legal, 
political and technological change constrain it? 
• What new knowledge can be gleaned from the NGA case as to the role of the 
state and police in industrial relations? 
• Where did decision-making lie within the NGA between national, branch and 
chapel levels and were there tensions between them? 
• Does a constant tension exist between rank-and-file members and their 
union leaders? 
• To what extent was the NGA’s strong collective occupational identity and 
solidarity based on sectionalism and how far was this a constraint in its 
survival?  
• What contribution do the features outlined above add to the wider debate 
over the future of trade unions? 
Thesis structure  
Chapter Two of this study considers the relevant literature and theories defining the 
nature of trade union power and how it is underpinned by the collective identity of 
workers. It considers the theories around trade union organisation within the 
framework of collective identity. Positional power provides the raw leverage for 
unions and helps build and is strengthened by organisational power. The chapter 
studies how this model of organisation influences the nature of leadership, 
membership participation and democracy. Discussed is the relationship between 
positional, organisational, institutional and associational power. The chapter 
considers these tensions in regard to the strategic choices made by union leaders 
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and helps set the context for the case study research. The study reviews the role of 
ideology as a secondary factor in shaping union values and strategy. It asks whether 
and to what extent unions are independent actors or are ‘path-dependent’ as 
secondary bodies (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980), largely at the mercy of strategic 
choices made by the employer and state. 
Craft unionism has been criticised for being sectional and divisive (Lane 1974), but 
strong common bonds build solidarity and help the union develop a range of 
additional benefits and ‘social capital’ (Jarley 2005). These offer advantages for 
union membership beyond the immediate workplace or relationship with the 
employer and the study reviews the literature around these issues.  
In Chapter Three the research looks in more detail at the nature of craft unionism, 
especially in the printing industry. Some of Britain’s oldest unions came from 
printing and the study looks back at their formation and the traditions they 
established. The skilled unions enjoyed a considerable degree of positional power 
and leverage to influence the employer and regulate the labour market. The closed 
shop was a key feature of skilled printing unionism but one that offered benefits to 
the insiders through the exclusion of others less skilled, especially women (Cockburn 
1983). The study examines the importance of welfare support particularly for out-of-
work members. The support mechanisms were a substantial benefit of membership 
and they protected working members from the undercutting effects of 
unemployment (Musson 1954).  
Arising from such exclusion, Chapter Three considers the sectionalism of craft 
unionism. Any trade union, by definition, covers a section or a group of workers and 
therefore has dividing lines with those in other groups. Sectionalism can lift other 
groups if the benefits achieved for one section knock-on to others but it can also 
exclude them as employers ‘buy off’ the more powerful group. Yet, to what extent 
does this model sacrifice associational power through coalition-building and social 
movement alliances? Another key area reviewed in the chapter is the role of 
employers in post-war industrial relations especially in printing, an industrial process 
where the technology had changed little since the late Middle Ages. How did a union 
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model based upon strong collective identity influence that employment 
relationship? 
Chapter Four surveys the political and legal context for the disputes in the 1980s. 
Industrial relations and trade union reform had been contested issues of public 
policy for several decades. The trade union movement had successfully resisted 
reform but the Conservative Government of 1979 came to power with a fresh 
determination to reduce trade union power in the light of lessons from previous 
failures. 
The study examines the nature of a largely voluntarist approach to trade unions for 
much of the twentieth century. This ‘hands-off’ concept is the background to the 
introduction of legal reforms, but also the response by trade unions anxious to 
preserve their freedoms. 
Having reviewed the debates over trade unionism and industrial relations, Chapter 
Five explains the methodology of the research. It specifies the reasons for the study 
into the contrasting printing disputes of 1980 and 1983. It justifies the use of archive 
material, photographs and oral testimony from those close to the events. The 
research gained access to previously confidential materials and closed archives. It 
contains interviews with the key participants and is able to provide details not 
available to earlier writers. 
Chapter Six studies the 1980 national printing dispute instigated and conducted by 
the union’s leadership, especially its Assistant General Secretary Tony Dubbins who 
is interviewed. It was a strategic campaign, directed from above and not through 
rank-and-file pressure, against employers timed to forestall the worsening economic 
climate, technological advances and hostile legal reforms. The chapter demonstrates 
how the campaign was launched and directed by the leadership relying on the 
organisational strength built up through the strong collective identity of the union. 
The study contrasts this offensive campaign with the 1983 conflict between 
Messenger Newspapers and the National Graphical Association. Just three years 
after its successful 1980 campaign, the NGA faced a range of pressures coming from 
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technological, economic and legal change. Chapter Seven discovers how the 
strategic options available to the union were reducing rapidly and the leadership was 
forced to defend the union’s status on a number of fronts. The dispute with Eddy 
Shah and his Messenger Newspaper Group involved just six striking NGA members 
but it escalated into a major confrontation culminating in a threat to hold a national 
strike covering the entire printing industry and even calls for a general strike.  
Chapter Seven traces the dynamics of the dispute, when and why decisions were 
made – or not made. It considers how such a small dispute escalated in the way it 
did and questions the role of collective identity in providing the impetus for the 
action in defence of its members’ interests. The research raises questions as to 
whether the dispute was a premeditated conspiracy by the employer in league with 
the government or whether the new laws set the context within which independent 
employers were enticed into challenging union power. It asks whether ‘the Left’, 
including those within the NGA, were looking for an opportunity to challenge the 
laws and repeat the triumph over Ted Heath’s 1971 Industrial Relations Act. Or was 
the battle over Messenger Newspapers an industrial dispute that spiralled out-of-
control? Participant testimonies reflect on the conduct of the dispute, the tactics 
used on both sides – mass pickets and police response - and the unprecedented use 
of sequestration.  
Chapter Eight uses photographs and ephemera to highlight the events of the dispute 
and confirm the testimony provided by the interviews. Chapter Nine studies the shift 
from positional power, exposed as toothless in the face of an employer utilising new 
technology staffed by non-union labour, to associational power through appeal to 
the TUC. 
Chapter Ten discusses the aftermath of the dispute. Controversy within union circles 
remains to this day around the apportioning of responsibility for the Messenger 
dispute defeat. The chapter looks at the consequences for the NGA, unions more 
generally, industrial relations in printing and for government’s trade union reform 
programme. The step-by-step approach to industrial relations by successive 
Conservative governments continued apace after the period examined by this 
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research. The role that legal reforms have played in determining trade union 
fortunes is the subject of debate and is examined by this research. 
Chapter Eleven identifies the conclusions of the study. It returns to the main 
research questions posed in this introduction. It draws out lessons from these 
disputes and the fall-out for trade unions. In the search for strategic options that 
unions can adopt to revitalise their fortunes there has been limited attention to 
strong occupational identity. The study concludes that this is a vital ingredient in the 
formation of strong trade union organisation and more research should focus upon 
this aspect and how the risks of damaging sectionalism can be reduced.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Union identity, power and strategic choice 
Introduction 
Trade union combination is the most obvious foundation upon which workers can 
seek to influence their working conditions (Hyman 1975). Their formation has been 
based largely upon occupational and sectoral interests and the purpose of this 
chapter is to set out a theoretical argument framework for the research. The study 
lays stress on the importance of collective identity and its relationship to union 
purpose, power, leadership and democracy. It explains why strong bonds of identity 
are required to build continuous associations and what power unions can deploy for 
what purpose. Union power is the leverage workers have in changing the position of 
their employer (Webbs 1920). 
 ‘Positional’ power is the ability of workers to disrupt the production process or the 
delivery of services. This can be achieved through structural leverage in the 
workplace or through restricting the supply of critical skills through the marketplace 
(Schamlz and Dörre 2020). To act upon such power unions require organisational 
power such as the leadership capability, collective discipline etc. Unions help define 
the interests of their members and the status of the occupation in order to maximise 
the leverage over employers. This study looks at the way strong occupational 
identity bolsters positional power but also how it is vulnerable to technological 
change. Its exclusive nature may negate alliance-building with other unions and 
wider coalitions beyond the workplace. The concentration on internal solidarity 
around sectional skills risks sacrificing wider alliances and ‘associational power’ 
(Hyman 1975, 1987, 2007; Hodder and Edwards 2015; Boxall and Haynes 1997 Undy 
2008; Müller-Jentsch 1988). 
In this study, associational power is not the bond between individual members but 
that gained from alliances with external partners such as other trade unions, 
community and campaign groups. Sometimes described as ‘societal’ and ‘coalitional’ 
power, it is the strength gained from the cooperation and joint work with other 
organisations, within and outside the labour movement. ‘Institutional’ power is that 
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derived from the legislative and regulatory framework within which the union 
operates. In a voluntarist industrial relations environment, strong unions preferred 
their reliance on positional power to legal remedies (Minkin 1991: 7). As the 
research will explore, with this undermined, unions have little choice but to use 
other means of leverage to protect their members. 
Hodder and Edwards (2015: 843) offer a model to describe the ‘essence’ of trade 
unions, which they define as the “complex interaction of identity, ideology and 
purpose”. This chapter will set out the argument that of these, occupational identity 
has been the central common cause for most trade unions. In doing so, it sets the 
context for the research and the case studies that demonstrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of such a model of organisation. 
The chapter examines the arguments around collective identity, union leadership 
and democracy. High levels of membership participation can provide a power 
resource but potentially can hamper a leadership’s ability to direct strategic 
decisions. Such issues were raised by Michels in his seminal work in 1915 reissued in 
1962. Considered in this chapter is a union’s capacity for strategic choice and what 
options are open to the leadership.  
The nature and form of strategic choice for union leaders between conflict or 
cooperation with employers is considered as is the question of whether this arises 
through rank-and-file pressure or leadership prerogative (Phelps-Brown 1986, 
Darlington 2018). It does not follow that a union based upon strong occupational 
identity adopts any particular orientation towards employers. Such decision-making 
is influenced internally by leadership ideology (Hyman 2007), internal democracy 
(Michels 1962) and micro-political factors, such as personality characteristics 
(Blissett 2013). 
 
Union purpose and effectiveness 
Unions offer a medium within which workers can form a common position and act 
collectively to influence or pressure employers in order to protect or improve the 
conditions of their working lives (Webbs 1920). For Hyman (1975) union purpose is 
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to exert, collectively, control over conditions of work and employment which 
workers are unlikely to possess as individuals. Unions seek to reset the balance of 
economic power between employer and worker, through collective power 
resources.  
The Webbs’ (1920: 1) definition of trade union purpose for workers was to maintain 
or improve the conditions of their working lives. This sets a context where unions 
have both a defensive and an offensive posture. It also concentrates attention on 
the structure of trade unionism. This contrasts with (Hyman 1973) who stressed how 
unions expressed and imposed the collective will of workers. Davis (1941) described 
unions as being defensive organisations, to preserve a standard already enjoyed. To 
establish an association for this purpose would require a shared sense of threat from 
the employer, state or other groups of workers. Flanders and Clegg (1954) wrote of 
union purpose as the ‘sword of justice’ for working people and (Kelly 1998) 
highlights collective identity mobilised around a common sense of justice.  
Freeman and Medoff (1984) asked: What do unions do? They weighed the balance 
between the ‘monopoly’ power of unions in the market with the positive benefits of 
union power and voice in the workplace. They exposed the tension between unions 
as socially valuable yet in conflict with the interests of private business. Their study 
sought to objectively quantify the economic, social and political impacts, negative 
and positive, of trade unions and they concluded that an economy is not a simple 
‘zero-sum’ game in which there are winners and corresponding losers. They 
addressed the argument that benefits secured through union power were paid for 
by wider society through higher prices or fewer jobs. A wage rise extracted by 
industrial action for one group of workers does not mean a redundancy or a price 
rise for others. Collective bargaining has been a tide that raises all boats even if it 
supresses excessive profits. The gains from collective bargaining, in Freeman and 
Medoff’s conclusion, outweighed the losses especially through a more equal society 
with unions acting as redistributive agents in economic and political power terms. 
There are costs of collective organisation to workers by way of membership 
subscriptions and risks of employer victimisation (Child 1967) but these are offset 
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through mutual protection and additional benefits to membership. The likelihood of 
counter-actions such as anti-union measures and victimisation is reduced by offering 
added value to employers such as the benefits of collective voice (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984). These can include improved employee relations and reduced 
management effort on individual grievances. 
Hyman (1973, 1975, 1987, 2001, 2007) stressed the class basis for trade unionism 
and its purpose in representing the working class in its adversarial relationship with 
capitalist employers. Group consciousness is not necessarily an expression of class 
consciousness yet might point the way to broader solidarities. The nature of class 
can be seen in different ways, in sociological, political or economic terms. It can be 
defined in terms of perceived status within society: ‘blue-collar’ or ‘white-collar’ 
workers or based upon salary levels. Many unions, whether formed around craft or 
on industrial lines, seek to serve the supervised and the supervisors (Lepie 2018). 
Hyman (2001, 2005, 2007) stresses how the values and identities of unions are 
embedded through the rhetoric of ‘adversarialism’ – ‘them and us’. Yet for many 
craft unions their founding objectives stressed the building of good relations with 
employers in the same trade. Musson (1954: 30) stressed the moderate and 
conciliatory attitude towards employers of the early typographical societies. Hyman 
(1975: 44) found it rare for craft societies to undertake serious initiatives to change 
conditions other than the occasional ‘wage movement’. Phelps-Brown (1986) cites 
the Minority Report of the Royal Commission of 1869 in which the Master Printers of 
London declared there had been no rise in wages for compositors between 1810 and 
1866. He found that sectors with the strongest, richest and most extended unions 
had wages and hours of the greatest permanence and the fewest disputes.  
If mobilisation relies upon shared grievances (Kelly 1998) it suggests that such 
collective identity must be oppositional. Hyman’s (1975) Marxist analysis argues that 
workers assert control only at the expense of the employer. Whilst the principal 
purpose of the union is to pursue the collective interests of workers this does not 
preclude shared objectives with employers. While there is a tension between the 
buyer and seller of labour, there can also be mutual self-interest (Musson 1954). 
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Scholars have studied the added value of collective organisation to the employer and 
state (Taylor 1994, Pohler and Luchak 2015). A number of writers including Freeman 
and Medoff (1984) and Hodder and Edwards (2015) believe that unions contribute to 
productive efficiency and press managers to improve systems. While unions might 
stress the benefits and seek to lessen the ‘cost’ of organisation employers will prefer 
to develop these themselves and not have to deal with a trade union if they have the 
choice (McIlroy 1990). Those unions able to organise workers with positional power 
present employers with little choice other than to recognise their place within the 
labour process. Bryson, Gomez and Willman describe the “two-faces of unionism” 
(2010: 43), reiterating Freeman and Medoff (1984); the “rent-seeking behaviour” 
when unions seek to raise pay and conditions that proves a cost to the employer and 
the provision of employee’ ‘voice’ which offers a number of benefits to the 
organisation.  
Daniels and McIlroy (2009) list what they see as union purpose: political influence, 
trade union voice and the improvement of the terms, conditions and lives of 
members. This acknowledges a wider role for trade unions beyond the relationship 
with the employer such as influencing state policy. Those seeking revolutionary 
change may see unions as being embedded in the capitalist system. In contrast, 
employers may welcome the way unions can ‘discipline’ their members and 
neutralise or supress more radical or revolutionary movements (Dahrendorf 1959). 
Academics have sought to finds ways to measure union effectiveness (Boxall and 
Haynes 1997, Charlwood 2004, Gall and Fiorito 2016) and how different models of 
collective organisation influence outcomes. The most obvious measure is 
membership numbers and density.  Other indicators of ‘success’ are wage premium, 
membership participation, collective bargaining coverage, organising effectiveness, 
and political influence. Unions as institutions might be judged by organisational 
efficiencies and financial strength but this can produce perverse results. A number of 
unions have witnessed steep membership declines due to industrial restructuring yet 
remain financially strong and efficiently run. An example was the London Jewish 
Bakers’ Union that remained financially well-endowered until the last twelve 
members voted to disband and share the resources between them (Wayne 1977). A 
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more recent example is that of Community, formed through the merging of two 
declining unions representing steel and textile workers. The resulting union was 
wealthy but industrial change continued to reduce its membership4.  
Charlwood (2004) offered a framework to assess effectiveness using consolidatory, 
organising and recruitment effectiveness (CORE) outcomes. His quantitative research 
measured a range of unions. This placed significant weight on the union’s 
commitment to recruitment such as the recruitment budget, training in organising, 
recruitment planning etc. In such a model a union like the NGA would score very 
badly despite its near 100% membership density across a closed-shop industry. 
Boxall and Hayes (1997: 571) made the obvious point that unions are effective when 
they meet the expectations of their members which raises the question of how such 
expectations are formed and judged. McAlevey (2014: 12) stressed that the core of 
organising is to raise expectations because workers do not expect much from work. 
Having raised the bar, the union must clear it in order to succeed. This risks leaving 
members dissatisfied even when their conditions are objectively better than non-
union workplaces (Freeman and Medoff 1984, Bryson and Davies 2019). Members 
need to be convinced that the sacrifice they make, in the form of contributions, risk 
of victimisation, participation and industrial action, will secure positive results (Smith 
P. 2001). 
Unions developed around strong collective identity tend to have long-serving 
members and low membership turnover (eg professional health unions, BALPA 
representing airline pilots, ASLEF representing train drivers, etc). Even the members’ 
assessment of the union’s success may vary from year to year as the fortunes in 
wage bargaining ebb and flow or on how it handles their personal circumstances. A 
union that successfully mobilises delivery riders or retail workers might find their 
tenure in the employment, and with it, union membership, short-lived.  
Measuring union effectiveness may be elusive in a dynamic labour market especially 




remain a default metric and as such unions built around a strong sense of 
occupational identity do well.5 As the chapter has described, measuring a union’s 
success in delivering its objectives depends upon its purpose and the power it can 
deploy to achieve it. 
 
Collective identity and union formation 
Britain’s trade union tradition was founded upon the membership of groups of 
workers with the same or similar occupations (Webb 1896, 1920, Cole 1924, Aspinall 
1949). They had common interests based upon their trade, employment or 
occupational sector. It was the shared occupational identity that provided workers 
with the framework to establish continuous associations (Webbs 1920). This is more 
than a temporary combination to seek to resolve an issue but a long-lasting body of 
workers who come together to protect or advance their interests in relation to their 
employer and in relation to new entrants and other groups of workers. Braverman 
(1975: 51) refers to the idea of a human fraternity based around an occupation as a 
universal attribute of society and the divisions of labour that come with it. Unions 
give it form and organisational structure. Craft unions tended to base their 
occupational identity on producers of goods, especially through hand-based skills 
and knowledge developed through an apprenticeship. ‘Professional’ unions tended 
to represent those providing a service with recruitment from colleges and 
universities. They have different traditions yet much in common through the stress 
on collective identity. 
Hyman (2001) gave three identities to unions: Anglo-Saxon business unionism, or 
pragmatic unions adopting varying policies of confrontation or cooperation to suit 
the circumstances; schools of war unions that act as agencies of mobilisation against 
employers and the capitalist state; and corporatist unionism that sought to integrate 
workers into the system. Craft unionism originated from within the Anglo-Saxon or 
British model which led to a focus upon industrial strength and raised questions over 
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where decision-making lay within unions. Workplace power was in the hands of 
workplace groups and not entirely under the control of union leaders. 
Successful mobilisation rests on the ability of the union to offer and deploy a range 
of power resources. This raises questions about the structures within which the 
union operates and its capacity or agency to influence or regulate these (Lévesque 
and Murray 2010, Edwards 2003, Hyman 1975, 2001, 2005, 2007), and whether 
collective organisation follows strategic choice by the union, opportunity or 
spontaneous reaction to events (Gall 2018). Traditional craft societies formed 
vertical associations to represent the narrow interests of the occupational group but 
as technology advanced many rationalised their structures into more conglomerate 
unions. 
Combination is a means to advance or protect workers’ interests and once 
established, a union can develop to serve wider purposes. Hyman (1994) described 
how unions help shape how workers see themselves and define their interests. This 
is particularly relevant in craft and professional unions where collective identity 
helps build pride and status in the job. Employers are the primary organisers of 
labour with unions as ‘secondary organisers’ for Offe and Wiesenthal 1980: 176) 
who describe unions as “associations of members who, before they can become 
members of unions, are already members of other organisations, namely employees 
of capitalist enterprises.” Müller-Jentsch (1988: 178) describes unions as 
‘intermediary’ organisations, mediating between capital and labour. They may 
mobilise workers within the contours established by employers but the process of 
association has a determination on the relationship and the outcomes for workers 
(Smith P. 2001, 2012, 2014). An issue is whether the mode of collective association 
determines the ‘quality’ and nature of the power resources accrued. An independent 
association of workers offering sustainable membership benefits beyond the 
immediate workplace provides organisational capabilities not dependent upon any 
one employer. In turn such a model builds membership density for when industrial 
power may be sought. 
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The early craft unions in Britain were joined by the development of industrial, 
professional and general unions. The highest rates of unionisation in a hospital, for 
example, are amongst the professional groups and specialist workers6. This may 
protect their interests in relation to other groups of workers as much as the overall 
employer. Scholars such as Braverman (1975) developing theories around labour 
process have highlighted how employees use skills and knowledge to undermine 
managerial power (Bradley 1999). This is strengthened when collectivised in an 
association built around the common bond of the craft, skill or profession. 
But does a collection of well-organised, if specialist unions, provide more power in 
relation to the employer, than one ‘industrial’ union representing all staff but with a 
lower density of membership? The answer depends upon the issue at the time and 
both models have their strengths and weaknesses. Literature focussed on US 
industrial relations is written through a context of contract bargaining that demands 
the union pursues a whole workplace approach to win a regulated ballot (McAlevey 




The case studies examine the changing fortunes of one union as the nature of its 
power was challenged by technological, legal and political change. If workers 
combine together to enhance their power, especially in relation to employers, their 
primary role is therefore to empower workers through collective action and by 
increasing their resources, capabilities and capacity to act (Lévesque and Murray, 
2010). Hodder and Edwards (2015: 848) define power as the ability to achieve 
objectives and “the establishment of a framework in which unions’ agenda can be 
pursued and the capacity to influence perceptions so as to create a climate 
favourable to unions and their roles”. 
	
6 Statistics from TUC, Government Trade Union Membership and Workplace Employee Relations 
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The nature of union power is described by Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010) 
and (2018) as structural, associational, organisational and institutional. The 
structural power - or positional power of the union as it will be termed in this thesis - 
is the relationship workers have within the production process and their capacity to 
regulate the supply of labour (Lévesque and Murray 2010). This power is based 
ultimately on the union’s ability to ‘stop-the-job’ through the denial of work or to 
restrict skilled labour supply. Restricting skills essential to production, or difficult for 
the employer to replace, gives craft unions the pivotal leverage over employers to 
protect or advance their members’ interests. Through ‘placement control’ 
competition for jobs is limited, forcing employers to comply with wage rates 
(Knotted 2008: 168). Whether these gains are at the expense of other groups of 
workers depends upon the nature of cross-union relations as well as wider industrial 
relations systems. Unions have often been presented as vested interest 
organisations within an ‘insider-outsider’ theory where they protect members at the 
expense of other workers and the unemployed (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). The 
‘outsiders’ could be those within the workplace but outside of the scope of the craft 
union, especially those denied entry into the craft. 
A key factor in the nature of structural (or positional) power is the technology and 
industrial process that positions the workers in a degree of control through which 
they can bargain. Structural power can be applied and amplified through 
‘organisational power’ built-up by the union over decades (Dörre, Holst and 
Nachtwey 2009). This is the range of factors including the common bond amongst 
members, the ability to call for solidarity actions, the gains from internal democracy 
and activism, resources and leadership that give shape to the structure and agency 
of the union. Craft unions with the leverage of these resources tended not to 
prioritise institutional power that might be derived from legislation and the courts or 





Positional power, sectionalism and solidarity 
The ‘positional power’ workers possess derives largely from the technology used and 
skills required within the production process. To command it, a union must recruit a 
sufficient membership and organise them into an effective and disciplined 
combination. There is a symbiotic relationship: the stronger the collective identity 
the more effective the organisation is likely to be and the stronger the organisation 
the more benefits the members can derive from it. 
The pioneering vision of one union for all workers failed to provide a sustainable 
model of organisation and associations of workers have all developed around some 
form of segmentation. The idea of one great union briefly flourished in 1834, 
championed by Robert Owen (TUC 1934) but the project soon foundered and there 
was a view (Howell 1890) that sustainable unions were only possible when based 
upon a craft. Yet the number of unions has fallen dramatically and the last thirty 
years has seen the development of large conglomerate unions, (Cole 1924) 
especially Unite that embraces a wide range of occupational sectors.7 
Unions open to all workers in a company or industry regardless of craft or skills 
emerged in the late nineteenth century under the banner of ‘new unionism’ but 
craft unions continued to play a prominent part in most sectors of the British 
economy (Cole 1924, TUC 1968). Power through weight of numbers was the leverage 
deployed against employers rather than the positional power of groups of skilled 
workers.  Visser (2012: 131) describes unions formed around skilled workers and 
their focus on mutual insurance, control over training and access to the job. He 
concluded that “the replacement of such workers by semi- or unskilled labour was 
the major existential threat to these unions”. In contrast unions based around an 
industry seek to unite different groups of workers within the same company, sector 
or location. Kelly (1988) questioned the way the debate was sometimes framed. He 
referred to “sectional consciousness” as opposed to collective identity and made the 
point that any action short of a complete general strike could be considered 
‘sectional’ (1988: 137). If sectionalism was a product of a large number of small 
	
7 In 1900 there were 1,302 trade unions (Cole 1924) 
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unions, he argued that fewer unions would result in less sectionalist disputes and 
greater political consciousness – but he concluded there was no evidence to confirm 
this (p: 132). His focus on mobilising workers with a shared grievance seeks to 
supplant the collective identity of the occupation. This means of organising has 
become a central theme within many unions but it lacks longevity in the face of 
hostile employers. 
Smale (2017) describes the characteristics of organisational identity and the 
attributes required to distinguish one group from another. In this he studies the 
different conceptions of identity including those that are actual and concretely 
manifested in contrast to those that may be perceived. Unions will help shape their 
ideal collective identity to reinforce the common bond and determine membership 
territories. While this process can help bind the membership and boost its status, it 
can prove divisive within the wider workforce. 
Smale (2017) studied the concept of ‘niche’ identity and trade unions. He looked at 
how such unions define themselves and used differentiation and sectional 
distinction around which to build group associations. He found organisational 
identity can be managed to some extent. Unions do not just represent workers’ 
interests but help shape them. It is in their collective interests to maximise the status 
and worth of the skills and knowledge they possess.  
Unity within a confined group, however, may prove divisive within the wider 
workforce or sector (Lane 1974). Pay bargaining framed in terms of differentials can 
be corrosive of solidarity yet the wider community or workers can make gains 
through the leadership of those groups with the most positional power (Hyman 
1975). McBride (2010) concluded that collective identity can divide as well as unite 
but can co-exist within a wider association of allied groups. In her history of 
blacksmiths, Tuckett gives examples of the demarcated structure of ship building 
trade unionism. On occasions the gains made by one section were used to the 
advantage of another and there was “harmony yet exclusions” (1974: 75).  
Despite the exclusive nature of many of their demands, craft unions often led the 
way for wider employment gains for other workers both within national collective 
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agreements and at workplace level. Pay scales often had compositors and printers as 
a top band and increases for them were reflected in lower grades. The metal 
packaging industry was an example where the printers formed a tiny part of the 
overall workforce but were the top grades in the national and company agreements 
(such as Metal Box) and set the pace in any pay negotiations (Gennard 1990: 565). 
Additional holidays or reduced hours won by the leading union tended to be enjoyed 
by all. But this ‘knock-on’ effect was not universal. In newspapers the largely female 
sections such as advertising and administrative departments, received far inferior 
terms and conditions to the printing sectors and only when technology allowed such 
workers to undertake the craft tasks did the unions pay much attention to their 
standards (Dawson 2010). Zeitlin (1979) in his comparison of positional power 
between engineers and printers, concluded that craft unions in print were in a more 
powerful position because of the nature of their industry, its product markets and 
because it employed few labourers who could be set against the skilled workers by 
the employers. This feature was especially true in commercial printing in which most 
of the entire production process was undertaken by craft workers. The divergent 
fates of craft unions in print and engineering flowed, according to Zeitlin, from their 
relative abilities to control the impact on the division of labour in using new 
technology. 
There were times, however, when divisions prevented the unions from maintaining a 
common front against an employer offensive. Tony Lane argued in The Union makes 
us Strong (1974: 278) that: “Sectionalism literally wrecked the several ambitious 
attempts at all-embracing union in the 1830s and . . . defeated the Triple Alliance in 
the 1920s”. But the strength of the alliance was more rhetoric than real (Marsh 
1992). Tuckett argued that skilled workers could not afford “craft exclusiveness” and 
the union needed “fresh thinking to get rid of a sectoral outlook” (1974: 249). This 
led to the formation of the Confederation of Shipbuilding Unions and ultimately 
amalgamations. The retiring General Secretary, Willie Michael acknowledged: “it is 
often too painfully obvious that the sectional divisions do on occasions hamper its 
ability to act with power and speed” (cited in Tuckett, 1974: 365). At the same time, 
however, the Confederation had to assure members that their interests would be 
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defended in the merged union. There were many times when the various craft 
groups united successfully and provided strong mutual support. Darlington found a 
similar picture in his study of three Merseyside companies. He concluded: “sectional 
interests and collective attitudes are not necessarily incompatible” (1994: 23). Clegg, 
Fox and Thompson (1964: 128) described inter-union conflict especially in ship-
building and found that in comparison the conflicts of the printing unions were mild. 
Sectional bargaining can be viewed as divisive if the notion of a fixed ‘wages fund’ is 
accepted. This implies that one group of workers can only gain at the expense of 
others. This places groups of workers as rivals and even antagonists. Sectoral 
struggles over pay can be corrosive to wider solidarity particularly if framed in terms 
of differentials but where a common claim can be pursued the effect may be 
unifying (Hyman 175: 179). Increases secured by groups with bargaining power can 
help secure overall rises, especially if applied across a whole sector, even if this is not 
the tacit objective of the original campaign. Darlington (1994: 168) wrote about 
individual chapels within Bemrose printers representing different groups of workers 
and the relationship between them and the employer. Some felt able to threaten 
production without asking other chapels within the plant. Such was the demarcated 
skill structure and discipline that no workers would cover for strikers. Indeed, it hurt 
the employer more to maintain wages for those not involved. However, he felt this 
demobilised the “self-activity of workers” and reinforced inter-departmental 
sectionalism (Darlington 1994: 168)”. He argued that such a strategy threw away 
opportunities to forge shop-floor links and build a united approach to management 
across the plant. Sectional bargaining reached its extreme in national newspapers 
and defied many attempts at reform. In the 1970s Mirror Group Newspapers sought 
to establish a single composing room chapel in place of the twenty-four that they 
had to bargain with (Martin R. 1981: 206).  
Lane (1974) believed sectionalism could only be held in check if the union 
programme is sufficiently broad and radical and set a context in which other issues 
become divisive, petty and trivial. But Hyman feared sectionalism and resistance to 
such a radical programme is incorporated into the organisational structure of unions. 
His conclusion was that sectionalism and limited class consciousness could be 
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overcome if workers’ control becomes explicitly central to the union demands rather 
than the process of regulation (Hyman 1975: 183).  
McAlevey (2016: 205) believes that “Craft unions wreak havoc on class solidarity”. 
She stressed that workers in the US health and education sectors: “need to maximise 
their power inside and outside the workplace simultaneously, through one unified, 
united strategy.” In the context of a US-style contract negotiations, the workforce 
needs a united approach, especially at that moment in time, and having separate 
unions is unlikely to help even if they are fighting for the same cause.  
Writing in 1978, Hobsbawm warned that the forward march of labour had halted. He 
highlighted the growth of sectionalism with groups of workers pursing their own 
economic interests irrespective of the rest and that the strength of a group lies in 
the inconvenience they cause to the public rather than the loss to the employer. His 
Marxist analysis coincided with that from the Conservative right which exploited the 
divisions within the working class to undermine the strongest unions. In many 
sectors of the economy technological and structural change diminished occupational 
identity as a mobilising source and power resource (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 
McBride and Martinez 2011). Howell (2015), Martin and Ross (1999) concluded that 
industrial and technological change alters work boundaries and trades and with it 
the basis for collective organisation by unions.  
Of the 48 unions affiliated to the TUC in 2021, 32 are clearly organised around a 
particular occupational identity, five organise members in a single business.8 Yet the 
literature on trade union renewal barely mentions this mobilisation and 
organisational approach. Many unions, representing members threatened by 
technological change, have sought refuge through amalgamations with leaders often 
promising to retain the collective identity in the merged association (Gennard 1990, 
Waddington 2005). Hyman (1975) believed amalgamation movements and industrial 
unionism may be seen as progress towards broader unity but was this at the 
expense of a dilution of collective identity and membership density (Müller-Jentsch 
1988, Dörre 2011)? There has been little debate over mechanisms to maintain strong 
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occupational identity within larger, multi-sector unions and whether this is desirable 
or not. This result has been an inconsistent approach to sectional representation 
with limited resources and branding behind it.9 
Unions grounded in an occupational identity may have greater capacity to 
manoeuvre regardless of management decisions partly due to the transferable 
nature of the work or craft. Membership not only sustains beyond the period of 
work for a particular employer but such unions tend to offer support when changing 
employment and training. The cradle-to-grave membership reinforces and nurtures 
the common bonds and develops a character or ‘quality’ of members that accept the 
requirement to practice solidarity and discipline (Smith P. 2001). But strong 
occupational identity, built on embedded customs and norms, may bring resistance 
to change and barriers to strategic choice in the face of technological or industrial 
change. The case studies examine this dilemma in greater depth. 
Union strength may rely on its positional power but continuity and organisational 
resilience was developed and harnessed by measures that strengthened the 
common bond between members and what (Jarley 2005) describes as the ‘social 
capital’. This idea based on the formal and informal networks and benefits of 
collective association will be explored further in this chapter. 
 
Leadership and democracy as power resources 
Organisational power inlcudes leadership competency and capacity but trade unions 
are collective bodies of workers with complex internal systems of democracy and 
accountability. The nature of a union’s leadership and democracy is shaped, to a 
significant extent, by the model upon which the membership is mobilisied and 
organised. Unions based on occupational identity will tend to have a more stable 
membership with higher levels of participation, typified by the example of the NGA. 






needed to be an effective administrator are not the same as those of an organiser 
and agitator. Leaders are bureaucratic functionaries with day-to-day management 
responsibilities such as deployment of staff resources, financial prudence, and 
administration of the union but the qualities needed to rise through the democratic 
structures of the union may not be those needed to run the operation. Effective 
administrators may not make good leaders (Allen 1954: 197). Leadership is therefore 
judged not just by its ability to successfully manage the operation but through 
contested views of ideology. 
Unions are democratic in that they exist to pursue the collective interests of their 
members (Hodder and Edwards 2015) but there is variation in the form and nature 
of internal democracy and how it holds executive officers to account. Michels (1915: 
338) described how workers need to form a “structural aggregate” to achieve their 
purpose but organisation brings other dangers in its train. "From a means, 
organisation becomes an end", he argued and leaders retain their hold on power 
through a number of forces such as their ability to gain advantages within the role 
such as exposure to members, skills in the art of politics and time to devote to their 
cause in contrast to what Michels called the “incompetence of the masses (p.111)”. 
He took a determinist, rather cynical, approach to leadership and democracy inside 
unions. Leaders, he believed, keep in touch with the rank-and-file so they know how 
to turn the crowd, that they gain the “gratitude of the masses” (p.90) and draw 
power from their “indispensibility”. Michels’ analysis seems based upon large unions 
and socialist parties claiming that the bonds connecting the bulk of members to their 
organisations are extremely slender (p.106). This does not do justice to smaller 
societies although they too had a record of long-term general secretaries.  
Leaders need to be sure their decisions carry the support of the membership and 
that the systems of democracy provide a foundation upon which to mobilise. Kerr 
(1957) said that a union expects to be “an army, a business and a town meeting 
(p.9)", but he believed, never achieves the later. He questioned the democratic 
nature of unions believing that a fighting organisation requires strong leaders, 
commanding discipline and loyalty, features that can contradict democracy. "Unions 
function best if they are removed from the pressures of democratic life (Kerr 1957: 
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11)”. Allen, (1954: 15) argued it was the role of unions to “protect and improve the 
general standards of members, not to provide workers with an exercise in self-
government”. The Teamsters in America was notoriously corrupt, led in a dictatorial 
fashion by Jimmy Hoffa, yet under his charge it became the fastest growing union in 
the US. 
Some unions claim a strong lay member control through elected structures but 
strategic decision-making remains firmly in the hands of the general secretary and 
the professional bureaucracy of the union. Michels cites examples of unions that 
have undergone profound changes in political orientation, not because of the 
democratic wishes of the membership but due to a change in leadership, for 
example after the death of secretaries. The case studies introduced more fully later 
in this thesis are from a time of leadership change within the union when the 
moderate general secretary was in the process of being replaced by a rising official 
on a more left-wing platform. Michels is right that leaders seek to appoint their 
successors (p.111) but the history of unions prove they do not always succeed. Not 
much has changed since Allen’s 1954 survey into the election or appointment of 
general secretaries. Most of those elected were previously assistant general 
secretaries and the contest is often between members of a small elite within the 
union. The National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA) had 
seventeen occasions between 1918 and 1974 in which the General Secretaries were 
re-elected unopposed (Martin R. 1981). Examples of leaders breaking through the 
institutionalised systems within unions are rare.  
Michels and Kerr both describe unions as one-party states, giving little weight to the 
unofficial factions that operate and leadership rivals who jostle for power. Lipset’s 
study into the International Typographical Union in the US (1968) describes the 
development of its unique two-party system which he described as the exception to 
Michel’s theory. Powerful internal lobby groups may restrict a leader’s room to 
manoeuvre and the case studies shall examine this tension. Democratic control over 
strategic choice can only exist if alternatives are available to be considered by those 
elected to oversee the union. Without alternative options, decision-making becomes 
affirmation of executive decisions – the illusion of being masters of their masters 
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(Michels 1962). Leaders are unlikely to offer choices to their executives. Allen (1954: 
202) cites George Isaacs, the General Secretary of the printing union, (NATSOPA) 
who rejected the notion that it was his function “to simply show members which of 
two or three roads they may choose”. Alternatives, therefore, rely on strong 
individuals or lobby groups and factions based upon sectoral or political lines. Union 
rules or leaders may constrain or even forbid such groupings to limit factional 
competition for policy formulation (Edelstein and Warner 1977). Such factions 
primarily exist to promote, or oppose, particular candidates at elections. Edelstein 
and Warner (1977) questioned whether the membership actively chose a policy or 
merely assent to it. Their critical test was the degree of legitimate and free 
opposition. They studied the role of organised factions in producing effective 
opposition and the space allowed within unions for debates around alternative 
options.  
While some leaders may wish to limit the authority of internal democracy, activist 
engagement can prove a power resource. Lévesque and Murray (2010) describe two 
dimensions within unions: collective identities and what they call “deliberative 
vitality”. The shared experience, real or imagined, is strengthened by the extent of 
membership participation within structures designed to capture the power of their 
engagement. Members need to believe that they are the union, with a sense of 
ownership and democratic control. There are challenges posed by competing 
identities and leaders and managers may favour – or be perceived to favour – some 
collective interests at the expense of others.  
British craft unions can claim a legacy of high membership participation and 
contested elections. For example Allen in 1954 found voting turnout averaged 70% 
amongst London Society of Compositors. A substantial proportion of members 
played some role in the operation of the union at workplace, branch or national level 
(Brushmakers 1847, Cannon 2011). My own former NGA Branch was typical; the 
Three Shires Graphical Society had an active Branch Committee of around fifteen 
members elected each year chaired by a President elected by secret ballot of the 
whole membership, quarterly members’ meetings were well-attended and these 
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were supplemented by meetings of chapel reps in each town10. There are records of 
lively debates over internal structures and finances (examples in Musson 1954: 354, 
465). The case studies will explore the extent to which internal democracy 
determines or limits strategic choice. 
If democracy is a power resource then the size and focus of the union must matter. 
Michels (1962) believed large-scale organisations give officers a near monopoly of 
power but Allen (1954) felt they have the advantage of being able to employ 
specialists to manage administration. He acknowledged that small unions enabled all 
members to “deliberate in assembly (p.18)”. Union leaders of narrow occupational 
unions require a thorough understanding of the sector covered. Many will have risen 
through the union’s internal structures and have worked in the trade. Union rules 
may require candidates for office at various levels to have a certain amount of 
membership of years of service as an officer (Allen 1954). The process to become an 
official reinforces the traditional beliefs and customs of the union but this stifles 
innovation and ‘fresh blood’. Younger officials can more easily break with the past 
and switch ideas (Allen 1954: 196). 
Davis (1941) stressed the importance of leadership in the outcome of a strike, 
growth or decline of a union and even the success or failure of the whole union 
movement. A strike for union leaders is what war is for professional soldiers believes 
Michels (1962: 283). Many a leader has been propelled to the top as a result of their 
actions during a strike but they can become accommodating to the existing order, 
and ultimately, weary of the struggle – “hot heads become cool (Michels 1962: 
284)". Kelly referred to “hot and cold” leadership to mark decisions made through 
the heat of emotions.11 
Leaders elected on a militant platform have sometimes been propelled into disputes 
which, especially in hindsight, were unwinnable. A notorious example is that of the 
air traffic controllers who, in 1981 elected a militant president committed to 
securing significant advances for members. After isolating itself from other unions, 
	
10 Three Shires Graphical Society records are held in Gloucestershire Country Archives 
11 Online seminar by the Elle Baker School of Organising 13.1.21 
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the controllers pursued strike action that led to the union’s destruction, 
imprisonment of its leaders and the loss of careers for its members (McCartin 2011). 
How collective action can become carried along under its own momentum is a 
feature that the case studies will examine further.  
Many, including the Webbs, writing in 1894, believed that full-time, professional 
union officials adopt a more conservative position than that of the membership 
(Child 1967). There is an assumption that the nature of the job places them in close 
proximity with employers and therefore liable to sympathise with their point of view 
(Dorey 2009, Michels 1962). They learn how the ‘other half’ lives and that they are 
decent people (Allen 1954). The professional nature of the job removes union 
leaders from the shop-floor and as such they risk ‘losing touch’ with the 
membership. The salary provided and working conditions may offer a standard of 
living, new social networks and a lifestyle that further removes leaders from the day-
to-day experiences of members (Allen 1954). 
Some writers such as Gall (2009) argue that many union leaders are effectively 
‘bought’ by the capitalist class to subdue class conflict (see also Lane 1974). The 
pressure on leaders applied by a radicalised rank-and-file is highlighted by writers 
such as Darlington (1994) and Hyman (1972, 2007). Hyman (1975) asserts there is an 
interdependence between shop-floor reps and full-time officers. Officers depend 
upon reps for recruitment, membership servicing, dealing with routine problems, 
information and organising votes in elections. He acknowledged a permanent 
tension between the institutional distinctiveness of the union and its democratic 
rationale (1975: 150).  
This tension between rank-and-file and its leadership is a feature of the literature on 
trade unions and reflects political divisions between commentators. In his analysis, 
Darlington (2012) believes that shop-floor agitation and mobilisation against the 
accommodative stance of bureaucratic union leaders is required to advance worker 
interests. Other writers (Blissett 2013, Kelly 1998, Streeck and Visler 1998) argue 
union officers and members have a mutual inter-dependence. The nature of the job 
exposes union officers to workplace grievances and the politics of industrial relations 
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management. Good officers nurture and support strong rank-and-file organisation. 
They must navigate union as well as management structures and systems, tackle 
internal conflicts and maintain organisational strength. Considerable effort and 
resources may have to be deployed to win rank-and-file support for a strategic 
campaign decided from the top (Michels 1962: 90). From my own personal 
experience, as lay activist and paid official, most time is devoted to seeking to agitate 
amongst and mobilise the membership to support a particular action. That doesn’t 
preclude situations where the professional officer and outsider perceives the truth 
of management’s position in a way the workforce may not due to poor historical 
relations or a breakdown in trust. This is different from the argument that officials 
tend to betray their members’ class interests and can only be held to account 
through rank-and-file pressure. 
Far from selling-out their membership, the political right caricatures trade union 
leaders as militant firebrands, unrepresentative of the more moderate members 
(Tomison 1972, Milligan 1976). Since the formation of the earliest unions their 
opponents have made assertions of an agitator basis for union mobilisation (TUC 
1934, Tomison 1972). It assumes that a few key radical individuals inspire or agitate 
groups of workers from their otherwise stable and disorganised state. This 
ingredient in the mobilisation process is often characterized as an ‘external’ force 
from the body of workers and one with wider interests based upon radical politics or 
the union as an institution. Militant agitators, motivated by left-wing politics, stirring 
an otherwise satisfied workforce is a common narrative used by employers and the 
political right to justify counter measures against union leaders (Tomison 1972, 
Selsdon Group 1998, Darlington 2012). Hyman (1975) thought it wrong to see union 
reps as trouble-makers but that trouble often comes to them. Much of the 
contemporary literature studies the role and nature of ‘organisers’ in leading the 
collective association of workers (Simms 2019, McAlevey 2014, Heery and Simms 
2010, Kelly 1998). Much of the literature discusses the methodology of organising, 
the tactics and training rather than the ideology of the organisers. Union leaders can 
help determine the direction of the union based upon their own ideology and can 
formulate interest amongst members to mobilise their support for a particular 
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priority (Heery 1998, Kelly 1998). The mobilisation theory lays stress on the need for 
organisation and external agitation around a grievance (Kelly 1998). This demands 
strategic decisions by union leaders to allocate resources and set priorities for such 
work but (Atzeni 2009) argues this plays down spontaneous collective action. Kelly 
rebuts this with his belief that all collective action requires a degree of organisation 
and leadership. 
Accountable to the democratic processes, leaders must maintain support amongst 
existing members, especially activists, rather than potential recruits. Such members 
may not share the priority objective of membership recruitment as their measure of 
success. Leaders are forced to nurture and placate internal power bases even when 
this becomes counter to the strategic priorities of the union. This research explores 
what this means for a craft union at the point the workforce faced replacement by 
non-union recruits due to technological change. It highlights the contested views 
around leadership and its relationship to democracy and rank-and-file pressure. 
Blissett (2013) highlighted micro-political factors in union decision-making and 
argued this aspect had often been overlooked by scholars. He cited personal 
loyalties, friendships and enmities within union leaderships in influencing strategic 
choices. This feature will be further explored within the case studies. 
This section has explore the nature of leadership within the framework of systems of 
internal democracy and the arguments over the tensions between union leaders and 
rank-and-file members. These features are at the centre of the NGA case studies for 
this research. 
 
Leadership ideology and union values 
Ideology represents a view of the world or a frame of reference (Hyman 1972). It 
shapes the relationship between unions, employers and the state and may derive 
from external sources such as political parties or faith. As such the ideology of a 
union can change with different leaders (Hodder and Edwards 2015: 846) and may 
derive from external sources such as political or faith groups. As such they concluded 
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it plays a secondary role to that of collective identity that offers relatively stable 
characteristics. 
Leadership ideology matters when making strategic choices but presents a paradox 
for those who believe in ‘rank-and-filism’. Darlington (2012) highlights the role of 
agency and leadership in the mobilisation of collective discontent, presenting the 
left-wing leadership of the RMT and its workplace focus as an example. He 
challenges the ‘agitator theory’ of strikes believing that holding left-wing militants 
responsible for industrial action ignores the importance of rank-and-file organisation 
(and see also Smith, D. 2020). It is the interplay with union agency that determines 
strike propensity according to Darlington and he highlights the importance of the 
role of leadership in the mobilisation of collective discontent. He argues that union 
leadership is as important as any structural or institutional complexity in shaping the 
nature of collective action (Darlington 2012: 520). But leadership – its strength or 
weakness – alone cannot explain levels of industrial action or other indicators of 
trade union success. This study will examine case studies where action was 
determined from the leadership and from activist pressure. 
Lévesque and Murray (2010) stress the importance of ‘framing’ as part of any 
strategy to form and shape actions. This includes narratives to mobilise support and 
justify new practices. But they warn that change can be problematic given the 
strength of past behaviours especially choices that have solved problems previously 
and the recollection of previous victories. The NGA had developed a repertoire of 
industrial practices and this research examines how adherence to them was central 
to the disputes featured in the case studies. Successful framing assumes an ability to 
change the script and “replenish the stock of narrative resources” (Lévesque and 
Murray 2010). These are the range of values, shared understandings, stories and 
ideologies that inform the way the union thinks and acts.  
Union strength and militancy does not necessarily correlate to a place on a left-right 
political spectrum. Powerful craft unions have been seen as more ‘right-wing’ than 
the general industrial unions (Milligan 1976). Yet ideological shifts inside unions 
reflect when and how unions use the positional power the possess. It will also 
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influence how the union positions itself within the wider trade union movement and 
society at large.  
 
Leadership and Strategic choice 
The common bonds, required by unions around which to mobilise, are dependent 
upon the nature of the labour market to provide employment. They are bound, as 
Hyman (1975: 102) describes, by the contours imposed on them by the capitalist 
system.  
Yet union leaders have a range of options open to them but the model of 
mobilisation and organisation of the union influences the capacity for such 
determinations. Hyman (2007) uses a military reference arguing that strategy 
denotes the planning of a whole campaign rather than tactics deployed in a single 
battle. Strategy involves actions towards the achievement of set objectives to take 
advantage of new circumstances or to avoid negative impact.  
A central theme in the union renewal literature is the strategic choice between 
cooperation or conflict with employers. Having positional and organisational power 
does not, in itself, lead to militant action, especially if determined from the top of 
the union. Lack of action may be due to recognition on both sides of the balance of 
power or it may be a leadership comfortable in its close relationship with employers 
(Hyman 1972). Few leaders would acknowledge this, however. The ‘moderate’ 
general secretary of the NGA in the 1970s recognised the power of the union at 
chapel level in Fleet Street: “We are obviously in a strong bargaining position. What 
does one do about it? One bargains strongly (Ferris 1972: 19)”.  
Contemporary literature on union strategic choice has often concentrated upon the 
large conglomerate unions that have faced the steepest decline in the last thirty 
years (Undy 2018, Murray 2017, Ibsen and Tapia 2010, Lévesque 2010, Heery 2003, 
Dörre, Holst 2009 et al). As such there is a gap in the literature around strategy for 
occupational or professional unions that have remained largely stable (see graphs in 
Chapter one). Frege and Kelly (2003, 2004) conceptualised six strategic options for 
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unions to achieve renewal from decline since the 1980s: organising, restructuring, 
social partnership/collective bargaining, political action, coalition building and 
international solidarity. Their analysis of the variety of union responses listed the 
menu of choices union leaders may consider. Yet in comparing union fortunes across 
a number of countries, Frege and Kelly confirmed the significance of national 
environments and institutions, as varieties of capitalism, indicating path 
determination for unions as among the conditions limiting strategic options. My 
‘palette’ of organising options is in Appendix Seven. 
The tension between ‘adversarialism’ and co-operation between unions and 
employers waxes and wanes over time and with the balance of power and changing 
external conditions (Silver 2003). It is possible to adopt a variety of orientations on a 
spectrum of conflict in some contexts and cooperation in others (Daniel 1987). 
Strategic choice on this dimension is therefore contingent on context. Leadership 
has to judge the union’s capacity for self-determination given the circumstances at 
the time. Smale (2018: 34) found moderation and militancy might be considered as 
components of union identities but labelling unions as either moderate or militant is 
too simplistic.  
Any option to determine a union’s stance towards conflict or cooperation has to take 
into account the attitude of the employer. A union may choose cooperation but it is 
only achievable if the employer concurs. Unions may see a cooperative relationship 
with an employer as the objective, achieved only through a period of conflict. But 
can such a forced partnership ever be sustainable? Pohler and Luchak (2015) found it 
was crucial for management to gain the confidence of the union by signalling its 
willingness to cooperate. Unless members see clear gains from cooperation the 
union risks the charge of co-option to management’s position.  
Union capacity to act strategically depends principally upon the economic and 
industrial relations environment in which they operate (Adăscăliței and Guga 2017, 
Hyman 1987a, 2007, Frege 2004). Strategic choices open to union leaders may be 
limited in contrast to those available to employers but this does not rule out 
discretion and independent action. In his study into the growth of white-collar 
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unionism, Bain (1970) concluded that growth was largely outside the hands of the 
unions themselves. He suggested that the explanation for union growth (or decline), 
therefore, must lie with the employer. There are factors, however, within the remit 
of union leaders, that determine growth outcomes and a range of literature 
highlights options for renewal that require strategic direction from union leaders 
(Lévesque 2010, Dörre, Holst and Nachtwey 2009, Fairbrother 2015, Saundry, Stuart 
and Antcliff 2012, Frege 2003 and 2004, Hyman 2007, Boxall and Haynes 1997, Kelly 
1998 and others). Yet much of this debate around union renewal has emphasised 
organising and the role of conscious action to unionise enterprises rather than 
compositional and structural factors (Gall 2018). 
Union agency assumes a degree of self-determination, a leadership with the 
resources to call upon and a membership demanding, or that can be mobilised for, 
action. Union organisers must explain the ways in which workers can define their 
interests and identities in collective terms even if this is based upon ‘us and them’ 
with other groups of workers (McBride 2010, Holgate, Simms and Tapia 2018). 
Martin and Ross (1999) described unions as organised actors who must constantly 
make strategic choices about their identities, goals, allies and opponents. They 
believe these choices are, to a considerable degree, constrained by their pasts. 
Hyman (1975) argued unions only move in directions that will not threaten shared 
ideas, values and habits. His conclusion is that unions are conservative institutions 
containing many veto points that block radical change. He feels they must overcome 
their conservative bias but that strategic innovation may require a process of 
‘creative destruction’. Hyman implies the need to overthrow past practices and 
systems in the search for new membership. This study, through analysis of the NGA’s 
1983 dispute, explores how far occupational identity becomes a boundary to limit 
scope for initiative and fresh ideas. This raises questions about the nature and 
authority of union democracy and leadership accountability. 
The framework by Hodder and Edwards (2015: 843) recognises the role of external 
factors and builds in a feedback mechanism for unions to set outcomes and build on 
successes or failures. They describe the relationship between purpose and strategies 
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as a two-way process, changing as a result of internal relations as well as external 
agency with employers and the state. Their framework concentrates upon ideology 
and purpose that helps shape the character of the union rather than the 
collectivisation of groups of workers needed to establish and maintain it. They 
accept that a union’s organising efforts are shaped by deeper identity, whether 
class-based or a focus on market relations, and their framework should contribute 
toward further research in this regard.  
People in unions develop a ‘taste’ for certain tactics and these can become 
entrenched in the choice of actions to pursue (Polletta and Jasper 2001). The NGA 
case study provides a good example of its traditional use of ‘blacking’ instructions to 
prevent work bypassing a dispute. Members may define their collective identity 
around their occupation or craft but activists may add to this through their shared 
experience of the customs and practices of the organisation. These may be 
reinforced when confronted by an existential threat or shared sense of injustice. 
 
Institutional and associational power 
Unions that can lever power through the position members hold within the 
production process will rely on this before resorting to other means such as legal 
remedies or wider publicity campaigns. This hierarchy of union power resources 
leads unions to shift their focus according to the changing nature of the environment 
in which they operate. Unions without positional power must seek other forms of 
leverage including institutional and associational power (Holgate 2014). In the face 
of hostile employers and diminishing collective bargaining, some unions have sought 
to mobilise outside the workplace including building alliances with external 
campaign groups. This approach, espoused by (Heery and Simms 2008, Holgate, 
Simms and Tapia 2018), features neighbourhood advice centres, welfare aid, 
immigration and language support, learning provision and campaigns on issues such 
as the living wage, safety and the local environment. The common cause is the 
locality rather than the occupation and the approach develops associational power 
and political influence. This is not the bond between individual members but the 
power of coalitions. It relies on ‘weak ties’ resting on shared values and empathy 
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rather than a collective identity at the workplace (Heery 2018). It does, however, 
share the organising approach where collective action is often mobilised around 
grievances caused by the behaviour of local employers. 
This approach offers assistance to those workers facing difficulties to which union 
membership has long struggled to address. These have grown in the so-called gig 
economy and include migrant workers and those on insecure and transient 
contracts. The model relies on financial support from charitable institutions, 
volunteers and low or no subscriptions (Fine 2006). This ‘social movement’ approach 
raises questions around the degree to which it adds weight to the power of unions 
or supplants them. Heery (2018) considered arguments that new movements might 
be more effective in mobilising citizens than unions are, especially if supporters 
believe unions lack legitimacy with under-represented groups or serve only a narrow 
interest of workers. Social movement theory places the emphasis on linkages with 
campaign groups and pressure groups through political processes, public protest and 
alliance-building (Simms, Holgate and Heery 2013, Holgate 2014). Developing 
stronger connections to wider allies may lever greater power in order to compensate 
for the loss of more traditional union power but it can raise tensions with those who 
view unions through the insider/outsider concept. This is based on the belief that 
unions only serve the narrow self-interests of their members at the expense of other 
workers and wider society. Heery questions whether working with allies offers fusion 
or replacement (2018). He points to the ability of community organisations to 
mobilise around shared values often with ‘weak ties’ as opposed to unions who 
require an instrumental commitment making sustained member mobilisation 
difficult (Heery 2013: 655). He found such coalitions often difficult to forge, fraught 
with tension and liable to collapse (2018: 67). Unions cannot opt in and out of 
alliance-building when they believe it is in their immediate interests and it may 
require a greater shift in their organisational culture. Ibsen and Tapia (2017) wrote of 
unions building external coalitions to compensate for the loss of structural power 
tied to collective bargaining. Associational power can therefore be seen as a sign of 
weakness, either by relying on allies for support or seeking to organise workers from 
	 55	
outside the workplace. This point will be explored further in the case studies for this 
research. 
Unions based and developed around strong occupational identity relied less on legal 
regulation to protect minimum standards and upon alliances with bodies beyond 
their immediate reach to influence employers. The notion of institutional power is 
the role unions as organisations have in the wider mechanics and laws governing 
industrial relations and in economic planning. A greater focus upon this leads unions 
to invest in a higher profile in influencing politics. The legal framework for industrial 
relations for much of the twentieth century was based upon immunities from civil 
actions for trade unions that acted as part of a trade dispute. Chapter Four will 
explore this context in more depth. 
(Adăscăliței and Guga 2017) include the relations the union has within the broader 
trade union movement as well as with external organisations such as campaign 
groups with similar aims or community groups that have overlapping objectives. 
Lévesque and Murray (2010: 337) describe the degree to which a union is linked to 
these wider groups as “network embeddedness”. They see some unions as being 
caught in a “spiral of isolation” while others have strong horizontal links with unions 
in the same sector or employer. Other unions create vertical links with regional, 
industrial, national and international structures.  
A union with considerable positional power and control over its relevant labour 
supply can opt to eschew wider collaborations. Associational power appears to be 
the strategic choice of last resort for unions yet some writers stress its importance 
for union renewal. McAlevey (2016) stresses the need to organise the ‘whole 
worker’ in the workplace and community, especially as they need to reach into the 
service economy. She criticises ‘business unionism’ and those leaders who believe 
they can recruit from the outside or cut deals with employers. She champions 
‘bottom-up’ organising, where workers are at the centre of all activities and that 
must mean addressing their wider interests outside of the workplace. Alliance-
building may not be possible if the priority is sustaining an insider base and when 
organisational insularity has a legacy of success. Polletta and Jasper (2001) found 
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that movements that defined their identities (and with it their membership) 
narrowly tended to reject alliances as ‘selling out’ and that such exclusiveness 
helped sustain the commitment of remaining stalwarts. Social movement leaders 
must strategize within a complex multi-organisational environment, whereas union 
leaders must satisfy internal systems of democracy (Heery 2018, Gaham and Pekarek 
2013).  
Alliance-building may have to overcome nervousness or opposition from potential 
partners. Rivalry and conflict can ignite between unions and campaign groups as 
they compete for influence and credit (Heery 2018). The need for union reps and 
officers to collaborate with external bodies depends upon the issues at hand. The 
development in union learning activities has required significant engagement with 
learning providers, career advisors and skills bodies. Supporting health and well-
being amongst workers may need the support of external specialists and mental 
health groups. These links can be undertaken with the active support or partnership 
with the employer or developed unilaterally by the union (Moore 2008). 
The stress on union organising and industrial power in the UK through most of the 
twentieth century, in comparison with statutory frameworks for industrial relations 
as developed across much of Europe, stems from the legacy of the voluntarist 
approach to industrial relations (Marsh 1992, Martin and Ross 1999). The need for 
unions to exert industrial power (Lévesque and Murray 2010) heightened the tactics 
of competitive sectional unionism (Cole 1924, Taylor 1980). 
Where the legal framework provided for or facilitated collective bargaining it 
reflected the industrial power of the unions. Lévesque and Murray (2010) argued the 
degree to which institutional power may become misaligned with ‘real’ union power 
depends upon the politics of the nation or posture of employers. Conflict tests the 
limits of each party and rests the balance of power. Differences between the models 
have been attributed to ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001, Crouch, 
2017). This implies a determinist theory in which difference in approach is explained 
through variations in the country’s business structure, economic management and 
systems and not through union leadership strategy. It leaves little scope for agency 
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at local level and this is challenged by Wagner and Refslund (2016) who describe the 
differences as the consequence of union strength. (Hodder and Edwards 2015: 848) 
see the legal framework as reflecting and inscribing the uses of union power rather 
than being a form of power directly. 
The approach to associational power through collaborations are strategic matters to 
be determined by union leaders including prioritising potential allies and developing 
shared objectives. This study examines these in the context of an employer and 
government offensive against them. 
 
Chapter Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has set out the theoretical context for the research on the role of strong 
occupational identity in relation to positional power, organisational strength and 
leadership. It has defined briefly the differences between ‘craft’ and ‘occupational’ 
identity and between craft and professional unions, stressing the similarities for the 
purposes of organising. The strengths and weaknesses organising around such 
identities will be examined in the case studies.  
The ability for any union to deliver its purpose depends upon the power resources it 
can wield. Concepts of positional, organisational, institutional and associational 
power are found to be a helpful theoretical framework to contextualise the case 
studies (Schmalz and Dörre, 2020, Hyman, Richard and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013). 
Positional power, based either on pivotal skills within the industrial process or 
numerical strength through ‘super majorities’, (McAlevey 2016) offers maximum 
leverage over an employer but is vulnerable to technological change and sectional 
divisions. Whether a union leadership opts to deploy such power raises questions 
over strategic choice, democracy and ideology.  
Unions develop organisational strength through the exploitation of positional 
strength and collective identity. These in turn build the social capital of the 
membership through formal and informal networks of mutual support and welfare 
assistance. In such a setting, union leaders command greater strategic choice, 
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especially in regard to the union’s orientation towards employers but they may 
balance these options with internal pressures from the democratic processes. Such 
options invoke the tension between union leadership and the rank-and-. High levels 
of participation may be a precondition for membership mobilisation but the 
relationship between internal democracy and strategic leadership has been 
described by Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2018: 11) as “an enduring dilemma 
for trade union democracy”. There can also be conflict between the interests of 
existing members and potential recruits. Democratic strength can restrict a 
leadership seeking radical or conservative alternatives in the face of an 
overwhelming external threat.  
In the absence of positional power, union leaders turn to other forms of leverage 
against employers including institutional and associational power, seeking legal 
remedies rather than industrial bargaining and alliance-building. The case studies in 
this research explore these factors especially at a time when a union, known for its 
independence, even detachment, from the wider movement sought to win allies as 
circumstances changed. 
The next chapter examines the nature of craft unionism and collective identity in 
more detail, especially in the printing industry. It explores social solidarity and the 
way additional strength is gained by the development of close personal networks. It 
charts the advances in technology that so fundamentally undermined the basis of 
the NGA and printing trade unionism. It will also look at why customs and industrial 
tactics were so embedded in the lifeblood of the union and question the extent to 
which this restricted the leaderships’ ability to consider alternative actions in the 





Craft trade unionism and the printing industry 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the nature of trade union purpose, power and the 
capacity of leadership to determine actions from a range of strategic options. It 
sought to provide a theoretical framework for the case study research centred in this 
thesis, based upon the role of collective identity in the formation and maintenance 
of trade union organisation and its relationship with positional and associational 
power. This chapter examines in greater depth how strong occupational collective 
identity is built and the nature of craft trade unionism, especially in printing. It 
describes how this helped shape the industrial relations within an industry 
dominated by small workshops (Child 1967). It examines the symbiotic relationship 
between positional power and the organisational strength built upon the collective 
identity. 
The printing unions trace their formation back to the mid-nineteenth century, with 
roots even earlier. They adopted many of the practices, language and structures of 
the earlier guilds but in contrast members saw their interests as different from those 
of their employer. The bedrock of the union was the chapel, but the interests of craft 
workers extended beyond the individual workplace (Musson 1954). They borrowed 
methods from the earlier friendly societies (Sabel 1982: 167, Thompson 1963) and 
offered a range of welfare benefits, social activities and mutual support. The chapter 
will examine the scope and nature of such an approach and the ‘social capital’ 
developed by this model of trade unionism (Jarley 2005). The unions mobilised and 
built a tight-knit organisation with strong loyalty and solidarity based on their shared 
identity. A central feature of their organisation was the closed shop and the chapter 
will address the arguments for this approach and whether it was a symptom or 
source of union power. 
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Such a model of trade unionism depended upon mobilisation around the craft or 
occupation as a common bond and the need to protect it from unskilled entrants, 
including defending the gender division of labour (Cockburn 1983). The chapter 
considers the nature of gender divisions within printing and how they were 
reinforced by trade unions. 
The chapter describes the technological transformation that the printing process 
went through, robbing unions of their positional power. It concludes by considering 
what options could be considered by union leaders in such changing circumstances, 
including stronger associational relationships between other unions and 
amalgamations (Gennard and Hayward 2008). Merger was a strategic choice for the 
NGA in the 1980s as it faced a combination of challenges from technological change 
and the newly elected Conservative government. This was the chosen path for many 
unions at that time. The chapter will consider amalgamation as a strategy and its 
consequences especially in regard to collective identity. 
The complex range of unions within the printing industry were rationalised so that, 
by the end of the twentieth century only the GPMU remained representing 









Industrial relations in printing 
Strong trade union organisation, as defined through membership levels, does not 
equate to poor relations with employers regardless of the size of the organisation. 
Adăscăliței and Guga (2017) stressed two crucial dimensions: the relationship 
between unions and employers and between unions and their members. The 
overlap between these two dynamics is where the NGA built its strength between its 
positional power and its organisational effectiveness. The collective bond the NGA 
built between and for its members was the foundation upon which it developed its 
bargaining strength with employers.  
Employers were obliged to accept a loss of control over labour or its performance in 
return for a stable supply of skilled workers (Blissett 2013). The early collective 
agreements unions reached with employers developed from the individual firm, to 
the town, the district and the whole country (Child 1967: 205). Employers saw 
advantage of combining to secure multi-enterprise agreements and unions tended 
towards a principled position of national minimum standards for all. The first 
national agreement in 1898 covered the working of Linotype machines (Musson 
1954: 137) and in 1900 the Federation of Master Printers was established and in 
1911 a national agreement was reached with it and federations of newspaper 
employers. 
In the small enterprises that dominated the commercial printing industry, the 
workforce and management worked in close proximity. The employer-union 
relationship was different from a large enterprise where the proprietor is a distant 
figure (Rainnie, 2016). Provincial newspapers, often owned by national 
conglomerates, were produced in relatively small workplaces. A reasonably large city 
such as Gloucester had a daily newspaper office employing around 100 people and 
small towns would tend to have a weekly paper produced by a handful of workers.  
In this context, National Agreements suited most employers and chapels. Yet Rainnie 
concluded that industrial harmony was a myth (Rainnie, 2016: 153) and stressed the 
diversity of small companies. In my own experience, relations in small firms could be 
excellent or could become highly strained. Family loyalties sometimes caused 
tensions within the workforce. As a full-time officer I could raise issues and expose 
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grievances in a way the employees felt unable to, given the close relationship they 
had with the employer. In his study of small printing firms Rainnie encountered two 
contrasting attitudes towards the NGA by employers: firstly acceptance of 
unionisation mainly due to the passivity of the membership but secondly “vitriolic 
hatred of the NGA organisation regionally and nationally” (Rainnie 2016).  
The story of industrial relations in printing is striking for its consistency over such a 
span of time. The fundamentals of the production process remained barely changed 
over several centuries. Longevity and tradition were not just important features of 
printing trade unionism but the products its members produced. Many provincial 
newspapers traced their roots back a century or more. The Berrows Worcester 
Journal, produced by a chapel I used to represent, lays claim to being the oldest 
newspaper in the world having been established in 1690.12 
National Agreements were a central feature in printing for much of the century but 
the Conservatives in the 1980s saw them as restricting labour market flexibility and 
sustaining trade unionism (Purcell 1993: 25). Freeman and Medoff (1984: 51) found 
that union wage differentials fall noticeably with plant-level bargaining as workers 
and managers worry about competitive consequences or as Hyman (2001: 474) 
described, the dynamics of global influences. After its election in 1979, the 
Government promoted ‘enterprise-confined’ or company-level agreements, but it 
took until 1991 for the commercial printing industry national agreement to break 
down. In some rare circumstances national agreements have survived such as in the 
engineering construction industry, largely due to the agency of labour and union 
strategies (Clarke and Fitzgerald 2020: 70). Preference for local or national 
bargaining depends much on the power balance between employers and unions. For 
example, there was a short period in the 1960-70s when the Society of Lithographic 
Artists, Designers and Engravers (SLADE) held supreme positional power. 
Lithography was the rapidly growing printing process and it relied upon large, 
expensive cameras and scanners, operated by a small number of highly skilled 
specialists to convert artwork into lithographic plates. An average commercial 
	
12 Berrows Worcester Journal – see: https://www.worcesternews.co.uk/news/13885539.worlds-
oldest-newspaper-celebrates-its-325th-birthday/ 
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printing factory would need to employ one or two such workers. SLADE decided to 
break away from the National Agreement – initially over a failure to agree on the 
role of assistants – but the union pursued a policy of house bargaining (Gennard 
1990: 565-567). This secured significant wage levels and led to the development of 
specialist reproduction houses. Maintenance of the house agreement policy was a 
condition of the merger between SLADE and NGA in 1982 (Gennard 1990: 154). Its 
success in sectionalist bargaining offered terms for the NGA and other unions to 
aspire to. 
A significant element within the earliest agreements between employers and unions 
was around the proportion of apprentices within any establishment and the nature 
of recruitment and training. This was a fundamental matter for unions seeking to 
control the supply of skilled labour. 
 
Apprenticeship entry 
Many of the earliest trade unions in Britain were based upon a narrow occupational 
group such as those within the printing industry. Sydney and Beatrice Webb (1920: 
44) wrote:  
It is not among the farm servants, miners or general labourers, ill-paid and ill-
treated as they were, that the early trade unions arose. The formation of 
independent associations to resist the will of employers requires the 
possession of a certain degree of independence and strength of character. 
Thus we find the earliest trade unions arising among journeymen whose skill 
and standard of life had been for centuries encouraged and protected by 
legal and customary regulations as to apprenticeship and by the limitations of 
the numbers which the high premiums and other conditions must have 
involved. 
As such the basis for trade union organisation was the craft group above that of the 
individual workplace. Clegg, Fox and Thompson (1964: 4) define a craft society as a 
“union of skilled workers who have attained their status through a prescribed 
apprenticeship”. The apprenticeship system was an integral part of the craft union: a 
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long period of training and induction into the craft at little pay. The reward was 
access to relatively secure and well-paid employment. The traditional apprenticeship 
was the “cardinal feature” of control of entry into the skilled occupations of the 
printing industry (Gennard 1990: 452). It required school leavers to undertake 
training over a fixed length of time starting with low, if any pay and rising to the rate 
of the ‘journeyman’. The unions had secured quotas limiting the number of 
apprentices to a ratio with journeymen. The system was designed to ensure 
apprentices acquired transferable skills through college attendance and 
qualifications such as those certified by City and Guilds13.  
By the 1970s the ‘time-served’ apprenticeship became increasingly questioned given 
the changing nature of skills needed and rising expectation from young people. In 
1975 apprenticeships were reduced to four years with a reduction to three-and-a-
half years if the apprentice demonstrated the competencies required. It also 
permitted an extension to five years if needed to achieve the standards expected. 
This began a shift away from time to a system of accreditation as a measure of 
achievement. With the transformation of the technology, the apprenticeship system 
struggled to keep up and new entrants were arriving from art colleges and 
universities. “Training was required which was comparable with VDUs and laser 
plate-making rather than Guttenberg and Caxton (Gennard 1990: 459)”. Art colleges 
could offer graphic design courses without the need for the equipment and 
machinery of the composing room. 
Other factors were at play through the 1980s with recessions leading employers to 
cease the custom of apprentice recruitment. In 1986-7 just 614 companies 
registered trainees under the revised Joint Training Council that oversaw a more 
modular form of training (Gennard 1990: 463). To tackle the rising levels of 
unemployment, the unions’ priorities became re-training of members, often those 
made redundant as a consequence of their employer’s lack of investment in new 
technology or inability to keep up with the pace of change. 
	
13 As demonstrated in indentures held in Gloucestershire Records Office 
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 Lee (1979) considers whether union strategy, driven by vested interest, was 
directed to regulating entry into the trade rather than upholding standards of 
training. Unions had to face the challenge of new routes of entry into the industry 
and with them the lack of control.  
Unions built around occupational identity sought to maximise access to training, 
including transferable skills. In this there was often tension with employers who 
sought to limit skill acquisition to only those competencies they needed. Lee found 
that this was often presented as a conflict between ‘restrictive practices’ by unions 
set against the drive to secure greater management prerogative (Lee 1979: 44).  
The approach to trade-based skills in Britain was reviewed by Clarke, Winch and 
Brockmann (2013) in their comparison with Germany. The British system tends 
towards a ‘production’ system, relying on on-the-job know-how rather than 
‘occupational capacity’ including accredited transferable skills. Lee (1979) highlights 
the limitations of the dependance upon the enlightened self-interest of individual 
employers under a voluntary system of training. 
For craft unions the apprenticeship system was more than training and accumulation 
of knowledge towards accreditation for the occupation, it provided unions with the 
opportunity to inculcate trainees in their customs and practices. 
 
Bound by tradition 
Collective identity includes organisational commitment (Ashforth, Harrison and 
Corley 2008) that comes with a shared protection of the characteristics that bind the 
society together. ‘Tradition’ for trade unionism has been viewed as anachronistic, 
and as some kind of “pernicious survival from the past (Lee 1979: 34)”. Traditions are 
developed from the special conditions of the type of employment and while the 
occupation is the source, the union can build upon them to enhance the status of 
their members and to magnify their positional power. Craft union leaders are bound 
by their heritage and repertoires of action (Smith P. 2001: 10). Musson (1954: 1) 
argued that: “The roots of trade unionism in the printing industry lie deep in the 
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customs and regulations of the craft gilds (sic).” Knotted (2008: 273) wrote of what 
he called “artisanal associationalism” that emerged before industrial factories.  
The cross-over between friendly societies and early trade unions was not 
straightforward and sometimes the language was deliberately used to confuse. 
Workers recognised the value in mutual welfare insurance but such schemes could 
be, and sometimes were, organised by the employer as an attempt to undermine 
the establishment of a trade union. Early unions also used the language of the 
friendly society to disguise more adversarial intentions towards the employer. In an 
industry dominated by small enterprises, meaningful mutual aid societies required a 
larger group involving multiple workplaces. At the same time, class divisions 
between employer and worker made the case for trade unionism that developed 
beyond friendly society benefits. 
In an environment where the career of a craft worker may outlive the business, such 
workers will be attracted to a society that will provide support in and between jobs. 
Members looked to their union for life-long protection, not just during what might 
be a transient period of employment with one employer (Child 1967: 123). Hyman 
(1975: 44) described the early craft unions as ‘defenders’ of their position and status 
apart from the occasional ‘wages movement’. Unions promoted trust and care for 
one another, of self-control, independence and self-reliance (Phelps-Brown 1986). 
 
The chapel and a community of workers 
The chapel, described by Joseph Moxon in Mechanik Exercises in the 1600s (Moxon 
1958), comprised all the printers in the office, the whole occupational group, 
including the master. It was a club bounded together by the same craft within the 
same workplace.  Darnton (2001: 101) in his account of the ‘Great Cat Massacre’, 
when apprentice compositors in Paris in the 1730s killed the employer’s pet cats 
because they received better treatment than the workers did, described the printers 




The chapel, as a term used by the union, is the voluntary association of workers to 
represent their interests as they may be different from the employer (Sykes 1960: 
52, Webb 1920, Aspinall 1949, Barou 1947, Cole 1924, Child 1967). The various 
printing craft unions had rules stating that 
where there were three or more members in a 
workplace, they shall form a chapel14. Known as 
‘the companionship’ or ‘ship’ the chapel was a 
mutual benefit society, a disciplinary and 
benevolent institution, almost masonic with its 
initiation ceremonies and secrets. Membership 
tended to be a constant through the whole of a 
career and not dependent upon any workplace, 
dispute or grievance (Musson 1954, Gennard 
1990). It built extraordinary solidarity (Melvern 
1986: 37-38), strengthening the workers 
positional and organisational power.  
The chapel was the bedrock of printing trade unionism, at first as a self-regulating 
workshop club (Phelps-Brown, 1986). The chapel was a strong community of workers 
that resolved all kinds of disputes that could arise amongst its members, both 
personal and work-centred. It emphasized the equality of its members and tended to 
create conformity of behaviours such as when and where to drink beer, social 
activities and common political ideology. “It would fine members for being drunk at 
work, then use its collection of fines so that all members could get drunk together.” 
(Jacobs 1980: 16-19). Sykes (1960) saw the chapel as a genuine association of equals 
with decisions made by the assembly rather than officials acting alone. In some, the 
Father of the Chapel (FoC) was a position rotated amongst all members (Martin R. 
1981). Cannon (2011) found that a third of the members he interviewed had held 
some form of chapel office. 
	
14 NGA Rules and the London Society of Compositors for example 
3.2 Rules of the London Society of 
Compositors, 1897, held at the Bishopsgate 
Institute, London 
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The chapel had customs such as initiation ceremonies and ‘bang-outs’ (making a 
cacophony of sound to mark the completion of an apprenticeship or 
retirement). Activities and institutions like these buttressed feelings of identification 
with the occupation and the society (Cannon 2011). Chapels were sometimes the 
focus of sporting activities such as bowls, skittles and cricket15. Social events were 
organised including group outings, known in printing as the ‘wayzgoose’. Worker 
interests can be described as being ‘socially constructed’ by unions but their 
collective interests arise from their shared sense of working in the same company, 
craft or profession. Their sense of common bond is the foundation of the union – the 
“root structure” as described by Hodder and Edwards (2015: 845) but it is also 
strengthened by the actions of it (see also Johnstone, Stewart and Ackers 2015; 
Hyman 1997). The union ran the industry’s system of recruitment, its welfare system 
and looked after members in dispute. Jacobs argued that “the employer is almost a 
bystander with what his union is doing.” (Jacobs 1980: 16-19). 
The development or use of social activities to help bind the society of workers 
together was not exclusive to printing. The records of the National Union of 
Agricultural Workers16 lists a busy programme of social activities including a convoy 
of coaches taking members on their annual holiday. The National Association of 
Local Government Officers (NALGO) was founded to "provide means for social 
intercourse amongst its members, and for their improvement, advancement and 
recreation, also promote a knowledge of the principles of local government (Spoor 
1967: 13)". NALGO leaders believed that for an organisation to succeed, it must 
equip itself with magnets, first to attract, then to hold. Its early magnets were 
drama, choirs, orchestra, sports, rambling and rifle clubs, holidays and medical 
insurance to attract members. NALGO acquired convalescent homes and holiday 
camps for members to use, providing an additional benefit to membership but also a 
means of creating a social network between members (Spoor 1967; Costley, Cole 
and Walker 2014). McAlevey (2016: 33) refers to how US unions in the 1930s drew in 
new members with music, boxing matches, card parties, dances, picnics and various 
	
15 Gloucestershire had trophies for such sporting activities 
16 Dorset NUAW minutes held at the Tolpuddle Martyrs’ Museum 
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sports. These activities also engaged the wives of members in the exclusively male 
domain of the trade union. Delegate conferences of the Typographical Association 
would have a parallel programme of outings for members’ wives with dinner-dances 
in the evenings. Women may have been excluded from the workplace organisation 
but were involved in the social life of their husbands’ union. 
Those who worked in composing rooms considered themselves more than factory 
workers. Setting lead type, photo-engraving the etched images of photographs, 
making up pages and reading the proofs, the samples of the pages – these they 
considered craft skills. The speed with which they set type or the ability to read the 
reversed words on the metal blocks, was for them an industrial art (Musson 1954, 
Howe and Waite 1948). The composing room had a special atmosphere imbued with 
the language, customs and culture of the chapel held deeply by members. As 
Johnson (1972: 56) described when writing about professional workers, the highly 
developed language or jargon served to maintain internal homogeneity and increase 
autonomy from outsiders. Chapel membership was ‘hard-wired’ into apprentices 
when they were first permitted to join the union. They were inducted into an 
exclusive society and they were expected to observe its rules. Some required 
members to keep chapel business secret from non-members (Sykes 1960). Breaches 
could result in fines or even expulsion and the consequences of losing your union 
membership could be the end of a meaningful career. The Rules of the London 
Society of Compositors of 1879 included: 
Any member working in an office where there is any encroachment made, or 
about to be made, on the authorised customs or regulations of the trade, 
shall give information respecting the cause of such encroachment to the 
Secretary or be fined 2s 6d. 
That no member shall accept a situation in any office, the character of which 
is either unknown or doubtful, without first enquiring of the Secretary and if 
found acting contrary to his instructions shall be fined 2s 6d. 
Despite the welfare benefits of membership, the unity and cohesion of the craft 
union was founded on the basis of conflict with the employer (Sabel 1982: 9). He 
makes the case that such craft workers can be both “docile and militant – out for 
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himself but capable of solidarity, disposed to lead broad movements against 
management but also to defend narrow privileges”. The union could adopt different 
orientations at different times but the panoply of benefits developed by craft 
unionism ensured membership loyalty and stability regardless. This confirms the 
degree of strategic choice available to leaders of craft unions. 
 
Welfare and control over labour supply 
The craft societies, especially in printing, developed sophisticated ways of 
maintaining support and regulating the supply of labour even during fluctuations in 
trade (Fowler and Wyke 1987). They recognised that over-supply of labour 
threatened to swell the ‘reserve’ workforce of the unemployed.  
In the early days of trade unions some believed that this model was the only one 
that could offer a lasting organisational basis. Dobson (1980: 45) describes welfare 
aid as being essential to maintain a continuous association and the strict rules of the 
friendly society formed the basis of trade union discipline. Writing at the formation 
of so-called ‘new unionism’ attracting semi-skilled workers, George Howell, believed 
that unions that simply concentrated on their ‘trade purposes’ would prove weak 
and inefficient (Howell 1890: vii). He acknowledged that members didn’t primarily 
join for the friendly society benefits but to be sustainable unions needed to offer 
members such reasons to remain (Howell 1890: 477). 
Unions sought to limit the supply of labour through restrictions on the number of 
apprentice entrants. This required union control beyond any single workplace 
(Phelps-Brown 1986). Members’ allegiance to the society was reinforced through 
protection when out of work.  
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When trade was depressed and workers laid-off, an 
option was to walk or ‘tramp’ to another town in 
search of work. The early societies developed a 
system of ‘tramping relief’ where members could 
report to the secretary of the local society to learn 
about possible vacancies or be warned of employers 
who refused to recognise the union or its pay rates 
(Knotted 2008: 172). Payments were made to the 
‘journeyman’ based on the mileage shown in a 
‘tramping map’ Child (1967: 99). Accommodation was 
provided until the job was obtained or the journeyman was obliged to set off for the 
next town (Rounsfell 1982). Tramping (along with assisted emigration) was one way 
to help members source alternative work in times of downturn and relieve the 
pressure from unemployment on terms and conditions for those still in work. 
Keeping labour short in good times was part of the long-term strategy of the union 
(Lee 1979: 45). Knotted (2008: 182) describes this as an “intricate system of supra-
local intermediation”. The system also built social networks and a collective sense of 
support to fellow members faced with unemployment. 
Child (1967: 101) cites the Compositors’ Chronicle of 1841 in which a member 
describes the twin motives of the system: 
I have often shared my evening meal with a forlorn tramp, and this I 
considered not merely charitable, but politic, for had I not done so, what 
security had I that the traveller would not, on the following morning, by 
underworking me, have turned me out of house and home? 
The Webbs (1920) contended that unemployment benefits were primarily designed 
to deter unemployed from undermining wage levels and only secondarily to relieve 
distress. Knotted (2008: 185) also found that unions were more effective, than public 
agencies, in verifying that the person was really unemployed. The London Society of 
Compositors provided benefits to members when out of work, compensation for 
‘loss from fire’, funeral allowance, emigration allowance, superannuation payments, 
removal grant, travelling cards, tramping relief, a reading room and a library (London 
3.3 Typographical Association 
Tramping Map – author’s collection 
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Society of Compositors 1879, Howe and Waite 1948). The system required a level of 
national coordination and supervision and so the local societies agreed to come 
together in a national union called the Provincial Typographical Society in 1849. Craft 
unions built an astonishing level of support as shown in the examples of mutual aid 
during difficult times. In 1866 the iron-founders union faced a crisis caused by 
depression in trade and the failure of some key employers. Unable to pay 
unemployment benefits the working members agreed to pay a levy of a sixth of their 
weekly pay and some members deposited savings of up to £2,500 to rescue the 
union (Howell 1890: 161). Brushmakers made similar sacrifices when their union 
faced a financial crisis due to rising unemployment. Debts were taken out on 
furniture and houses to assist the union meet its obligations to out-of-work 
members (Brushmakers 1847).  
After the Second World War, as the State increasingly provided welfare support and 
workers were less inclined to an itinerate lifestyle, tramping relief was replaced with 
a system of unemployment benefits. Up to 1983 unemployment benefit was paid to 
out of work NGA members for up to six months at a rate of a third of the basic wage, 
a valuable incentive to stay loyal to the union and a way to prevent unemployed 
members undermining them (Musson 1959, Gennard 1990). But with a tide of 
redundancies in the early 1980s, this generous benefit was unsustainable. An 
emergency levy of all members supported the fund until agreement was reached to 
freeze the benefit level (Gennard 1990). 
Assistance to members while out of work was a significant benefit to belonging to 
the association and encouraged feelings of solidarity (Faniel 2012). It was a powerful 
way to retain members and develop a strong sense of mutual support. Other 
benefits such as sickness, educational grants, funeral grants and retirement 
payments, provided the ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach to membership ensuring 





Social Capital and unionism 
The close-knit nature of the association provided social and personal networks. 
Union officers often acted as social workers and social secretaries. This is described 
as ‘social capital unionism’ by Jarley (2005) and includes trust, norms, and networks 
representing any group which gathers consistently for a common purpose (Gilchrist, 
2009). Social capital is often associated with privileged elites and the echelons in 
society who can use networks and closed societies to gain or maintain advantages in 
education, employment and social standing. In the context of trade union social 
capital may be defined as those resources inherent in social relations which facilitate 
collective action. Craft unions maximized the social capital of members to control 
the labour supply and provide mutual support. The privilege of membership meant 
higher earnings and job security but it led to barriers for others who sought entry, 
especially women (Drake 1984).  
Craft or professional unions follow the worker not the workplace (Fairbrother 2015). 
Social capital includes benefits flowing from belonging to a collective institution and 
the added value that comes from the shared interests of members and the 
interactions between them. Job movements within the printing industry built strong 
member networks (Child 1967). The social capital approach developed benefits not 
dependent upon the employer and helped boost or bolster occupational status, 
spread ideas and prepared members for future change. This dynamic process 
adapted to the needs of members from welfare support to retraining.  
A lifelong career in a single trade brings a high level of commitment with long-
standing networks and friendships. Union journals contained articles about the 
trade, changing technologies, news from around the industry but also 
correspondence from members expressing their views and arguing over union 
policies17. As technological change become more rapid from the 1970s onward, the 
union offered retraining courses for members especially those unemployed. As a 
consequence, membership knowledge of the technology and process of printing was 
high and the ‘organisational intelligence’ of the union, important when making 
	
17 Examples include The Process Journal of Society of Lithographic Artists Designers, Engravers and 
Process Workers – copies held by the author 
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strategic choices, was strong. Union officers at every level developed expertise about 
the industry that could be utilised for the benefit of members and employers (Daniel 
1987). Klindt (2017) studied the potential for union renewal through skill formation 
and local partnerships. He found the knowledge base of the craft union can be used 
to complement a firm’s production system and refine vocational training 
programmes. Such unions are also in a favourable position to facilitate local 
networks and coordinate skills development activities. A key ingredient in the 
success of such an approach was the level of ‘social trust’ unions brought to any 
partnership and their ability to motivate workers to train. 
In summary, the craft unions, especially in printing, developed, by accident or 
design, a panoply of benefits above and beyond the immediate relationship with the 
employer. These responded to changing circumstances such as turning tramping 
relief into unemployment benefit. The need to maintain members’ employment 
within the sector led the unions to offer retraining schemes. Rooted in the labour 
process, the union built organisational strength and in turn this strengthened its 
positional power. The system relied on a very high level of membership penetration 
across the labour force. The benefits offered were obvious and so the incentive to 
join was overwhelming. But there was a risk from non-union ‘free-riders’ and as a 
consequence the membership supported and defended the principle of the closed 
shop. 
 
The closed shop 
The nature of the production process gave craft workers in printing positional power 
but they needed organisational strength to use it. To regulate the labour supply the 
union needed to ensure maximum membership density. From the late nineteenth 
century, the printing craft unions achieved a comprehensive pre-entry closed shop 
model. Memberhip of the union was a requirement to obtain and retain 
employment. This required a potential recruit to be an existing member with 
clearance from the local branch.  
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For example, in 1918 the 
Gloucester Typographical 
Society had authority from the 
union’s National Council to 
declare that there were no 
‘open houses’ left in the city18. 
This meant that every worker in 
the craft occupations covered by 
the union were in membership 
of the Society, a status common 
with most trading centres across the country. The route to entry was through an 
apprenticeship or exceptional circumstances agreed by the local branch committee, 
possibly with the payment of an entrance fee. This ‘pre-entry closed shop’ was the 
cornerstone of the craft union model in printing but Purcell (1993: 28) argues it was 
more of a symptom than a source of union strength. As the case studies will show, 
100% membership and the closed-shop were traditional elements of craft unionism. 
It was clearly in the interests of craft workers to be on the inside and union members 
and leaders considered it a source of strength rather than a by-product of effective 
organisation. 
When a vacancy occurred, the employer was expected to contact the local union 
branch that would send suitable applicants for the position. Unemployed members 
were given priority and if none were available the job could be advertised, often 
with the words: ‘NGA advised’. Pay and conditions were based on the national 
agreement, supplemented by local bargaining. Lloyd described it as representing the 
“most complete and successful form of workers’ – or more accurately, union control 
in the country” (Lloyd 1984: 33).  
Employers accepted the fact of the closed shop as they had little choice, but it 
proved useful in maintaining stability, ensuring high levels of skill and reducing wage 
	
18 Memo from Typographical Association headquarters, 1918 
3.4 Typographical Association memo confirming the abolition of 
open houses in Gloucester – author’s collection 
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undercutting (McKelvey 1953). In the history of the National Union of Boot and Shoe 
Operatives an employer is quoted:  
We would not have a trade unionist on our payroll if we could help it. But if 
we had to employ union labour we should be quite willing to employ nothing 
else . . . to make their bargains through their responsible officials and to stick 
to them after they were made (Fox 1958: 342). 
Milligan (1976) shared a similar view, believing employers would prefer their 
workforce to be non-union but the closed shop system could simplify life. The union 
control over labour supply reduced wage competition between firms and avoided 
wasteful recruitment costs. It guaranteed a stable supply of skills and reduced 
‘poaching’ between employers. The holding of a union card assured the employer of 
the competence of the worker, a measure of qualification that was part of the 
prestige of the association (Baron 1991). Hart (1978) suggested that employers 
supported closed shops to avoid multi-unionism and because they allowed union 
officials to reach unpopular agreements. Smale (2018) cites the example of the 
Association of Education Psychologists who, while not applying a closed shop as 
such, secured a high membership density by offering services that made it 
significantly more difficult for anyone to remain outside and still practice in the 
profession. 
Mandatory membership through the closed shop helps bind the collective identity 
and enforces discipline but it means the union contains those who would otherwise 
be indifferent or even hostile to the values of the organisation. This, it has been 
argued, moderates the leadership’s ideological posture and dampens demand for 
radical action. Hyman (1973) argued the compulsion of the closed shop led to ‘paper 
members’ with a weak attachment to the trade union and a contradictory approach 
to state intervention and free collective bargaining. His perspective may have 
changed given the demise of trade union power when such paper members are now 
unlikely to be members at all. A militant posture is unlikely to succeed if it fails to 
win a sufficient proportion of the workforce to its cause. Action involving a minority 
of workers without sufficient positional power is likely to be limited to symbolic 
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protest and large majorities are required for it to be effective (McAlevey 2014, 
2016). 
The closed shop did not extend fully across the printing industry. Some journalists 
saw it a restriction on civil liberties. In other areas unions sought a closed shop but 
often failed to achieve it (Finch 1984). Recruitment in these areas was not exclusive 
to apprentices and workers were less bound to the industry for employment and 
thus the relation with the union could be transitory.  
There is little evidence of resistance to the craft union closed shop – it was a club 
most workers wanted to be inside. There was opposition to ‘outsiders’ and those 
who sought a ‘free ride’. Controversy arose in the late nineteenth century with the 
rise of ‘new unionism’ amongst semi-skilled workers where weight of numbers was 
critical for industrial power. It was fine for skilled workers to combine in closed shops 
but Howell, an early TUC leader, wrote of his concerns over the coercion of other 
workers into unions. “Freedom to combine carries with it the corresponding 
freedom to abstain from combining” (Howell 1890: vii). The question of individual 
liberty has accompanied the concept of the closed shop. It became a more central 
part of the debate over trade union reform through the 1970s. Right-wing groups 
such as the Freedom Association supported individuals who refused to join the union 
and wider public opinion became more antagonistic to the closed shop (Opinion 
Research Centre 1979). But the Conservative Party was warned in 1979 that while 
opposition to the closed shop had increased, it was not particularly pronounced and 
found mainly amongst non-union and white-collar workers. Union members 
objected to legislation banning closed shops and the polling confirmed attitudes 
around the ‘free ride’ of non-unionist who refuse to contribute to the union but 
expect the benefits (Opinion Research Centre 1979). 
Craft unionism builds a ‘group pride’ and in turn an enhanced status for being part of 
the collective. But societies built on the collective bond around a job function risk 
division or sectionalism with those not in the group. Reinforcing, even exaggerating, 
the special qualities of the craft serves the purpose of the development of collective 
identity and in doing so raises its status within and beyond the workplace. This 
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approach can, however, ferment tensions even within the association as groups 
undertaking specialist job roles press their own group interests. Musson (1954: 358) 
reports on moves to form break-away sections within the Typographical Association 
and specialist chapels and how these were resisted by the leadership. 
With employees being mandated to join, unions rarely had to persuade a non-
member to enrol. This lack of recruitment experience hampered unions when 
changing technology introduced to the industry new workers with little if any 
knowledge of the trade and the union (Blissett 2013). And many of these new 
workers were women. Until the 1980s the NGA possessed little if any institutional 
experience of open membership recruitment. It did not need the materials or the 
expertise to persuade workers to join (Blissett 2013). Strategic options for such 
unions were principally around the package of membership benefits and its relations 
with employers – individually or by sector. There is a dilemma faced by a union 
focused upon serving internal forces when this may be in contrast to the interests of 
a new workforce that could form its potential membership in the future. 
Turner (1969) saw ‘closed’ or ‘open’ approaches to trade unionism as alternative 
strategies for recruitment and organisation. The first defined membership in 
exclusive terms with the union attempting to close its borders to those not 
‘qualified’. The second sought to build the broadest possible collective of shared 
interests and was typified by the development of ‘general unions’ (Johnstone, 
Stewart and Ackers 2015). ‘Closed’ unions establish a strong and lasting sense of 
solidarity at the expense of those excluded whilst ‘open’ unions rely on a wider 
appeal of common interest and may use the language of socialism to appeal for 
workers’ unity. But the closed model relies on positional power due to the 
production process. The case studies examine the impact of technological change 
and the challenge of transforming a union from a closed to a more open model. 
 
The consequences of exclusive membership 
The printers’ chapels and societies can be idealised for their solidarity and mutual 
responsibility but their structure was based around limiting access to employment in 
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the industry and in providing an exclusive membership. Michels (1962: 272) believed 
that printers took the lead in ‘aristocratic stratification’ and that differences in 
cultural, social and economic status between the compositor and the casual labourer 
were more pronounced than between the compositor in one country and the small 
manufacturer in another. 
In some craft unions, new members had to be nominated by existing members and 
their qualification verified. Their acceptance into the society had to be approved by 
the local committee and entrance fees could be imposed in certain circumstances. 
NGA Rules referred to adult entrants into the union being charged if they had “stood 
aloof” from the Association (NGA Rules 1983). Apprentice entrants had to ‘serve 
their time’ as well as prove their abilities through the passing of exams and approval 
by the employer. Sons of men in the trade had the knowledge of how and when to 
apply and were often given precedence – Allen (1954) called this restriction 
‘patrimony’. This further fostered the common bond but also divisions with outsiders 
and the process became self-perpetuating. The benefits this proffered to those 
inside relied on exclusion and division.  
For print unions, the sense of identity based upon the craft was strong and provided 
stable characteristics and orientations over time regardless of changes in the 
leadership. The union helped sustain craft pride and reinforced the belief in being 
‘special’. It differentiated them from other sections of staff and in the wider 
community. The level of craft gave them an advantage over management who did 
not possess the same level of knowledge but could sometimes lead to frustrations 
over decisions being made by people who didn’t understand the production process 
(Mortimer 1960: 416). 
Exclusivity brought a powerful sense of belonging and provided a defensive structure 
based upon the nature of the work. The system was self-reinforcing, building a 
greater status for workers on the inside. The question, much discussed in the 
literature is the extent to which benefits gained by this model were at the expense 
of others or whether the positional and organisational strength of such unions 
helped others rise in proportion? The evidence from the literature appears mixed. 
The compositors, for a considerable period of time, held the high ground in 
	 81	
positional power and developed organisational strength around it. Other unions, 
especially in printing, aped much of the same structure and industrial tactics – either 
as a direct consequence of the compositors lead or because of their own positional 
power. But administrative and sales workers in newspapers – predominantly women 
– did not enjoy terms and conditions comparably better than similar workers outside 
the industry and were not considered worthy of much attention by the union until 
technology enabled them to undertake the work of the compositor (Gennard 1990: 
110, Dawson 2010, 2014).  
 
Craft unionism and gender 
There was a long tradition to maginalise and exclude women from the better paid 
jobs in printing. They were seen as a threat to the conditions of the journeymen 
(Bundock 1959: 67). Ramsay Macdonald (1904) collated a substantial study in the 
book Women in the Printing Trades in which he described the nature of employment 
which viewed women as a cheap supply of labour and in which married women were 
not expected to work. Where women were employed their wages were unregulated 
and they were largely unorganised. Craft societies made every effort to exclude 
women. Macdonald described the constant struggle of the Typographical Association 
to protect the journeymen’ positions against three forms of cheap labour: 
apprentices, unskilled men and women.  
Macdonald’s work is grounded in a gendered view of the world, acknowledging the 
position that society put women workers in. He listed the advantages to employers 
of engaging women including the acceptance of low wages, not being a member of 
the union and therefore: “more amenable to the will of the employer as the 
absolute rule of the workshop” (1904: 50).  
Macdonald argued that young women assumed their careers would be cut short by 
marriage so were prepared to do jobs with limited prospects. They were less inclined 
to put their minds to advancing their careers and as such: “preferred to remain 
incompetent” (1904: 65). He acknowledged that employers saw little point investing 
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in their training and they found evening classes difficult to attend. “Girls go home to 
commence a new round of domestic tasks from which the boy is exempted (p.66)”. 
The craft unions claimed to support the employment of women on equal terms but 
in reality this was a meaningless gesture that provided a cover for their 
determination to restrict the entry of women into the trade. In 1886 a conference of 
the typographical societies resolved: 
“That while strongly of the opinion that women are not physically capable of 
performing the duties of a compositor, the conference recommends their 
admission into membership of the various typographical unions, upon the 
same conditions as journeymen, provided always the females are paid strictly 
in accordance with scale (Macdonald 1904: 28).” 
This guaranteed that it was practically impossible for any women to be employed or 
join the societies. In 1904 the National Union of Printing and Paper Workers 
admitted women but did so to maintain the sexual divisions.  A delegate at the 1911 
conference of the bookbinders union described: “the growing menace to our trade 
in the competition of unorganised female labour (Bundock 1959: 86). Women were 
often seen as a ‘problem’ for unions (Bradley 1999: 164). In 1918 women were 
allowed to join the National Union of Bookbinding after much debate (Boston 2015).  
Composing type was a lightweight function, requiring nimble finger work and 
technical skill. It was a job women were more than capable of performing yet 
resistance to their employment by the craft unions ensured that only a handful were 
employed in the industry (Cockburn 1983). There were exceptions, such as the 
women’s printing society in Edinburgh in the 1860s which employers engaged to 
break a strike of compositors in 1872 (Drake 1984: 33). They were paid half the 
men’s wage rate. In 1910 the Typographical Society served notice on employers to 
eliminate cheap female labour. An agreement was reached stopping further female 
apprentice compositors until 1916, a success that was achieved due to: “the hearty 
support of the ladies themselves (Drake 1984: 35). Women were employed as 
compositors in Warrington news offices in 1880 and were found to be quicker than 
the men (Macdonald 1904: 46). Despite being paid a third of the men’s rate, the 
women didn’t stay long. 
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It was not only that the male-exclusive societies perceived female labour as a threat 
to their pay and conditions but there were deep-rooted cultural and societal 
prejudices against it. The Typographical Association (TA) in particular adopted an 
uncompromising policy against women and declared any office as ‘unfair’19 in which 
women were employed (Musson 1954).  
During the First World War when women entered the labour market in large 
numbers, the printing unions did all they could to exclude them. To fill labour 
shortages, the TA accepted that printing machine minders could manage more than 
one press, compositors were permitted to also run presses, rules against 
‘smooting20’ were lifted allowing members to work in different offices and overtime 
restrictions were suspended. Some employers tried to introduce women but the 
TA’s stand was largely successful (Musson 1954: 321-322). 
At the outbreak of the Second World War an Emergency Agreement was reached 
between the employers and unions to meet the needs of a war economy but the TA 
made it clear that “all attempts to introduce dilution of labour – women, labourers – 
must be resisted. (Musson 1954: 412). As the war progressed, some women 
‘dilutees’ were recruited and while the unions insisted they were paid the full rate, 
they restricted access to training. Through this the TA hoped to safeguard the 
standards of pay and prepare for the exclusion of the women when the war was over 
(Musson 1954: 416). 
In sectors where women were organised in unions, it was unlikely to be on a ‘craft’ 
basis but ‘industrial’ across a range of job functions. This was in large part due to the 
degree to which they identified themselves by gender rather than skill (Drake 1984). 
 
Patriarchy at work 
Printing apprentices took up their role in work structured not only by capital but by 
older men. The apprenticeship not only taught the arts and mysteries21 of the trade 
	
19 The union maintained a ‘Fair List’ of employers in which members could work 
20 Working as a casual operative for different employers 
21 A typical phrase used in apprenticeship indentures 
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but also appeared to be a rite of passage into manhood. The threat to lose such 
work, therefore, meant more than the mere loss of a livelihood (Cockburn 1983, 
Baron 1991).  
Baron (1991: 50) describes how apprentice boys acquired their masculinity during 
the long apprenticeship system and how printers sought to define their work as 
‘manly’, combining intellectual and manual labour. She describes how a man losing 
his job also lost his role and status within the family as ‘breadwinner’. Baron 
describes how workers who were discharged for incompetence lost their manliness 
as well as their job (1991: 59).  
Cockburn described how men relied upon the advantages accruing from:  
the hierarchical relations of patriarchy, the unions were male power bases 
and they gained much of their standing and comfort from their authority 
over women at work and at home. Their radicalism never came near 
relinquishing – or even questioning – that power (Cockburn 1983: 33). 
In 1972 the NGA had only 203 women members. In 1977, the Royal Commission on 
the Press highlighted that no national newspaper employed women in production. 
There was not a single woman amongst more than 5,000 compositors and in the 
regional press just 300 women worked alongside more than 11,000 men (Cockburn 
1983: 161). The NGA, sometimes referred to as ‘No Girls Allowed’ had just four per 
cent female membership in 1981. My own experience in the 1980s included securing 
employment for the first ever women in some significant workplaces. They received 
equal terms and conditions but their introduction was not without resistance. 
The structure and culture of craft unions such as the NGA enhanced the status of 
men by excluding and subordinating women (Dawson 2010, 2014). For some 
feminists it confirmed the failure of trade unionism to represent women on an equal 
footing. This phenomenon was not exclusive to craft unionism but they are held up 
for this stance because they had the power to enforce their will on the employers. 
Musson (1954) describes how when non-craft unions sought to organise women 
workers, they faced strong opposition from the craft unions and they “came to 
accept this viewpoint (p.387)”. Other unions have a poor record of welcoming 
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women into their ranks and supporting the cause of equal pay (Drake 1984, Boston 
2015).  
It wasn’t the craft union model of strong collective identity in itself that excluded 
women. In Cobble's (1990) study of waitresses in the US union HERE, however, she 
found that the successful organising campaign by women had utilised many of the 
characteristics of the craft union model. The craft emphasis on pride in the trade and 
loyalty to others in the same occupation encouraged the women’s identity with the 
union and fellow workers. 
Dawson (2010, 2014) concentrates on the failure of the union’s internal systems of 
representation including within the negotiating machinery of collective bargaining to 
advocate and achieve progress to secure gender equality. She touches on the mixed 
impact of technological change upon women workers, charting the fall in their 
numbers as a consequence of mechanisation, especially in bindery occupations but 
their increase as a result of new systems of composition. The gendered nature and 
culture of the NGA is a critical issue when it sought to recruit ‘non-traditional’ (ie: 
women) workers employed on new typesetting systems such as those utilised by 
Messenger Newspapers in the research case study. Bradley (1999) believed that 
employers tended to employ women to fill jobs more prone to the business cycle 
and technological restructuring. She considered ‘gender homogenization’, the 
blurring of gender divisions and the scale of convergence in patterns of employment 
and work histories. Her conclusion was that the structures of gender segregation had 
been dented but not displaced (1999: 213). 
The male-dominated craft unions were not entirely indifferent to the lot of women, 
especially those who worked in jobs of close proximity. There were examples of 
solidarity shown to women in bindery occupations in a number of disputes (Child 
1967). In a Gloucester printing company, the men refused to return to work after the 
1926 General Strike until all the women were reinstated22. In the rare cases where 
women were indentured as apprentices the union ensured equal pay and conditions 
(Gennard 1990). 
	
22 Gloucester Typographical Association Minutes 1926, held in Gloucestershire Records Office 
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Union policy may have taken a patronising attitude towards women but the 
overarching objective was to keep them at bay using any tactic and argument 
possible. Women were segregated into jobs identified as unskilled, emphasising 
elements of the job deemed to be masculine. Dawson (2010: 96) described this as 
sectional interests taking “the guise of gender interests masquerading as class 
interests.” 
In regard to technological change, there is a balance between the economics of 
capital investment and the price of labour. Employed in Warrington in the 1880s, 
women were on such low pay it was unnecessary for the business to introduce the 
new Linotype machines in order to remain competitive. Similar accounts came from 
women bindery workers and new technology. Macdonald (1904: 94-98) discusses 
machinery displacing women especially in mechanising hand-work. His research 
found examples of machinery replacing workers of both sexes but the women were 
seen as the more dispensable and were more likely to be discharged. As new 
typesetting machines were introduced in the 1970s and 80s they were seen as easier 
to operate and as such women could be employed to use them.  
The NGA, seeing the changing nature of the labour market through the 1970s, 
sought to break out of its segregated past with conscious efforts to recruit women, 
represent them within its structures and abandon its misogynist traditions (Gennard 
1990). It dropped its overtly sexist language and practices such as the sole term of 
‘father of the chapel’ and the monthly photos of semi-naked women in its journal. 
The leadership actively sought to recruit women but members were often reluctant. 
It established a Women’s Committee – initially with a man in the chair (NGA Minutes 
1980)! In negotiations with employers the NGA pressed for provisions for maternity 
and paternity leave, took up issues around sexual harassment and women’s health 
but such issues were often dropped in the process of collective bargaining (Dawson 
2014).  
Inequality was deeply embedded in all aspects of employment and the collective 
bargaining process struggled to address it. Dawson (2014) describes the gender pay 
gap in printing, how negotiating teams were dominated by men and the “muscular” 
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approach to the process. Equality issues often failed to get on the agenda and were 
the first to drop off. 
By 1980, male compositors were not only challenged by employers winning over the 
constraints of craft control through new technology, anti-labour legislation but by 
women in pursuit of equal access to employment. Whether by feminist incursion or 
employers taking advantage of lower-paid women workers, technology was breaking 
down the male bastions of the NGA and its control over the labour supply. Men saw 
their power diminishing and women had new opportunities for work but for both 
men and women, their collective power over capital was being reduced. Cockburn 
(1983) makes the case for fusing socialism with feminism and highlights the 
contradictions and confusions caused by a highly segmented labour market and its 
impact upon class solidarity. White-collar workers, women and men, look down on 
male manual production workers as being socially inferior despite earning 
considerably more money. “Men are torn between a working-class identity and a 
masculine one – all too often subordinating the former to the latter” (Cockburn 
1983: 213).  
In her feminist analysis of the technological change in printing, Cockburn does not 
predict or propose the mechanisms for transforming the industry and in whose 
interest such change would be. Technological advance is presented as an inevitable 
development yet highly gendered. She questioned whether the new-style workforce, 
with more knowledge of machinery and labour, will stay loyal to capitalism. She 
wondered if “advanced technology carries the seeds of revolution within it” (1983: 
218). But when the book was republished in 1991 her afterward acknowledged that 
employers had used technological change combined with legal reforms to “scupper” 
the newspaper compositors (1991: 234) and while the number of women in the 
industry had increased their status relative to men had not.  
 
Strategic choice in craft unions 
The ‘culture’ of the craft workplace, its ground rules and atmosphere, rooted in the 
labour process, could be determined by the workers themselves, acting together. If 
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everyone decides to take a tea break at a certain time, it is hard for management to 
prevent it. If there is a shared position that a particular task takes twenty minutes, it 
becomes part of the operation even if it can be done in fifteen. These practices then 
offer points to bargain over. If the boss wants it done in fifteen there is a price! 
Workers found a variety of forms of collective action to gain power and influence in 
the workshop such as calling meetings, refusal to train others, slow-downs and 
strikes. They could determine the inner life of the workplace often through unilateral 
action but also through compromise and accommodation (Hyman 1975: 152).  
At what level within the union decisions could be made depended upon the power 
of the chapel and branch. NGA branches, called local ‘graphical societies’, retained 
considerable autonomy, but the industrial power existed at the point of production 
within chapels, especially for time-critical newspapers and magazines.  
Blissett (2013: 71) confirms the success of the craft union model in generating an 
“almost doctrinaire belief in the defence and perpetuation of chapel and branch 
autonomy”. He concluded from his analysis of policy-making in British and Australian 
unions, that this made adjusting union strategies to cope with a transformed 
institutional and industrial environment extremely problematic.  
The diagram in Appedix Seven sets out the range of options for union leaders and 
how they relate to unions built around strong occupational identity. Much of the 
literature considers startegic choice as being primarily the orientation with 
employers, to seek confrontation or cooperation. Yet strong occupational unions can 
adopt a variety of positions and have been typified by seeking good relations with 
employers. Darlington (1994) considered that the strength of militant chapels was 
constrained by the officialdom of the union. 
For unions such as the NGA, its leaders took a largely pragmatic approach to each 
employer except when they sought significant advances in the terms of national 
agreements as the case studies will examine. ‘Strategic choice’ for its leaders often 
concerned such matters as the level of contributions, the range and extent of 
membership benefits, the alteration of demarcation boundaries, relations with other 
unions and the allocation of resources to recruitment.  
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Strategy and associational power in printing 
Chapter Two described the nature of associational power. Craft unions saw little if 
anything to gain from association with other crafts (Cole, 1915: 213-214) and the 
relationship with other unions was based on the need to guard against membership 
incursion.  
After the Second World War there were a dozen or so printing unions, some 
representing a very narrow craft group or occupational sector. By the 1980s they 
had merged into either the NGA or Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT). 
In commercial printing the respective territories were clear, in newspapers the 
demarcation lines were more open to argument. The unions had mostly been part of 
the National Agreements covering commercial printing and the newspaper industry. 
Relations between unions became strained when technological change combined 
different union functions and led to competition over work (Gennard 1990). 
The friendly society benefits of craft unionism, the social networks and internal 
organisational issues meant they focused most of their attention on matters 
confined to their own business and relations with employers within their own 
particular industry (Fox 1958). Some craft unions, such as in engineering operated 
within a wide range of industrial sectors where relations with other unions was a 
constant matter of importance (Mortimer 1960). The degree to which a union 
needed to influence allied unions depended upon its status within the sectoral 
agreements in terms of membership numbers and industrial power.  
The NGA worked within cross-union committees within its own printing back-yard 
but it did not concentrate on building strong alliances across the labour movement 
or within the wider community (Gennard 1990). That did not mean that individual 
members and activists did not take a very full part in such affairs and many 
represented the union on trades councils and college committees. Some became 
councillors and JPs. Some individual activists played leading roles within trade union 
history. For example R Hartman was the Secretary of the campaign to free the 
Tolpuddle Martyrs in 1834. Compositors SC Nicholson and WH Wood called the first 
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Trades Union Congress in 1868 and CW Bowerman of the London compositors was 
the TUC Secretary 1911-1921 (TUC 1934, 1968b).  
Institutionally, craft unions tended to be strong enough to focus upon their own 
affairs with little need for allies or partners. In the 1970s the NGA was required to 
resign from the TUC after it registered under the Heath government reforms in 
defiance of a policy of opposition. At the time its leadership adopted a politically 
‘moderate’ position, supported by delegate meetings and membership votes 
(Gennard 2000). If there was what could be described as a shared ideology within 
the union it was not a left-wing one. In 1973 NGA members voted by two-to-one not 
to take part in the TUC May Day protest strike as recommended by the leadership 
(Milligan 1976). It was not a ‘labourist’ union in the way Cole (1915) describe as 
having a narrow focus on improving wages and conditions in that it had a wider role 
in membership support as a society of workers with shared interests. 
Through the 1970s, as some aspects of print production became less dependent 
upon skilled craft workers the NGA sought to follow the job into in-plant units. This 
clashed with the dominant unions who had bargaining rights such as in local 
government. The case study of the 1980 printing dispute for this research is an 
example of the NGA disregarding the views of the other unions in the industry. Cole 
(1915) stressed the risk in such independent actions and felt that as long as a craft 
union remained on good terms with the employers and semi-skilled workers did not 
threaten to encroach on its territory, it could remain detached from other 
associations.  
As technological change eroded its positional power, the NGA was forced to engage 
with other unions that represented members competing for the same work. It also 
need to build alliances beyond its industry to gain wider political and industrial 
influence. The case studies in the study expose the challenges this involved in a 





When I was first elected as a full-time officer for the NGA in 1981 there were still a 
number of small-town newspaper offices and commercial printers that would have 
been entirely familiar to William Caxton from 1476. Pieces of lead were assembled 
into words, lines and pages with a relief image so that, when ink was applied and 
paper pressed on them, a printed image was produced.  
Mechanisation had sped-up the setting of type. but skilled and experienced 
operators were still required. Like a manual typewriter a bell would ring as the 
operator approached the end of a line. Judgement was needed over whether the 
next word could be squeezed in, carried over to the next line or hyphenated. The 
preceding spaces would be adjusted to 'justify' the line to fit the column width, 
known as the ‘measure’. The columns of mirror-image type were arranged into 
pages using a complex puzzle of lead pieces, blocks for pictures, headlines and rules 
then squeezed into a frame with such accuracy that none of the pieces would come 
loose during the printing process.  
The letterpress printing presses got faster as ways were developed to turn the flat 
block of type into a rotary drum. But this was overtaken by developments in 
lithography, another age-old process using a chemical process to separate the 
printed image. Lightweight aluminium plates and rubber drums to 'offset' the 
printed image allowed much faster printing, including both sides of the paper at the 
same time.  
Using photography to etch the image to the plate meant that words and pictures 
could be reproduced in ways, other than through the arrangement of pieces of 
metal. Phototypesetting was quickly overtaken by computerisation and 'desk-top 
publishing'. In a couple of decades, the printing office changed from a craft 
workshop to a design studio, from frames of typecases to banks of computers in 
open-plan offices. The craft of the compositor was largely eliminated. 
The first technological challenge to the power of the compositor was at the turn of 
the twentieth century when mechanical means were invented to set type. Employers 
and manufacturers argued that the new machines were not that much more 
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complicated to operate than a typewriter. Monotype, the manufacturer of the 
leading typesetting machine in commercial printing, offered training courses aimed 
at women (Musson 1954) but the unions were able to restrict entry to them. 
Unlike the Linotype machine, the Monotype system required a keyboard operator 
and a casting attendant. This led to demarcation and payment disputes between 
unions and the employers (Musson 1954: 210). As an apprentice compositor I 
learned Monotype keyboard, casting and hand composition. The casting room was 
more akin to a foundry operation, turning a molten lead alloy into hot metal type. By 
the time of my experience the union had embraced the role of the casting process as 
a skilled function and part of its occupational identity. This was not a given and had 
to be socially constructed by the union. In trade typesetters and small print shops, 
the Typographical Association was able to claim this work but in some 
establishments there was inter-union rivalry over the operation and employers 
sought to employ caster attendants on lower pay than the compositor. 
In 1911 national strike action was threatened by the compositors that succeeded in 
maintaining control of the machines, secured higher pay rates for their use and a 
reduced working week but the numbers of workers employed fell (Musson 1954: 
144, Zeitlin 1979). The International Typographical Union, in the US, acquired 
Linotype machines in order to train its members to use them (Lipset 1968) and retain 
control. 
Zeitlin (1979: 272) in his comparative analysis between compositors and engineers 
1890-1930 concluded that it was the market structure which: 
create the pressures for change and set the limits for confrontation, and the 
divisions within the ranks of workers and employers themselves which so 
influence each party’s relative strength. 
Employers sought to utilise technological change and so-called scientific 
management to break-up and disrupt the power of skilled workers in order to pay 
the lowest price (Braverman 1975). The result has not been the elimination of labour 
but its displacement to other occupations and industries. The compositors had won 
command over the technology whereas the engineers faced competition from other 
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groups of workers. The engineering employers maintained far greater unity than 
their counterparts in printing, partly due to the nature of the product market (Zeitlin 
1979).  
An important feature of the printing industry was its fragmented nature involving a 
complex network of specialist skills and production methods (Rainnie 2016). A 
printed product passed through numerous different firms from conception, design, 
composition, plate-making, printing and binding. Trade typesetters would be used 
for particular jobs, specialists may be required or expensive equipment such as large 
cameras and scanners with highly skilled operators. Metal type or ‘camera-ready 
artwork’ could arrive from multiple sources to make-up a single job. Different 
presses were used depending upon the size, volume and colours required. The 
nature of the industry provided unions with particular leverage provided they could 
organise solidarity action across the industry. If the union faced a dispute with an 
employer, members in other firms were expected not to send or receive work from 
the company until the conflict was resolved (Gennard 1990).  This significantly 
extended the union’s positional power beyond the individual workplace. 
For a union whose strength relies on the nature of the production process and the 
skills required, technological change poses a particular threat. Phelps-Brown (1986: 
24) wrote “Technical change was liable to bypass any toll-gate held by a union”. 
Davies (1986: 34) writes of the ‘social bias’ of technology in that it is “not an 
autonomous force but used to increase managerial control over workers”.  
As described in Chapter Two, the positional power of craft unionism depends upon 
the technology and requirements of the production process. The Linotype and 
Monotype machines may have been owned by the capitalist but it was the 
compositors who, through their organisational strength, retained the power of 
knowledge to utilise them. Unions that relied upon control of a craft labour support 
made sure they were aware of any new ideas and technologies that might challenge 
their position. Through the 1970s and 80s, NGA members and the union’s leaders 
were well aware of the changing technology (Gennard 1990) and the threat it posed 




3.5 The way technology changed newspaper production and union influence 
 
By the 1970s, instead of setting type with pieces of lead, new photo-typesetters 
were coming onto the market. Products such as Letraset and golf-ball typewriters 
provided an alternative to ‘hot metal’ typesetting. Authors, journalists and 
advertising copy-takers traditionally typed out the words so that the compositors 
could ‘set’ them into type. As technology advanced it became feasible to type the 
copy directly into the composition system and eliminate the compositor almost 
completely. This ‘direct input’ or ‘single keystroke’ significantly reduced the 
workforce and led to a struggle for control of the jobs that were left. Journalists, 
advertising staff and compositors were pitted against each other for the work.  
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The technology caused tensions between unions as they competed for influence 
over the process. The National Society of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media 
Personnel (NATSOPA) saw new technology as ending the barriers of craft 
exclusiveness and largely welcomed it (Martin R. 1981). The Society of Graphical and 
Allied Trades (SOGAT) Delegate Conference in May of 1983 carried a motion highly 
critical of the NGA and its “continued encroachment” into areas of its members 
work. It called on the union to meet the NGA’s “incursions head on” (SOGAT minutes 
1983). This was a contest between unions in which the employer was not a ‘neutral’ 
party. Given the choice, the employer opted for none of them and sought to 
eliminate trade union influence all together (Gennard 1990). Union leaders saw joint 
action as the most effective to control the new technology but as Martin (1981: 158) 
pointed out: “Like virtue, unity is desirable in principle but inconvenient in practice”. 
The NGA sought to use its control of the final make-up and printing to retain control 
over the process. Artwork arriving at an office would need to carry an impression or 
stamp signed by the union chapel from where it came. Members were instructed not 
to touch artwork without such a stamp or label (Gennard 1983 and Dunn 1985). If 
the union could not ensure the work came through their organised workplaces, it 
would seek to organise those places that did it. The union had to learn the skills of 
recruiting new members just at a time when their popularity was poor (Blissett 
2013).  
Members looked to their Association for support in the face of rapid advance of new 
technology and expected its past success to be maintained. The union developed 
ways to help members retrain and learn new skills. This grew to encompass wider 
learning opportunities and the development of a suite of services to support 
members (Gennard 1987). But these appear to have been mainly branch-level 
initiatives rather than a strategic approach by the union leadership. 
The NGA National Council established a special committee to consider its response 
to what was described as ‘work by-passing the composing room’. It studied emerging 
processes and analysed technological developments in the US.23 Griffin (1984) 
	
23 NGA National Council Minutes 17.3.83 – see Appendix 2 
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compared the process of technological change and craft control across the UK, 
Australia and America. At the time he was writing he found that the UK unions had 
been able to maintain a broadly united front against employers seeking to challenge 
craft controls. In New York the privileged position of the Typographical Union left 
them struggling to gain support from other print unions and Griffin (1984: 57) found 
that in both Sydney and New York the lack of inter-union solidarity and therefore the 
inability to stop publication was crucial in favour of employers. Griffin reflected on 
events at The Times newspaper in London in 1979 when the employer sought to 
break the unions through an eleven-month lock-out. The tactic failed as it united the 
unions in the dispute. The rival Fleet Street publishers raised production to fill the 
gap – and with it employed many of the workers locked out (Martin R. 1981). 
Earlier, in 1972 T Bailey Forman began to take an aggressive stance against union 
control at the Nottingham Evening Post. The newspaper appeared throughout a 
number of disputes by using strike breakers and agency copy instead of local 
journalists.  
 
Amalgamation as a strategic option 
Narrow, craft-based unions faced with the loss of their craft sought mergers with 
other unions to gain access to new jobs or retraining. An example was when new 
platemaking technologies replaced the work done by members of the National 
Society of Electrotypers and Stereotypers. Workers making stereo plates for 
letterpress printing were threatened by new technology and the shift to lithographic 
plates. They could not compete with the more powerful NGA for control over new 
job functions. In 1967 the small craft union transferred into the NGA protecting its 
members employment and accommodating retraining into the wider work of the 
composing room (Gennard 1990: 98-100).  
A merger option would relax demarcation boundaries and would secure the security 
of officials (Streeck and Visler 1998). Union mergers sought to unite workers in the 
same workplace or sector, preventing the employer from exploiting union divisions 
and maximising resources (Gennard 2008). The process of amalgamation, however, 
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dilutes occupational identity and disrupts established formal and informal networks 
and customs (Waddington 2000, 2005). Common bonds established through a 
narrow, shared experience can be lost in the need to develop a new unity of purpose 
in the new union. Even informal networks and unofficial factions can be disrupted in 
the process of merger (Waddington 2005). In contrast, Smale (2018) observed that 
smaller, niche unions have survived even in a relatively poor financial state, opting 
not to pursue defensive mergers. 
One niche union was the Association of Correctors of the Press (ACP) that 
represented proof readers, initially within a fifteen mile radius of the London Post 
Office, who passed a tough entrance examination and could show six years’ 
experience as a copy holder (Shane 1954). Of the 120-130 candidates who took the 
annual exam only a quarter passed (Gennard 1990: 96-97). The ACP sought to 
uphold high standards of proof reading and much of the discussions in its journal 
were as much about correct grammar as pay negotiations24. Nicknamed the ‘Comma 
Club’, it had a lively level of membership participation devoted largely to upholding 
the professional status of the job and acting as a voluntary employment agency 
(Shane 1954). The Typographical Society and then the NGA considered all its 
composing room members as being capable of proof reading and encroached on the 
ACP membership. Many ACP readers wanted employment in the growing industry 
outside London where the NGA held sway. The amalgamation promised designated 
representation for proof-readers at every level of the NGA to assuage fears that their 
identity would be lost. In the end the vote for merger was carried by just 51 votes 
(Gennard 1990: 98). Whatever gains or losses followed for proof-readers, the 
features of their exclusive society and its focus on the professional aspects of the 
occupation were diminished. 
Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2018) share the view that rank-and-file 
involvement is greatest in unions with a skilled and homogeneous membership and 
the tendency towards larger conglomerate unions weakens internal democracy 
creating strong and authoritarian leaders who retain control through the largely 
passive consent of members. Thomas (2017) found that in the larger general unions 
	
24 Journals kept in the Three Shires Graphical Society library 
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corporate management and efficiency took precedence over internal democracy. 
Faniel (2012:141) argued that the bureaucratisation of trade unions is ill-suited to a 
real internally democratic operation and that passivity of members undermines the 
effectiveness of the union. Conglomerate unions must preserve their internal 
cohesion at the expense of the sense of proximity and camaraderie held within 
occupational groups. Lyddon (2015) came to a similar conclusion and that general 
unions, where no closed group of workers had a dominant interest, tended to have 
low membership participation and display the greatest difference between members 
and professional officers.  
Conglomerate union strategists and policy makers can become bogged-down in 
bureaucratic routines (Hyman 2007) or feel obliged to champion a ‘one model fits 
all’ approach to the large and diverse membership needs. Craft or ‘closed’ unions are 
able to lever control over labour supply and have a more assertive democratic 
control over decision-making (Allen 1954, Turner 1962). 
Undy (2018: 141) describes unions as collectives formed from disparate individuals 
and groups, “divided and united by occupation” and as such embodying permanent 
tensions and fault lines that have implications for governance and structure. In 
‘general’ unions there is conflict between the priorities that may be given to 
members in certain sectors and the need to achieve and maintain unity across the 
whole union. When the Transport and General Workers Union was established its 
structure sought to balance trade groups with territorial representation (Coates and 
Topham 1991: 841, Adonis 2020). Unite the Union has 22 industrial sectors25. The 
National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) wrestled with its 
structure to ensure it retained the collective identity members had in their 
association as it grew into new sectors (Spoor 1967), an issue UNISON faced. In large 
conglomerate unions generic services become more important and centralised. 
Membership identity is inevitably less regarded and decentralised in the name of 
greater class unity. As an ally of the syndicalist movement, Cole argued that it was a 




identity. He lists other benefits of larger combinations, the prime point being that it 
is “superior in its better adaptation to the needs of industrial warfare” (1915: 215). 
When covering a wide range of occupations and industrial sectors it is difficult to 
speak with one voice for all members. The need to protect the union from legal 
challenge, potential impact from the action of one group on another, such as 
demarcation and pay differentials, means that decisions on collective bargaining and 
industrial action are controlled from the top (Streeck and Visler 1998).  Welfare aid 
and services, which provided ‘cradle-to-grave’ craft membership, have been 
sacrificed in many of the larger unions and with them has gone the less tangible 
benefits that come from the strong community of workers within a special interest 
group. The union becomes a more distant institution rather than a combination of 
workers and ceases to be embedded in the everyday work process. The union is seen 
as only needed when a problem arises and as Streeck and Visler (1998: 41) describe, 
most members do not need the union most of the time. 
In conclusion both Waddington (2000) and Undy (2008) found that mergers, at best, 
have prevented members from leaving but the overall membership decline that led 
to the amalgamation continued unabated. This has proved the case with the 
trajectory for NGA, merging into Unite, then Amicus and currently Unite26. Dawson 
(2010: 97) concluded that the mergers in printing had helped to mitigate the loss of 
members rather than helping to establish unionism in more promising job territories.  
In Paul Smith’s (2001) study of unionisation in the road haulage industry, he 
concluded that British drivers failed to create a powerful union like the US Teamsters 
devoted exclusively to their interests. Such a sectional occupational union might 
have helped them raise their status and achieve a clear identity rather than 
becoming a rather isolated group inside the Transport and General Workers union. 
Despite the advantages of combined resources and expertise, the merger process 
has negative effects on membership identity and mobilisation. These processes have 
left an increasingly centralised a top-down union leadership and diminished 
	
26 TUC statistics 
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membership participation (Murray 2017, Waddington 2000).  
Streeck and Visler (1998) concluded that centralised service provision of the more 
general unions led to decentralised representation and participation. Combined 
strike funds in conglomerate unions reduce the vulnerability when exposed to a 
dominant sector and its fortunes or employer offensives. But they also found it led 
to greater central control over strike action. Leaders need to take into account the 
impact of action on other groups of members. They cannot deploy identity as a 
strategic tool in the way narrow occupational groups can. 
The fragmented and fluid labour market has taken away much of the ground upon 
which craft unions flourished. Visser (2012) concluded there was no future in craft or 
occupational unionism. It was, in his view, a form of exclusive unionism suited to 
stable occupations that lasted a lifetime and not suited to the current labour market. 
But he does argue for unions to develop the offer around training and mid-career 
progression assistance. Careers may have become more fluid and the nature of work 
more insecure but as some defined job roles disappear new ones emerge around 
which a collective identity can be built. Smale concluded that many unions retaining 
a niche identity have successfully exploited a position in the labour market and 
advocates a systematic reconsideration of contemporary union identity (2018: 22). 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter contextualized the nature of craft trade unionism and how this was 
typified within printing. It examines how these unions were founded upon significant 
positional power in relation to employers due to the technology, production process 
and industrial structure (Child 1967). It charts a very long time-frame during which 
the fundamentals of the production process changed little and embedded traditions 
that helped shape industrial relations. It helps explain why these were engrained in 
the lifeblood of the union to be cherished and protected against the challenges from 
employers and the state. 
The relationship between workers and their employer was the bedrock of union 
purpose. The union’s organisational strength, however, was based upon factors 
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wider than the individual workplace. It formed a community of workers with shared 
interests bound together with systems for welfare provision, social networks and 
occupational status (Musson 1954). This model of trade unionism developed ‘social 
capital’ through the informal networks and systems of mutual support (Jarley 2005). 
This reinforced the organisational resilience and the sense of group pride. Such 
strong sectionalism, however, generated divisions between unions (Lane 1974).  
The closed shop was a central feature of the organisation of the NGA but while this 
exclusive approach built solidarity it created disunity within the wider workforce and 
was based upon gender division (Cockburn 1983). Such features of printing craft 
unionism helped develop organisational strength but left it vulnerable to 
technological, societal and industrial change. The tradition of self-reliance and 
exclusivity left such unions potentially isolated and lacking in associational power.  
To explore these issues in more depth, this research examines two significant 
disputes in the printing industry in the 1980s. It is necessary to set the context for 
the case studies, which made this period pivotal for the future of the union and the 
wider labour movement. British unions, by and large, favoured free collective 
bargaining over ‘institutional’ power through regulation, but this was challenged by 
a Conservative government determined to reduce union power. The next chapter, 
therefore, will examine the battle over industrial relations reforms and how 
governments targeted the mechanisms relied upon by craft unions in printing such 
as ‘secondary action’ and the closed shop. The chapter looks at the clash of ideology 
that pitted a powerful union founded upon strong collective identity against a 




Politics and the law, the industrial relations background 
 
Introduction 
The case studies in this research reflect a period of turbulent labour market change. 
In the 1980s the printing unions faced challenges from the Thatcher governments’ 
reforms of labour law and from the introduction of new technology. This chapter 
sets the scene and summarises the background. It explains the sense of foreboding 
apparent after two decades of controversy over trade union reform. For 
Conservative Party policy-makers and minsters the reforms introduced in 1980 and 
1983 had not been tested and were not secure.  
Reform to the UK’s ‘voluntarist’ system of labour relations regulation was considered 
by Labour as well as Conservative governments over the 1960s and 1970s. It was 
from 1979, however, that Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher 
sought to use the law to radically reform the UK’s economic and social landscape 
(Wedderburn 1987, Dorey 1995, 2009, 2014).  
Explained in this chapter is the voluntarist legacy in UK labour relations, dating from 
the end of the 19th century when Parliament enacted statutory trade union 
immunities from common law liabilities. ‘Free collective bargaining’ set the terms of 
employment for most British workers rather than a state regulated system. Unions, 
especially those with the industrial power to benefit from free collective bargaining, 
fought to defend it. This was especially true for the industrially powerful printing 
unions.  
This chapter considers how the industrial relations system of the UK shaped the way 
trade unions developed and how it tended to focus attention on positional and 
organisational power at the workplace rather than institutional power provided by 
legislation to facilitate collective bargaining or provide a framework of workplace 
rights and minimum standards (Schamlz and Dörre 2020). The chapter examines the 
context of successive government attempts over the 1960s and 1970s at industrial 
relations reform and how the trade union movement was able to resist such changes 
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until the advent of the Conservative government of 1979. Margaret Thatcher led the 
new government after a period of internal policy debate over a step-by-step 
approach to trade union reform (Dorey 1995). The Chapter uses relevant literature 
and confidential Conservative Party papers, held in the Bodleian Library, recently 
released for research purposes. The chapter goes on to examine the role of the TUC 
in coordinating the trade union response to these reforms. These set the context for 
the case studies in which the NGA became the first union to be confronted by an 
employer utilizing the new laws. 
 
Whose freedom? 
Much debate on industrial relations over the twentieth century centred on the 
extent to which law and the courts influenced and regulated collective bargaining 
and the operation of trade unions. The Webbs said, although legal, trade unions’  
status was precarious (1920). GDH Cole wrote how unions came into conflict with 
the law as soon as they took any action (1924: 140). Throughout the history of trade 
unions there has been conflict over the degree to which the law regulates their 
activities. This research looks at a time when this issue was at the centre of political 
debate but the nature of employment law remains a contentious topic27. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unions were given a set of 
immunities from civil action that heralded what became known as a system of 
‘voluntarism’. British law developed a system of collective laissez-faire to limit the 
intervention of the courts within industrial relations. The law stood aside except to 
accommodate collective bargaining (Marsh, 1992: 3, Kahn-Freund 1959: 224). In 
1911 Winston Churchill told the House of Commons: “It is not good for trade unions 
that they be brought in contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts” 
(Pelling 1982: 901). British law made a virtue of trying to keep out of relations 
between employers and trade unions (Brown 2011, Palmer 1986). Without a positive 
framework of rights underpinned by law, however, unions relied on industrial 
	
27 Motion to 2020 TUC Congress as an example 
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strength through restricting the labour supply or by weight of numbers and solidarity 
(Frege 2004, 2003; Frege and Kelly 2011). The ‘voluntarist’ framework of British 
industrial relations suited those unions with significant industrial or positional 
power. Strong unions wanted no legal intervention and sought little assistance from 
the state as they possessed the capacity to starve the employer of critical skills 
(Lévesque and Murray 2010). This was buttressed by highly effective organisational 
systems and structures to regulate the terms for their members (Clegg 1954: 291). In 
the early nineteenth century craft workers believed it was their discretion to 
determine their terms. Clegg, Fox and Thompson (1964: 4) cite the London Union of 
Compositors who in 1834 declared: “what we alone have a right to regulate, the 
value of our labour”.  
Academics argued over the extent to which capitalism was prepared to 
accommodate free collective bargaining (Hyman 1987, Ewing 1998: 2, Dickens and 
Hall 2003). The debate raged about comparative industrial relations systems (Kahn-
Freund 1959, Donovan 1968, Hyman 1972, Milligan 1976, Wedderburn 1986, 
Metcalf 1989). The unequal development of relations and a reliance on industrial 
power placed emphasis on shop-floor leadership and adversarial bargaining tactics 
to secure advances for members rather than political influence and legal protections. 
Unions resisted legal reforms that might impinge upon their industrial actions and 
freedom to organise themselves (McIlroy 1990). This was especially true for 
powerful industrial unions including those in the printing industry. 
The voluntary system, with few legal safeguards, left behind those workers not able 
to organise themselves. Alternative systems, more reliant upon a legal framework of 
rights (institutional power), were developed across continental Europe after the 
Second World War, along with the concept of ‘social partnership’ in which unions, 






Post-war industrial relations 
The post-war period saw trade union membership grow and collective bargaining 
become a more central feature of the labour market (Undy 2015). Printing in 
common with other craft and manufacturing trades developed sophisticated joint 
arrangements for conditions of employment and apprentice numbers, training and 
accreditation. Most terms of employment, determined by national agreements 
between the unions and federations of employers, included various forms of dispute 
resolution. Whilst the Conservative Party was reluctant to legislate to regulate trade 
unions, some on the right of the Party, pressed for regulations to limit the closed 
shop, the frequency of strikes, particularly unofficial ones, and the financial support 
unions gave to the Labour Party (McKelvey 1953; Dorey 2006).  
Conservatives increasingly blamed trade unions for economic problems and Freidrich 
Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) argued that unions had become uniquely 
privileged institutions to which the general rules of law do not apply. These rights, he 
claimed rendered the market system ineffective. Through the 1960s and 70s the 
debate raged about the nature of industrial relations with a growing clamour within 
the Conservative Party for restrictions on trade unions. 
The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations in 1968 chaired 
by Lord Donovan supported reform of collective bargaining but unions sought to 
retain the status quo of the voluntarist approach. The TUC argued that the 
State should stand aside with an attitude of abstention and formal 
indifference (Woodcock 1968, McCarthy 1972). The Labour Government in 1969 
responded to the Donovan Report with proposals for a new framework of industrial 
relations in a White Paper, ‘In Place of Strife’. After a bitter dispute with the unions, 
the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson agreed to abandon most of the White Paper. 
Barbara Castle felt the trade union movement “had done itself great harm by its 
‘hands off us’ attitude and would pay the price under a Tory government” (Castle 
1993: 424-425). Undy (2015: 14) concluded that the episode could, retrospectively, 
be seen as: “a missed opportunity, rather than a betrayal of union rights”. The 
divisions over In Place of Strife were perceived as a factor in the defeat of the Labour 
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Government in 1970 but it emboldened trade unions to oppose future attempts to 
restrict their activities whilst convincing Conservatives that a robust and more 
regulatory, interventionist approach was required (Dorey 1995). 
Rising inflation in the 1970s saw increased industrial action over pay. The 1971 
Industrial Relations Act sought to stabilise industrial relations by placing 
responsibility on union leadership to regulate industrial action, if necessary, through 
the courts. The Act, influenced by the American model of regulation (Fosh, Morris, 
Martin, Smith and Undy 1993) was a complex range of measures including a 
requirement on unions to register in order to retain immunities, legally binding 
collective agreements, a new Industrial Relations Court, rights for workers not to 
belong to a union and ways to hold a union responsible for the action of any of its 
members (IBID).  Dorey (1995: 97) believed that most union members supported the 
reforms but were: “none the less readily mobilised against the Act by their union 
leaders”. The Trades Union Congress, according to Darlington (2018), reluctantly 
called a 'Day of Action' in protest, with a ‘Kill the Bill’ march through London. The 
TUC required its member unions not to comply with the Bill’s provisions and 
organised further demonstrations in protest. The most effective tactic was to ensure 
that most affiliated unions refused to register under the law (Dorey 1995: 98).  
The NGA broke ranks, however, and complied with the legislation claiming that it 
had to protect its special financial arrangements to pay unemployment and other 
provident benefits to members. The TUC did not accept the NGA’s special pleading 
and it was suspended from membership at the 1972 Congress. The union’s isolation 
from the rest of the TUC reflected its ability to operate effectively regardless of the 
new restrictions. Its industrial power left it immune from the measures and it was 
prepared to be ostracised by the rest of the movement. 
Early in 1972 the mineworkers took national strike action for the first time since 
1926. They had significant public support and coal was the principal fuel for 
electricity generation and gas production. The large gas works at Saltley in 
Birmingham was used to store coking coal and Arthur Scargill from the Mineworkers’ 
Union organised a picket of the depot. The picket grew each day and on 10 February 
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1972 workers from Birmingham factories, especially engineers, joined the picket in 
large numbers. Faced with the massive crowd, the police ordered the gates to be 
shut (Tomison 1972). The new tactic of ‘flying pickets’ to blockade a strategically 
important site and win a symbolic victory helped determine the outcome of the 
dispute. Shortly afterwards the National Coal Board made an improved pay offer and 
the dispute was settled. Mass picketing and secondary action to back-up strike 
action had proved successful. This physical trial of strength between union pickets 
and the police became an emblematic struggle for the labour movement, 
dramatized in theatre and song. Echoes of this incident return in the case study of 
the Messenger dispute in 1983. Stung by their failure at Saltley, the police took 
measures to prevent a repetition (Wiles 1985). 
Later in 1972, dockers at the Chobham Farm container depot in Newham took 
unofficial action and began picketing the site. The action continued despite a legal 
injunction to stop. Five shop stewards refused to appear before the court and were 
arrested for contempt of court. Imprisoned in Pentonville Prison on 21 July 1972, 
they became known as the ‘Pentonville Five’. Following their arrest, a rolling series 
of strikes became virtually an unofficial national strike (Pelling 1979: 279-80). The 
TUC called for an official national strike on 31 July, demanding the release of the five 
shop stewards. Thousands of striking workers marched to Pentonville Prison. The 
Government backed down and the five were released when the Official Solicitor 
overturned the arrests.  
Yet trade union resistance was not clear-cut. Later in 1972 railway workers took 
industrial action in pursuit of a pay rise, led by the powerful, yet not traditionally 
militant, train-drivers’ union, ASLEF (Ferris 1972). The Government turned to its 
Industrial Relations Act to impose a ‘cooling-off’ period. Ignoring the TUC’s outright 
opposition, the unions complied and when action was due to recommence the 
Government used the Act to require a members’ ballot. The unions complied again 
and when the votes produced huge majorities in favour of the action, a settlement 
was agreed. Unions claimed victory, side-stepping the fact they had breached the 
position adopted by the TUC. 
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The failure of the Act had a significant effect on future Conservative policy makers 
and a determination to avoid making such martyrs (Marsh 1992). Lord Scarman 
concluded that the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was an attempt to subject the 
power of the trade unions to the rule of law of the land;  “The challenge which faces 
lawyers is to win and retain public confidence in the law as the instrument of 
control” (cited in Weir 1986: 132-133). 
The TUC later reflected on the defeat of the 1971 Act and concluded that the 
aggressive posture adopted by unions made the law unworkable. Unions had 
successfully seen off hostile legislation through tactics of outright opposition.  
The Conservatives became increasingly split. Pragmatists argued that, like it or not, 
unions needed to be accommodated and brought into the management of economic 
policy. Others wanted a more robust assault on trade union power. Auerbach (1993) 
described the profound shift that was taking place away from the post-war 
consensus and ‘abstentionist’ approach in relation to the law and industrial 
relations. 
The British economy was rocked by the 1973 Middle East oil crisis and high rates of 
inflation. In response, the Government capped public sector pay rises. Faced with 
rapidly diminishing earnings, workers looked to their unions for action. In 1974 the 
Government faced a second miners’ strike in two years that quickly hit electricity 
supply. The government took drastic action and commercial users of electricity were 
limited to three specified consecutive days' consumption each week. To break the 
crisis, Heath called a general election over the issue of ‘Who Governs Britain?’. He 
lost narrowly and after the defeat the Conservative Party argued over the lessons to 
be learnt over how to constrain trade union power.  
 
Labour’s approach to industrial relations 
Labour in 1974 had to govern with a small parliamentary majority and faced serious 
economic problems. Harold Wilson, the new Prime Minister, within minutes of re-
entering No. 10, asked that the TUC and the CBI meet him and his new ministers. 
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The miners’ pay claim was swiftly settled and the three-day week brought to an end 
(Haines 1977: 198). The incoming government repealed the Conservative Industrial 
Relations Act through the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 with rules on 
trade union functioning and legal status, the presumption that a collective 
agreement is not binding and the immunity of unions who take strike action in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. 
Inflation remained high and Labour secured agreements with the TUC over pay 
policy, limiting wages rises to £6 a week in 1975 and further caps in 1976 and 1977. 
Inflation fell from 26.9 per cent at its height to around ten per cent28. Unions wanted 
to sustain Labour in power but, with pressure from their rank-and-file, wanted a 
return to free collective bargaining (Pelling 1979, Taylor 1980). The Government 
pressed ahead with a five per cent pay cap despite opposition from the TUC and 
warnings over the consequences, especially amongst the lowest paid public sector 
workforce. Trade union membership reached a peak at around thirteen million 
members29. By late 1978, anger was growing in the public workforce including refuse 
collectors, grave-diggers, hospital porters and nurses. In January 1979 a series of 
strikes took place in what became known as the ‘Winter of Discontent’. Rubbish 
piled up in city streets, picket lines appeared outside hospitals and local councils. In 
February an agreement was reached with the TUC but the images of strike-prone 
Britain etched an indelible mark on public opinion. Much of the 1979 General 
Election was fought around the issue of trade union power and scenes of strikes and 
rising unemployment helped the Tories to win under the leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher (Pelling 1979, Taylor 1980, Jackson 1982, Marsh 1992) 
In 1979 the NGA was fined £80,000 for blacking firms that advertised in the 
Nottingham Evening Post. The courts ruled that the NGA had no ‘trade dispute’ with 
these companies (Gennard 1990: 475). This ruling was under the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act introduced by Labour to replace the Industrial Relations Act of 
	
28 https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/2647/economics/history-of-inflation-in-uk/ 
29 TUC membership records 
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the previous Conservative Government but prompted debate over “Are the union 
above the law?30. 
 
The New Right prepares a step-by-step approach 
In the run-up to the 1979 General Election the Conservatives prepared their 
approach to trade union reform. Policy makers studied the mistakes of previous 
legislations, especially under Edward Heath – what Auerbach describes as the 
“political horror of this experience” (Auerbach 1993: 39). The Conservative 
leadership recognised that all-out war on trade unions and an open strategy to seek 
revenge would not win support from the electorate or the consent of ordinary trade 
unionists. Such an approach would lose the party’s claims to be a ‘national party’. 
The Right, however, believed that their case for major trade union reform had been 
vindicated. They were gathering strength in the party and opinion hardened against 
voluntarism and neo-corporatism. The influential economist Friedrich Hayek 
proposed the restriction of picketing, the abolition of the closed shop, extension of 
collective agreements and tort immunity of unions – ideas that gained ground in the 
Conservative Party under its new leadership (Dorey 2013). 
The question became not whether a future Conservative Government should seek to 
reform trade unions but how far and how fast it should go. In an article entitled 
‘Preparing to tackle the trade unions by stealth’, David Mahony (1976) a former Bow 
Group official advocated a more subtle approach in which the strengths and 
weaknesses of unions would be analysed and ‘guerilla warfare’ tactics adopted. 
Unions should be softened up before confrontation. Nicholas Scott advised a future 
Conservative Government to take small evolutionary steps to alter the laws 
governing trade unions (The Times 3 Feb 1976).  
The report: Stepping Stones, a private ‘communications programme’ produced in 
1977 by John Hoskyns and Norman Strauss, aimed to shift the terms of the debate 
on trade unions and challenge those Conservatives who sought an accommodation 
	
30 Militant, 13 April 1979 
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with them. It became a blueprint for the first Thatcher Government, 1979-83. In his 
diary, Hoskyns reported that Thatcher ‘had read the draft report and was thrilled 
with it’. Yet Stepping Stones was far from generally accepted. Lord Thorneycroft, the 
Conservative Party chairman, interpreted it as a ‘smash the unions’ strategy and 
was, according to Hoskyns, anxious to have all copies recalled and destroyed (cited 
in Taylor 2001). 
In confidential Conservative papers, held in the Bodleian Library, the summary of 
‘Stepping Stones’ policy stresses how central trade union reform was to the Party’s 
policy agenda (Conservative Party 1979). Despite a few individual voices to the 
contrary, anti-unionism was deeply embedded in the Conservative Party with 
“visceral ideological hostility” (Auerbach 1993: 223; Hyman 1972). 
Nicholas Ridley argued that unions must be blamed for rising unemployment: 
“People must be made to suffer the consequences of their actions, or inaction, once 
more” (The Times Dec 1974). His 1977 Report of the Nationalised Industries Policy 
Group, known as the ‘Ridley Plan’, was leaked to The Economist on 27th May 1978. It 
proposed how the next Conservative government could fight and defeat trade union 
action especially in the coal industry. This strategy included being prepared to deal 
with violent picketing with a “large, mobile squad of police who are equipped and 
prepared to uphold the law against the likes of the Saltley coke-works mob.” Dorey 
(2013: 176) described it as: “the most ambitious plan for ‘taking on the unions’”. 
There was tension within the Conservative Party, however, between those who did 
not wish to repeat the experiment of the previous government and wanted a 
pragmatic approach to unions and those who believed that the Heath Government 
had failed due to its confused and half-hearted attitude to labour and economic 
policy (Auerbach 1993). Jim Prior, the Shadow Secretary of State for Employment 
was reluctant to wage a full-throated war on the unions and stressed the need to 
address what he saw as the excesses of union practices. He commissioned an Inquiry 
in certain trade union recruitment practices led by Andrew Leggatt QC (1979) which 
was highlight critical of both SLADE and NGA. Both unions refused to cooperate with 
the Inquiry. Prior singled out the Society of Lithographic Artists Designers and 
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Engravers (SLADE) that used a system of labels to show that artwork had originated 
from a union source. Citing the Inquiry, he claimed SLADE was an extreme example 
of a protection racket amongst printing unions, and this was the sort of practice the 
Conservatives intended to outlaw.  
The 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto included five key tasks, number one being to 
strike: “a fair balance between the rights and duties of the trade union movement” 
(Conservative Party 1979: 7). The Conservatives argued that unions were dominated 
by a handful of extremists who did not reflect the “common-sense views of most 
union members” (Conservative Party 1979: 11). The sustained attack by the 
mainstream media and careful tactics by the Conservatives shifted public opinion 
(Johnstone, Stewart and Ackers, 2015). The Conservatives emphasized individual 
rights over the closed shop and claimed that the unions had become dominated by 
extremists. A survey carried out by Market and Opinion Research International 
(MORI) in 1978, quoted by Taylor (1980) found that 82 per cent of people believed 
that unions had too much power in Britain. Nearly three quarters (73%) of trade 
unionists believed this, although other polls found a marked reduction when the 
question was whether their own union had too much power. “The Right had shown, 
cynically and manipulatively, a frightening ability to communicate with the working 
class’, concluded (Johnstone, Stewart and Ackers, 2015). 
The Employment Act 1980 removed unions’ tort immunity for picketing away from 
an employee’s place of work and for industrial action outside the first customer or 
supplier of a company in dispute – so-called ‘secondary action’. It also took tentative 
steps to regulate the closed shop through confirmatory ballots.  
Hoskyns argued that exposure of trade union funds was the key to making them 
behave more responsibly. The Conservative Party papers show the level of 
preparations for potential conflict and the way the Conservative Party gathered 
intelligence on the posture of trade unions. A research memo by Peter Shipley called 
The State of the Unions in July 1980 warned “the NUM and the print unions are 
especially militant. They want total opposition”.31 The memo speculated the TUC 
	
31 Confidential memo 25.2.80 from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
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General Council would resist a wholesale campaign of disobedience that encouraged 
workers to disobey injunctions but: “It could however, be a different matter in the 
heat of a dispute: a collective response from assorted militants to flout a court order 
over secondary picketing, for example, is not inconceivable”. 
A confidential note on The Daily Telegraph notepaper from Peter Utley, a close ally 
of Thatcher, to Alan Howarth, then a right-wing policy assistant to the Conservative 
Party considered the need to prepare for serious industrial strife.  
It would be desirable for us to set up a very small and secret group to 
consider now a hypothetical state of affairs in which, during a general strike 
or something like it, the Government would have to take over a very large 
measure of the responsibility for the dissemination of information, 
instructions and exhortations.32 
Utley postulates over the need to control broadcasting and suggests looking back at 
the 1926 General Strike when the Government commandeered resources to produce 
the British Gazette but stopped short of controlling the BBC. Utley refers to the 
failure of the Loyalist strike in Northern Ireland that “was in no small measure due to 
the degree of sub rosa cooperation between the press and the official information 
service designed to conceal the good start to which the strike got off in many 
places”. Utley suggests a very small group headed by the Paymaster General are 
prepared to take charge with one or two “wholly reliable people with media 
experience”. He nominates Bill Deedes, the former cabinet minister, the Daily 
Telegraph editor and known opponent of the print unions.33 
Peter Shipley from the Conservative Research Department and a member of the 
Prime Minister's policy unit in Downing Street 1982-1984, followed up Utley’s 
memo.34 He suggested the need to consider the recruitment of volunteers and 
special constables, as in 1926. Shipley was a member of Shield, a secret committee 
	
32 Confidential memo 22.2.80 from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
33 Confidential memo 22.2.80 from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
34 Confidential memo 25.2.80 from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
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set up by radical right-wing activists and former intelligence officers in 1976 to brief 
Thatcher and her aides on ‘subversion’ (Powerbase 2018).  
At the start of Thatcher’s first term it appeared that the pragmatists or ‘wets’ might 
still hold sway. Jim Prior became the new Secretary of State for Employment, but as 
the momentum of the New Right gathered pace he became isolated within the 
cabinet. Prior resisted proposals to restrict union immunity as advocated by 
Hoskyns, Thatcher’s advisor, and deflected the more radical ideas into a Green 
Paper. Thatcher backed Prior’s line in public but supported Hoskyn’s in private 
(Marsh 1992:58). After she consolidated her position, she replaced Prior as Secretary 
of State for Employment with Norman Tebbit in September 1981 – long sought by 
Hoskyns – this shifted the agenda quickly and radically to the right. The ensuing 
Employment Act 1982 significantly narrowed the statutory definition of a trade 
dispute to conflicts between employers and workers within the UK, opened trade-
union funds to tort actions and further regulated the closed shop – see Chapter Eight 
for more details. Auerbach (1993) highlighted Tebbit’s direct intervention in the 
affairs of unions as his most personal and significant measure. It gave employers, 
rather than members, the right to seek injunctions and court orders, regulations to 
shift bargaining power toward employers through limits on industrial action, 
picketing, etc. and direct regulation over how unions run themselves such as the 
election of officials, complaints, disciplining members, political funding.  
The editorial in The Sun warned union leaders: “Don’t be foolish”. It wrote of “dark 
rumblings” that unions will resist the government’s plans for curbing excessive trade 
union power. It declared that the public backed the “sensible, moderate” measures 
to ban secondary picketing and the worst abuses of the closed shop35. NGA leaders 
knew that the proposed laws would make unlawful its most effective industrial 
tactics. It hoped that employers would not opt to use them for fear of conflict and 
clung to the policy of opposition declared by the TUC (Gennard 1990). 
 
	
35 Sun editorial 9 July 1979 
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The TUC and the law 
The Trades Union Congress, the longest surviving union federation in the world, has 
rarely sought to instruct its members to act and was established with limited 
authority over affiliated unions. Its decisions are made by delegates elected by 
unions to its annual congress and acted upon by its General Council. It reflects the 
majority view of its affiliates but has little direction over them. As Darlington points 
out (2018) the TUC is not the ‘General Staff of Labour’ able to mobilise working class 
forces in conflicts with government and employers. It offers to coordinate actions 
agreed by individual unions but has resisted supporting industrial action in breach of 
the law. This will be a key feature in one of the case studies for this research. The 
TUC has never sought to challenge the dominant capitalist system. Its posture has 
swung depending upon the context in which it operates. Its search for consensus 
across a wide range of unions results in compromise that may not please everyone. 
The TUC called a ‘Day of Action’ in May 1980 against the Thatcher employment laws 
and another in support of NHS workers in 1982. Even at the time they were seen to 
have failed, in that they confirmed the government’s narrative that union leaders 
were out of touch with ‘ordinary’ members (Marsh 1992). Any union hopes that 
rescue would come from the return of a Labour Government were dashed when 
Thatcher won a landslide victory in June 1983. With a fresh mandate, the Right of 
the Conservative Party were firmly in control and could press ahead with their 
assault on trade union power. For the NGA this left their time-honoured industrial 
tactics outlawed at a time when technological change was also threatening their 
positional power. It clung to a position of non-compliance with the law and refused 
to contemplate any accommodation with it. 
 
Trade Union power resources 
The first chapters of this thesis have studied the nature of craft unionism at a critical 
time for the Labour Movement facing a period of traumatic change. It has presented 
the background of a skilled union with a long history of positional power within the 
workplace and through the regulation of the labour market. The helped develop and 
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was in turn strengthened by strong organizational power. As such the union largely 
stood aloof from the wider trade union movement and had little recourse to 
institutional power provided by the state. It felt little threat from the proposed trade 
union reforms of the 1970s. But technological change and the arrival of the 1979 
Thatcher Conservative government transformed the environment in which the union 
operated and with it the power resources it could call upon. 
Underpinning this work is a theoretical framework of trade union power resources 
which helps analyse where unions can derive power. This will provide a valuable 
approach to the case study research that follows. 
The diagram below summarises the nature of trade union power resources for a 
craft union such as the NGA. It places the power developed through strong collective 
occupational identity in the ‘Organisational Power’ box along with the structural 
resources of the union such as its leadership, internal democracy and closed shop. 
The diagram shows the symbiotic relationship between organisational and structural 
power. 
Such a diagram cannot be seen as fixed in time and as technological change and 
political reforms undermined the resources of the craft union so the dynamic 
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This chapter has set the context for the looming battle with trade unions following 
the election of the Conservative Government in 1979. It charts the policy debates 
and attempts at industrial relations reforms over the preceding decades up to what 
became a turning-point for British industrial relations. It looks back to the nature of 
early trade unions as seen by the Webbs (1896 and 1920) and GDH Cole (1924) and 
how the law gave no positive rights, rather it allowed unions to function free from 
civil court actions.  
The chapter argues that historically the so-called voluntary approach led to a focus 
upon bargaining power rather than a wider legal framework where rights were 
enshrined – positional rather than institutional power. This suited craft unions such 
as the NGA that built high levels of discipline and solidarity amongst a closed shop 
membership. Such a focus on sectionalist organising reinforced the unequal pattern 
of power resources with groups of workers largely unprotected by collective 
bargaining. The Conservative Party in power from 1979 with Margaret Thatcher as 
leader viewed trade union reform as an economic imperative and unfinished 
business from previous failed attempts (Dorey 1995). As the case studies will show, 
some on the Left were eager to confront the laws in the belief that they could again 
be defeated by the might of collective action. 
This chapter has set the scene for analysis over chapters 6 to 10 of the NGA case 
study disputes of 1980 and 1983. It has captured the sense of anticipation of major 
conflict whether in excitement or foreboding for both Government, employers and 
trade unions.  
Chapter five sets out the research methodology and explains how the case studies 







This chapter explains the basis of the research for this dissertation. It sets out the 
principal aims of the research and the methodology to be used.  
The research, set within the theoretical framework provided by the preceding 
chapters, examines the roles of occupational identity in craft solidarity and their 
impact on union structure and leadership. The reliance upon positional power within 
the production process was threatened by technological change. Key features of the 
union’s organisational model such as the closed shop and solidarity actions were also 
directly challenged by the new laws enacted from 1980 and used for the first time in 
the 1983 Messenger dispute. The dispute is seen as pivotal (Dickinson 1984, 
Goodhart and Wintour 1986, Gennard 1990, Neil 1997, Lang and Dodkins 2011) but 
has been largely overshadowed by the 1984-85 miners’ strike and the conflict at 
News International in 1986. This study revisits the 1983 dispute, contrasting it with 
the early national printing dispute in 1980. 
The thesis is partly a fresh historical account of a significant industrial dispute 
including evidence not available to earlier authors and an industrial relations study. 
This is especially relevant to the debate over union renewal. The study questions the 
degree to which trade unionism based upon a narrow occupation, craft or profession 
has a determination over membership mobilisation and leadership.  
It draws evidence from two contrasting case studies involving the National Graphical 
Association in the early 1980s using a review of existing accounts and media 
coverage with new materials from previously hidden archives. These are 





This research sets out to answer the following questions: 
• What factors underpin positional and organisational power and how did the 
changing environment of the early 1980s impact upon them? 
• What was the NGA’s capacity for strategic choice and how far did legal, 
political and technological change constrain it? 
• What new knowledge can be gleaned from the NGA case as to the role of the 
state and police in industrial relations? 
• Where did decision-making lie within the NGA between national, branch and 
chapel levels and were there tensions between them? 
• Does a constant tension exist between rank-and-file members and their 
union leaders? 
• To what extent was the NGA’s strong collective occupational identity and 
solidarity based on sectionalism and how far was this a constraint in its 
survival?  
• What contribution do the features outlined above add to the wider debate 
over the future of trade unions? 
Telling the story of the disputes within a narrative framework, the research adopts a 
case study approach to examine the NGA disputes in 1980 and 1983, contrasting 
examples of offensive and defensive union strategy and action (Perry and Bellamy 
2013). Between the two conflicts much changed, economically, politically, legally 
and technologically but the later dispute with Eddy Shah was a ground-breaking use 
of new trade union laws.  
This first section in this chapter summarises the research approach and philosophical 
context. It explains the basis for the qualitative approach and choice of research 
methods, highlighting the role of the researcher as a key instrument in the case 
studies. 
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The next section explains the nature of the case studies, and their credibility for the 
purposes of this research. It delves into the sequences of events and describes the 
episodes through a detailed narrative. 
With the passage of time, some of the politically sensitive issues have faded and as 
such the research can obtain information about the dispute in a way not possible at 
the time. Memories can also fade and individuals may adjust their views with the 
benefit of hindsight. It is possible to cross-check with accounts taken at the time, 
media reports and documents to ‘triangulate’ the findings and question the viability 
of the memories. Some material is collected from anonymous participants. Their role 
and relationship to the events is described without revealing the source. 
This study reviews the contemporary literature that examined the 1983 Messenger 
dispute. Earlier accounts of the Messenger dispute, most notably Mark Dickinson’s 
To Break a Union (1984), did not have access to the archive materials obtained by 
this research.  
The study of industrial disputes and their consequences requires the facts to be 
judged through the values and beliefs of those involved and in the context of 
conflicting ideologies and political objectives. The research listens to what people 
say and triangulates the findings through the analysis of the documentary evidence.  
The evidence taken from the testimonies of key participants is considered alongside 
recently opened archival material. Confidential government documentation from 
government acquired through the Freedom of Information Act is used as well as 
confidential internal documentation of the Conservative Party held at the Bodleian 
Library in Oxford. 
Minutes of the NGA National Council meetings with associated reports and 
correspondence have been accessed and utilised for the first time as a result of this 
research. Media transcripts and recordings have been obtained and are used to 
inform and enrich the narrative approach. 
 
Research approach - philosophical context 
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The complex nature of industrial relations can only be fully studied through analysing 
and contrasting the various perspectives of the parties involved and viewed within 
the context of political and economic power at the time. The research’s ontological 
position suggests that people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, 
experiences and interactions are meaningful properties of social reality.  
The research’s epistemological position embraces a legitimate way to generate data 
on the ontological properties through talking interactively with people, asking them 
questions, listening to their accounts, analysing their language and through 
construction of discourse.  
This investigation, into the controversial and highly significant Messenger dispute, 
considers its causes and consequences. The research produces a comprehensive 
record of the actions and events and provide descriptions of the way the dispute was 
viewed from the perspectives of different actors. I believe a different researcher 
studying the same materials would come to the same conclusions. 
The question often raised in qualitative research is its authenticity. Interviews, often 
open-ended, gather an understanding of people’s experiences and an account from 
their memories. Like many qualitative studies this research relies on a small sample 
for interviews and the relationship with the interviewer can be defined in political 
rather than scientific terms (Searle and Silverman 1997). 
Gabrial (1990) questions how to turn transcripts and memories into reliable, valid 
and useful statements. The methodological answer is to be found in ‘hermeneutics’, 
a term related to what Wells and Lunn (1986) called ‘rolling hypotheses’ and Blyth 
and Robson (1981) described as the inductive approach. The principles of 
interpretation, discourse analysis and language in use are critical in qualitative 
research. Ritchie (2033: 32) is right to warn that: “People remember what they think 
is important, not necessarily what the interviewer thinks is most consequential”. 
There is a difference between history and memory and it is important that the 
process and use of oral history acknowledges this. The reaerch seeks to report the 




The research examines in detail the events of contrasting industrial disputes using a 
range of methods: archives, media accounts, interviews with key participants, etc as 
described in more detail below. Case study research is sometimes viewed by 
methodologists with circumspection (Gerring 2007). The use of a single observation 
to shed light on a larger class of cases raises problems of representativeness 
(Vennesson 2017). No two industrial disputes are the same but the intensive study 
of the decision-making can aid our understanding of the factors involved. 
Given the contested nature of industrial conflict and the arguments that prevail to 
this day over the events of these cases, the research does not necessarily aim to 
prove one side right and the other wrong. Proof may be hard to come by in social 
science but lessons can be learned (Flyvbjerg 2006: 224). 
Case studies are sometimes chosen to be stereotypical and thereby providing 
analysis of a typical situation or set of circumstances. Atypical or extreme cases can, 
however, reveal more information because they expose more mechanisms and 
activate more actors. They can also highlight a point in a dramatic way (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 229). An example of a single extreme case study is that of Graham Allison’s 
Essence of Decision in which he examined the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971) and 
Galileo’s theory of gravity based on a single case study from the Tower of Pisa is 
often cited to make the argument for reaersch based on one case. Michels (1962) 
chose to study an ‘extreme’ case study of a grass roots organisation with strong 
democratic ideals. He chose this outlining case study to prove that even this example 
conformed to his theory of the tendency towards oligarchy.  
The research analyses the events involved in the 1980 national printing dispute and 
the 1983 Messenger dispute and draw lessons and conclusions from them. Chapter 
Eight, contains a substantial element of narrative. As such it is difficult to summarise 
into neat scientific formulae. Instead it provides a rich description of events as 
observed by those involved with all the complexities and contradictions  (Flyvbjerg 
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2006: 237). It reports what people say alongside an analysis of the documentary 
evidence. The research helps understand the beliefs, experiences and perceptions of 
the participants involved in the dispute. A thorough understanding of these events 
and an exploration into their significance cannot be obtained by running numbers 
through a computer. But the research has taken into account Ritchie's (2003) 
warning that people remember what they think is important, not necessarily what 
the interviewer thinks is most consequential (Gabrial 1990: 32). 
 
A qualitative approach 
Sykes (1960) believes that qualitative research is often inductive in its approach, with 
findings and conclusions being drawn directly from the data in contrast to the 
deductive approach where formulated ideas and hypotheses are tested out in data 
collected especially for the purpose. The research will allow an examination of 
participants’ experience in detail using in-depth, semi-structured interviews. A 
qualitative researcher needs to be open-minded, curious and empathetic, flexible 
and able to listen to people telling their own story. This involves studying the 
subjective meanings that people attach to their experiences (Hennink et al., 2010: 
14). 
Anthropologists, ethnographers, and other social scientists often incorporate 
interviews and narrative into their research. The idea is to observe and talk with the 
people whose beliefs and behaviours the researcher wishes to understand and to 
record carefully the interactions with them (Blyth and Robson 1990). Shopes 
believes that oral history research has moved from understanding an interview as an 
archival document to a: “historical record that must, in turn, be evaluated for 
accuracy, to understanding it as a narrative construction, with attendant concerns 
about memory, subjectivity, and identity that must be interpreted (Shopes 2014: 
257-268).” Ritchie warns, however, that oral history is “too dynamic and creative a 
field to be entirely captured by any single definition (Ritchie 2003: 19).” 
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The perspective provided includes the effect of the passing of time, the influence of 
change and continuity. It is the difference between a diary and a memoir, with the 
reflection gaining the benefit of hindsight. Ross and Moore (2014) present the 
benefits of biographical, narrative, interpretive methods to interrogate and rework a 
participant’s memory. 
The question often raised in qualitative research is its authenticity. Interviews, often 
open-ended, gather an understanding of people’s experiences and an account from 
their memories. The methodological issue is the reliability of the interview schedule 
and the representativeness of the sample. Like many qualitative studies this research 
relies on a small sample for interviews and the relationship with the interviewer can 
be defined in political rather than scientific terms (Searle and Silverman 1997). 
The research sample is based upon a purposive selection of participants and 
witnesses to the events in 1983 and a selected number of practitioners and 
commentators to reflect contrasting perspectives on the consequences of the 
dispute for trade unionism today. The sample is largely self-selecting as the surviving 
actors in the drama but the research widened the sample through ‘snowball 
selection’. Participants were asked to suggest other potential interviewees and 
asked to assist with contacts where appropriate.  
The perspectives of the TUC and the wider trade union movement are obtained 
through interviews with people involved at the time alongside an examination of the 
documentation of key meetings, conferences and reports. Although focused upon 
the trade union position, the research interviews Eddy Shah, the employer and 
principal actor in the dispute. He was given assurances of objectivity and honest 
reporting in the presentation of his statements. There are interviews made at the 
time of the dispute but the research will try to obtain his reflection not just on the 
events of the dispute itself but of its consequences. 
 
Researcher as research instrument – role of ‘insider’ 
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In developing the research methodology, I recognise that I am the primary research 
instrument and must take into account my relationship with those being interviewed 
and my own role in the dispute.  
In 1983 I was the youngest full-time officer in the NGA. Elected at the age of twenty-
four, I filled a post typically reserved for older men. As such I wasn’t as embedded in 
the institutional culture as my peers. I was apprenticed as a ‘hot metal’ compositor 
and introduced to the customs of the chapel and the rules of the union. To 
undertake such research, I have reflected on my capacity to objectively investigate 
the different dimensions of this dispute. The research is dispassionate and has pro-
actively pursued alternative positions in the literature, documentation and witness 
statements. I have relied on my own personal memories of these events very 
sparingly and the research seeks to verify my own personal evidence. 
I identify with Braverman, a former apprentice coppersmith, who explained in his 
seminal work, Labour and Monopoly Capital (1975: 4) that he sought to rebut any 
suggestion that his background had led him to adopt a sentimental attachment to 
the “outworn conditions of now archaic modes of labour”, He had seen first-hand 
how the transformation of industrial processes had robbed the workers or a craft 
heritage with little if anything given in its place. His thesis sought to learn from his 
experience and point to a future model of employment not seek to restore a 
romantic version of his past. 
My contemporaries are now retiring or retired and the time is critical to capture 
their stories and memories of the dispute but also to tell their accounts of activities 
that have not been told before due to the sensitivities of their accounts, fears for 
damaging themselves or their union and possible disloyalty to others involved. 
Gabrial advises qualitative researchers to recognise the potential bias and try and 
deal with it (Gabrial 1990). The advantages of personal contacts and access to key 
figures within the union and the TUC carries the risk of leaving the reader to 
question the credibility of my research. The risk of bias and undue personal leanings 
is constantly questioned. Readers will be given sufficient extracts from transcripts to 
allow them to assess the credibility and validity of the findings. 
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As an active participant in the events of the case studies and a TUC official my role in 
the research could be described as participant observation (Crotty 2014). The case 
studies, however, are not current events in which I am taking part or ones where the 
research is immersed within the community such as Beynon’s (Beynon, 1973: 9) 
Working for Ford in which he described himself as “ an outside who was accepted 
inside”. He was a researcher who got inside to gather his evidence, I was an activist 
who became a researcher. I do not attempt to expunge my subjectivity from the 
research, as per the positivist approach. I am conscious of emotional attachment I 
may have from my ‘insider’ perspective.  
C. Wright-Mills (1959) wrote of the concept of being able to ‘think ourselves away’ 
from the familiar routines of our daily lives in order to look at them anew. To have a 
sociological imagination, a person must be able to pull away from the situation and 
think from an alternative point of view. This demands a high degree of self-
awareness throughout the collection of the data. Patton (2014) stresses the 
importance of the background, experience, training, skills, inter-personal 
competence, capacity for empathy, cross-cultural sensitivity and how the researcher 
engages in fieldwork and analysis. Interpretation is “affected by who you are, what’s 
going on in your life, what you care about, how you view the world and how you 
have chosen to study what interests you (Patton 2014: 832).” The researcher is the 
‘research tool’ and therefore the methodology must provide sufficient reflective 
information in order to make a judgement regarding the influence on the study 
design and the findings presented.  
 
Interview methodology 
The interview methodology was flexible and designed to elicit general personal 
reflections as well as detailed accounts of events. The accounts provided through 
semi-structured interviews are quoted in detail to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the different perspectives.  
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Anecdotes can inform, enliven, enrich and colour a narrative. Some critics dismiss 
anecdotal evidence as random and not statistically significant to be able to 
generalise, yet others believe they can corroborate a position and provide a 
convincing portrait. (Ritchie 2003) The research seeks to provide multiple, matching 
stories that reinforce the evidence and back up other materials. 
Ethnographic enquiry seeks to uncover meanings and perceptions from the 
perspective of the participants (Crotty 2014). In this it makes sense to use 
unstructured interviews. The flexible research design allows change as different 
perspectives emerge and when analysis of documents exposes potential fresh 
avenues for exploration or validation. Patton (2014) advises to expect the 
unexpected, look for it and see where it leads. Ritchie also advises the interviewer to 
follow the interviewee down unexpected paths and to be prepared to abandon 
carefully prepared questions if necessary (Ritchie 2003). It is important to recognise 
the value of serendipity in the research process. One document search will often 
lead to another and one interview will open up new leads or paths of enquiry. 
Archives often contain surprising material and information can be gleaned from 
unexpected places. 
The research is based on interviews with a small carefully selected group of 
individuals who were directly engaged in the events of the disputes.  
Attwill, Steve Unite Regional Organiser was GPMU and NGA official, 
joined Messenger Group picket. Interviewed 12.2019 
Burke, Tony Unite Assistant General Secretary, was President 
Stockport NGA Branch at the time of the dispute and led the initial 
negotiations with the employer. 18.2.2014 
Coop, Owen was West Pennine Graphical Society Branch Secretary, 
NGA National Councilor, Unite National Officer. Interviewed 
14.2.2020 
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Dobney, Megan Southern and Eastern Region TUC, formerly NGA and 
GPMU activist, Mother of the Chapel and National Council member, 
joined Messenger Group picket. Interviewed 13.8.2016 
Dubbins, Tony was NGA Assistant General Secretary, General 
Secretary, GPMU General Secretary and Unite Assistant General 
Secretary Interviewed 17.8.2017 
Harris, Peter was NGA South West and South Wales Assistant 
Regional Secretary Interviewed 9.2019 
Field, Anne was SOGAT, GPMU and Unite Officer, joined Messenger 
Group picket. Interviewed 28.8.2016 
Grindley, Mike Chair of the GCHQ unions and one of the dismissed 
trade unionists. Interviewed 2014 
Manning, Alan was TUC North West Regional Secretary Interviewed 
8.2018 
Monks, Lord John was TUC official in charge of the Committee 
responsible for industrial action support in 1983, was TUC General 
Secretary. Interviewed 12.3.2015 
Newis, Chris was NGA National Council member. Interviewed 
3.12.2017 
Parkinson, Brendan Unison officer, was NGA activist, joined 
Messenger Group picket. Interviewed 9.7.2015 
Royston, Alan was Father of the Chapel at Messenger Group 
Newspapers and one of the ‘Stockport Six’ sacked NGA members. 
Interviewed 2014 
Scott, Vince was NGA activist, joined Messenger Group picket. 
Interviewed 24.6.2015 
Shah, Eddy was Managing Director of Messenger Group Newspapers. 
Interviewed 7.4.2015 
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Slater, John was South Wales NGA Branch Secretary. Interviewed 
9.2019 
Williams, Ray was Liverpool NGA Branch Secretary, organised pickets, 
Messenger Group was GPMU President. Interviewed 4.2014 
 
Plus a number of anonymous participants 
Interviews began with those involved in the negotiations with Messenger 
Newspaper management and those on the union’s National Council. Personaltiies 
played a big part in the way anagonisms developed within the business and the 
research took into account the way interviewees still sought to defend the actions 
they took. Tony Burke was then a lay member and Preseident of the Stockport 
Branch. He led the early negotiations despite his conflict of interest in working for 
the principle rival to the Stockport Messenger.  
The research gathers data from the employer perspective in terms of a significant 
interview with Eddy Shah. He refused to speak to Mark Dickinson for his book (1984) 
and work was needed to track him down to his home in Wiltshire and persuade him 
to participate.  
As the employer and principal actor in the Messenger dispute, Shah was given 
assurances of objectivity and honest reporting in the presentation of his statements. 
He provides an invaluable insight into the causes of the dispute and his reflections 
on its consequences. His perception is set against that of government, police, media 
and union. The differences are examined and challenged through the research. 
Tony Dubbins, the former NGA General Secretary, was always likely to be a difficult 
interview to arrange. He had a reputation to maintain and actions to defend but it 
was hoped that he would be more prepared to share his reflections since his 
retirement. Now living in Spain, the interview took time and effort to arrange. 
The FoC (shop steward) of the striking workers, or the ‘Stockport Six’ gives his 
account. Other full-time officers of the union involved in supporting the union’s 
campaign and in sustaining it through the dispute and the sequestration of its assets 
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are questioned. The research interviewed those engaged in the picketing, including 
those who helped organise it, lay members who participated and others who were 
witness to the events. The views of activists and delegates help inform the pressure 
on the leadership of the union to settle or not, to confront the law or not.  
The research participants were asked to recount their memories of the events 
before, during and after the Messenger dispute. Given the time lapse it was critical 
to allow them to recall events and try to remember their thoughts at the time rather 
than in retrospect. Memory is important to oral history but may be unreliable and 
flawed, being part of someone’s subjectivity (Ross and Moore 2014: 5). The more 
reflective views, with the advantage of hindsight, were discussed later in the 
interview process. Some prompts, such as sharing the minutes of the meetings they 
attended, were used to encourage memories but this was done with care to offer 
accounts of events to stimulate their own memories. The interview style was kept 
free-flowing and without formal structure but the key research questions were 
probed as the interviews developed. Where appropriate and possible some 
interviewees were able to read minutes of meetings to remind themselves of the 
events and how they were recorded at the time. 
The interviews were not treated as ‘confessionals’ or ‘therapy sessions’ nor were 
they interogations. They covered some awkward issues and sought to explore the 
motivations of the interviewees for their actions including those that remain 
controversial and contested. In some instances the evidence appears to contradict 
statements they made at the time and assessments are required to judge whether 
this is due to their changed memory or a wish to alter the way the research will 
record their actions given the hindsight of time. 
After the passing of more than thirty years, some of those involved are prepared to 
describe the actions taken in more detail and openness. Previous research may have 
encountered difficulties in obtaining a full and comprehensive account due to 
reluctance by participants to show disloyalty to the union or make remarks that 
might lay them or the union open to criticism. The NGA has since merged with 
SOGAT to form the Graphical, Paper and Media Union. This in turn formed part of an 
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amalgamation to become Amicus and Unite. Officers have changed and the 
proximity and attachment to the people of the 1983 dispute has stretched making a 
full and frank account of events more likely. Some of the information included will 
be in the form of anecdotes that circulated within the union and are remembered by 
interviewees. Some stories have become ‘legends’ within the union and cannot 
always be verified. They are given with caveats for their authenticity but they add 
flavour in describing the mood of the union and its determination to win the dispute 
and survive the onslaught from the courts. During the period the NGA had its assets 
seized or sequestrated officers and staff conducted the day-to-day business without 
access to bank accounts and in fear of deeper restrictions over its resources. The 
level of secrecy that was adopted to survive this episode means that some data is 
hard to obtain or authenticate. The research will only use anecdotal evidence to help 
paint a picture of the atmosphere within the union, the sense of siege and show the 
degree to which an institution will defend itself against what it believed to be 
unjustified and unfair attacks by the law. 
Oral history provides valuable narrative descriptions of past events and builds an 
archive of recorded material. Shopes (2004) describes it as a dialogue, and a self-
conscious, disciplined conversation between two people about some aspect of the 
past considered by them to be of historical significance and recorded with the intent 
of preserving it. An interview is a historical record and must be evaluated for 
accuracy, to understand it as a narrative construction, with attendant concerns 
about memory, subjectivity, and identity that must be interpreted (Shopes 2004,  
Blyth and Robson 1981) 
Triangulation is achieved by linking the evidence from interviewees to investigation 
of primary and secondary source documentary evidence, including trade union 
minutes, internal government correspondence, Conservative Party papers, media 
reports and press cuttings, photographs and other relevant ephemera – listed in the 
Appendix. 
 
Documentation and archives 
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Trade union records  
Alongside interviews, the research has a strong documentary basis through its 
analysis of union histories, union journals and minutes of meetings – see Appendix 
Two. Trade union histories have to be interpreted with care, taking into account the 
authors and the motives behind the records. Many historical accounts are 
commissioned by the unions themselves and as such risk being a partial or biased 
view of their record. Some are produced as ‘souvenirs’ for members on the occasion 
of a key anniversary or at the time of merger. The authors are sometimes current or 
retired union offices, they can be commissioned researchers who have to account to 
the union’s leadership before publication (Lyddon 2017). 
The histories of unions based upon craft or occupational lines often refer to the 
sense of community of workers or ‘family’, especially brotherhood, (for example: 
(Cummings, in the history of shipbuilding unions, 1905, and the accounts in the 
history of the Brushmakers, 1847). There are many references to the sense of 
fellowship based upon the job but also relationship forged in common struggle. 
Lyddon (2017: 252) challenges the way union histories are written and questions the 
use of the term ‘family’ in the history of the National Union of Public Employees 
(NUPE). Written to convey what Lyddon called the “cuddly” image of the union from 
the leadership’s point of view, such expressions may not be shared with the rank-
and-file Lyddon argues. His critique was based on the history of a more ‘general’ 
union which was hierarchical and covered a period where women members were 
not treated equally.  
Trade union documents are highlighted by Scott (1990) in categorising such 
materials as ‘ideological’ in the sense they were mainly written for unions 
themselves and were intended to reinforce a sense of collective identity.  
The research examines archive materials not available to contemporary writers such 
as Dickinson (1984) and Gennard (1984). It interviews participants and witnesses to 
the dispute and recounts the public debate on the tactics deployed by both sides. 
Primary source documents are used including draft correspondence and speeches 
prepared for government ministers obtained through a Freedom of Information 
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request. They expose ministerial reactions to the initial enactment of the legislations 
and the police handling of the dispute. It is significant to see the process through 
which amendments were made. Parliamentary papers and Hansard records confirm 
the comments and speeches finally made. 
The research examines to what extent the dispute was politically pre-determined by 
studying Conservative Party documents and accounts as well as public declarations 
of the intent of the legislation and the response from trade unions.  
Minutes 
The minutes used are from meetings of the NGA National Council, Executive and 
NGA delegate conferences. TUC Congress, General Council and sub-committee 
minutes have also been accessed. The research also draws on minutes from SOGAT 
West of England Branch and its national delegate conference in May 1983 and 1984. 
The various minutes take different forms. NGA Delegate Conferences were held 
every two years or called on an emergency basis to deal with a particularly pressing 
matter. Delegates were elected from every branch. The minutes are a verbatim 
account.  
The NGA National Council minutes were given to Warwick University in large bound 
folders for archiving with instructions that they were not be opened for 70 years. 
Unite took over responsibility for the archives and initially sought to maintain the 
covenant placed on the records by its constituent union. After several attempts, 
access was eventually given for the purposes of this research. 
The correspondence regarding access to the NGA archive is given as an Appendix. 
National Council meetings tended to last two days with a membership of 40 National 
Councillors elected by the membership on a regional and sectoral basis. Also present 
were the 13 National Officers including General Secretary, Assistant General 
Secretary and Financial Secretary, and seven Regional Secretaries. The meetings 
received reports from the union’s Executive, a smaller group of leading councillors 
and officers, a variety of sub-committees and working groups and reports from 
national officers.  
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The minutes are summaries of meetings and do not necessarily reflect the scale and 
scope of the discussion. They are often a succinct account of a verbal report and 
therefore do not provide a comprehensive account and may simply record any 
decision made or action agreed. These sources are compared or triangulated with 
other accounts of the events covered and from the recollections of the interviewees. 
The brevity of the account may be due to the style of minute-taking, a desire to 
maintain confidentiality or because the officer may be reluctant to place in writing 
an assessment of a dynamic dispute. Sometimes the officer’s report is accompanied 
by documents such as draft agreements, letters between the parties etc. On 
occasions the National Council received copies of letters or motions from branches 
expressing views on issues under consideration. NGA Delegate Conference minutes 
provide verbatim accounts allowing the reader to obtain a sense of the mood and 
atmosphere in the meetings as well as view the differing arguments and contested 
views over tactics. 
The research explores actions taken that would not have been contained in minutes 
or official records. For example, the dispute involved the seizure or sequestration of 
the union’s bank accounts. To sustain its activities, the union resorted to a range of 
necessarily secretive tactics. The research is able to reflect perceptions of this 
episode and the extent to which this was successful and how other unions learnt 
from this episode.  
The records of the national meetings and evidence from the interviews with the 
union’s officers can result in a slanted perspective. The story of the leadership is not 
the full picture of the union as a whole and the research interviews lay members and 
activists. It studies the official histories of the NGA and GPMU (Gennard and 
Hayward 2008), news accounts and other sources to question the interpretation of 
contested decisions. 
The TUC archives include the Annual Report summarising the key decisions of the 
General Council, minutes of the various committees and General Council and the 
verbatim minutes of Congress36. The 1983 TUC Congress was held in Blackpool 5-9 
	
36 See list in Appendix 2 
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September, at a time the dispute between the NGA and Messenger Newspaper was 
rumbling along but before its escalation into a major conflict. The record of the 
Congress provides a good account of the way the TUC was shifting its stance over 
how to deal with the employment laws and relations with the freshly re-elected 
Conservative Government.  
 
Internal Government documents 
The research uses documents headed Private and Confidential that were internal 
memos and letters between government departments – see Appendix 4 for details. 
The names of recipients and authors are mostly redacted but refer to various 
divisions of the Home Office (such as F4) the Department for Employment and the 
Cabinet Office. The dispute would have been the principal responsibility for the 
Secretary of State for Employment but as the picketing developed it also involved 
the Home Secretary and Downing Street.  
Administrative records are not neutral reports of events, they are shaped by the 
political context in which they are produced and by cultural and ideological 
assumptions of the departments and organisations responsible for them (Scott 
1990). Some of the correspondence requires a degree of interpretation with key 
information left unstated. Civil servants writing to one another and to politicians 
summarise or confirm the outcomes of conversations and sometimes leave the 
researcher to ‘read between the lines’. 
Some of the letters were not intended for public view and require a degree of 
interpretation to ascertain where they are from or who is the intended recipient. 
Examples are those written to the “Secretary of State” by “Robin Harris, Private 
Office”. With further investigation it is discovered that Harris was a Special Adviser at 
the Home Office at the time having worked for the Conservative Party from 1978. He 
became Director of the Conservative Research Department from 1985–88 and a 
member of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit from 1989-90. He was Margaret 
Thatcher's speechwriter and was chosen by her to write her biography.  
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Many of the exchanges are internal memos, often confirming a telephone call or 
other conversation between themselves or with others such as MPs or the police. 
Some include draft replies to Parliamentary Questions or other correspondence. The 
documents highlight when the Prime Minister was involved or when her office 
wanted more information or action. The research compares draft speeches with 
what was actually delivered in Parliament, provided by Hansard. This shows 
interesting variations and changed emphasis. The Messenger dispute took centre 
stage of political debate and the research looks at parliamentary records to judge 
how the dispute was viewed by the parties. 
It is not always possible to trace the sequence of events leading up to a statement in 
Parliament. For example, accusations in a draft speech about a man possessing a 
pistol on the picket line were excluded when Leon Britton, the Secretary of State 
spoke, presumably because it could not be substantiated. Also removed were 
references to police protective equipment and the closure of the M6 Motorway. This 
apparent toning down or factual correction of drafts may be at odds with later 
reporting, when ministers appeared to talk up the level of threat and violence. 
The correspondence includes letters and memos between the Home Office and the 
Cheshire Constabulary. These often take the form of reports on events on the picket 
line but also include exchanges over how the dispute should be policed. In principle, 
local police forces are autonomous of central government but at the time central 
government was seeking to play a more significant role in directing the policing of 
industrial disputes (Wiles 1985: 161). This tension becomes apparent when reading 
the private correspondence. 
See list of government documents used in this research in the Appendix. 
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Conservative Party archives 
The research accessed the 
confidential papers of the 
Conservative Party held at the 
Bodleian Library in Oxford. These 
are in the form of briefings to 
ministers and MPs as well as 
letters arguing for particular 
policy positions. Some are on 
Daily Telegraph headed paper. 
They expose the debate within 
the Party at the time but also 
expose the pressure being applied 
by key figures and policy groups 
on the edges of Conservative 
politics. 
See list of Conservative Party 
documents used in this research 




The government papers include press reports and even transcripts of media 
interviews about the dispute. Civil servants were clearly closely watching all reports 
and interviews about the dispute and reporting to ministers. These add to the 
research retrieval of press reports over the period of the dispute from a variety of 
5.1 – Cover of confidential briefing by Conservative Research 
Department 
5.2 – example of a memo to Conservative Party figures from the 
Daily Telegraph 
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newspapers held in the British Library or other repositories. The left-wing and trade 
union press, including the NGA’s own journal PRINT, covered the dispute extensively 
and these are used to reflect a significant strand of thinking within the union’s 
leadership. Also accessed are a number of leaflets, circulars and other campaign 
materials used by the union during the dispute. 
Newspaper articles, recording and transcripts of TV and radio programmes help 
highlight how the dispute was seen by the public. But in this research the 
newspapers themselves are part of the narrative. Newspapers were overwhelming 
hegemonic in the way they viewed the politics of the day, especially in regard to 
industrial relations reform. Media proprietors had a vested interest in the outcome 
of the dispute. Parts of the employment legislation had a critical impact on the 
printing industry and may have been written at the behest of employers (Dickinson 
1984: 31). The research will examine the contested views over the initial attitudes of 
the national press, whether they supported Shah or whether they feared becoming 
embroiled in a wider conflict over which they had little control. The research 
examines the level of influence certain newspaper owners had over the Government 
and what evidence there is to show it was used to ensure the defeat of the print 
unions. Left-wing newspapers, journals and trade union newspapers provide a 
counter-point to the mainstream media. 
Regardless of motives, the positions adopted by the national press, informed public 
opinion and framed the political debate over the dispute. The dispute was headline 
news for some weeks and the high profile of the dispute influenced the behaviour of 
the parties involved. This research will reflect to what extent this made a difference 
to the outcome.  
See a list of media reports used in the research in the Appendix. 
 
Photographs and ephemera 
Photographs are used in the research to illuminate the sense of occasion as the 
events unfold but also to provide visual evidence around the contested moments of 
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the dispute. Pictures during disputes can give false impressions and account is taken 
of this risk. Research integrity requires a description of the conditions under which 
photographs are gathered, altered and analysed (Glucksmann, 2000). For research 
that uses still photographs as data, it is unacceptable to present photographs 
elsewhere described as ‘photo-fiction’ or ‘editorial photography’ (Glucksmann, 
2000). Photographs can be manipulated and altered to enhance the image or to 
misrepresent the situation to the viewer. Jordan warns that changing photographs to 
alter the representation would amount to research misconduct. 
Operating amidst violent confrontations between pickets, demonstrators and police, 
photographers make judgements that influence the way the situation is seen. A 
photograph taken from behind police lines can give a very different impression from 
one taken facing them. The research hears a number of accounts of police attacking 
people taking photographs and filming or their equipment. There appears to be a 
period of time, during which police cleared the largest crowd, where there is no film 
footage or photographic account. Before mobile phones and social media, this was a 
time when photographers and camera operators were more conspicuous and 
perhaps vulnerable as a consequence. But there could be other explanations such as 
the speed of movement of police and demonstrators during what might appear to 
be a chaotic situation. The camera can prove a useful witness – not one that can be 




In undertaking the research, potential ethical issues have been explored. The 
interviews are based on informed consent and have been recorded and transcribed. 
Interviewees have signed a Consent Form that states the research objectives and 
asks them to confirm their consent to be recorded and for quotes from the 
transcription to be used in the research. They were advised of their right to 
withdraw at any point. 
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University ethics committees or institutional review boards need to be satisfied that 
research involving humans stays within ethical bounds, regardless of the topic. 
Informed consent is firmly established as a guiding principle for those engaged in 
oral history.  
The research commenced before the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) 
were introduced, nonetheless it met these standards in any event. The principle of 
consent has been embedded in the study. The data collected has been kept 
electronically by the researcher in a manner secure and closed to anyone else 
according to GDPR regulations. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explained the philosophical approach to this research, explaining 
the qualitative research using comparative case studies. It explains the choice of case 
studies to explore the research questions and the narrative approach within the 
thesis. 
The methodology describes the use of interviews and archives including those 
discovered for this research. 
The thesis will look in depth at two disputes involving the NGA in the early 1980s. It 
so doing it has utilised archive materials from government, the Conservative Party 
and internal government documents that have not been available before this 
research. It uses the documentation alongside media reports, press cuttings, 
photographs and ephemera to triangulate the primary and secondary evidence.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
Case Study – the 1980 NGA national dispute 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have reviewed union purpose, formation and how collective 
occupational identity is a power resource and defining factor in strategic choice. 
Craft unions are studied in the context of sectionalism as the basis of solidarity 
amongst an exclusive group at the expense of wider solidarity.  
Chapter Four set the political and legal context for an anticipated clash between 
government and trade unions. The election of the Conservative Government in 1979 
heralded a determination to reform trade unions and curb their influence within UK 
industrial relations (Dorey 1991, 1995, 2009, 2014, Fosh and Littler 1985).  
The methodology chapter set out the basis for the research and explained the 
approach taken to the chosen case studies involving the NGA in the early 1980s 
This chapter charts the evidence of how and why the NGA used the powers it had to 
launch a national action in 1980 to advance its members’ interests. The case study 
addresses research questions around the factors that underpin positional and 
organisational power to lever significant gains for members and the capacity for 
strategic choice. The decision to conduct an offensive campaign was taken by a 
leadership with the confidence of its internal systems of democracy rooted in a 
strong collective identity amongst members. 
The 1980 campaign was led from the top with the leadership calculating that if it did 
not act then, the opportunity would be lost. Other factors played their part such as 
personal ambitions and inter-union rivalries. The union deployed a range of tactics 
that out-manoeuvred the employers, forcing them into significant concessions over 
pay and working time. These were only possible in a union with substantial 
positional power, organisational strength and membership loyalty. 
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This chapter uses archives opened for this research together with interviews from 
the key participants to examine the way the 1980 dispute unfolded and how 
decisions were made.  
The thesis will go on to contrast the 1980 campaign with the dispute with Messenger 
Newspapers in 1983, a defensive conflict against an employer determined to bypass 
the union and one that had profound ramifications for the whole trade union 
movement. It considers how legal, technological and economic changes reduced the 
strategic capacity of the union to act. 
The purpose of comparing an offensive campaign of action to a defensive dispute is 
to examine the nature of union decision-making and the degree to which new laws 
and new technology impacted upon it. This includes considering what evaluations 
were made of available options and their possible consequences.  
 
A closing window of opportunity 
For most of the post-war period, the industry was largely regulated through national 
agreements between the unions and the employers’ federations (Child 1967). The 
national press was represented by the Newspaper Publishers Association and the 
provincial newspaper industry by the Newspaper Society. But cross-ownership was 
common: Associated Newspapers - the Daily Mail group - for example, owned much 
of the provincial press (Gennard 1990). In commercial printing, where some 85% of 
NGA members were employed, employers were represented by the British Printing 
Industries Federation. 
Although the commercial printing labour force was significantly larger than that 
employed on newspapers, the news sector generated more conflict and attention 
(Musson 1954, Gennard 1990). The newspaper industry attracted big ego employers 
– the ‘press barons’ such as Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook who sought the 
political influence of newspaper ownership. Robert Maxwell owned the Mirror 
Group and Rupert Murdoch had acquired the Times, Sunday Times, Sun and News of 
the World. The high costs of newspaper production suited owners if they served to 
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deter new entrants and competition (Melvern 1986). Fleet Street was often 
characterised by management weakness, excessive union power and technological 
backwardness (Martin R. 1981). The battleground within newspapers was largely at 
local level where competitive sectional bargaining was at its most extreme (Martin R. 
1981). Any stoppage would have immediate impact on a perishable product and 
there was often tension between chapel and national union power (Martin R. 1981, 
Gennard 1990).  
The Federation of Master Printers was formed by employers in 1901 and the 
Newspaper Society was established in 1920 from the reconstitution of the Linotype 
Users’ Association. By 1914 national agreements covered more than 50,000 workers 
(Child 1967). For employers such bargains reduced industrial strife and helped 
prevent wage under-cutting. The national agreements settled minimum terms and 
conditions, regulated apprenticeship entry into the industry and provided dispute 
resolution mechanisms (Child 1967).  
The NGA had seen consistent growth in membership and in 1979 had 111,541 
members. By the September of 1980 this rose to 116,438, its high point before the 
merger with SOGAT37 
Like many craft unions the NGA was characterised as politically ‘moderate’, 
traditional, conservative, more opportunist and accommodating (Michels 1962, Child 
1967). Cole (1915: 216) described independent craft unions of skilled workers as 
“almost peaceful in character.” Their history lists moments of conflict but also a 
comfortable, amicable relationship with employers and their federations (Child 
1967).  
Half the NGA’s membership contracted out of paying the political levy used to 
support the Labour Party and associated political activities (Gennard 1990: 338). The 
NGA saw its engagement with politics as an extension to its industrial activities 
(Gennard 1990). It did not see radical change to the existing order of society as a 
	
37 TUC records 
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major factor and by and large focused its political engagement on its narrow 
interests within the printing industry (Gennard 1990, Musson 1954: 467).  
The NGA established a degree of joint oversight with employers over matters such as 
recruitment and training, an approach that supported decades of technological 
stability and relatively harmonious industrial relations. Large printing companies 
tended to have a long history and many managers and supervisors rose through a 
highly unionised and regulated industry. Both sides were familiar with the national 
agreements, union rules and with each other – often personally – and many 
managers retained their union membership (Musson 1954: 363).  
Having positional power does not mean union leaders opt to use it through industrial 
action. Disputes sometimes occur when one party or the other opts to test the 
resolve of their bargaining opponent or where trust has been lost. In 1980 the NGA’s 
positional power was under threat. In testimony for this research, participants recall 
how the NGA’s leaders were well aware of the looming challenge posed by new 
technology and the new government of Margaret Thatcher elected in 1979 on a 
platform of trade union reform (Gennard 1990: 311). This research found that if the 
NGA was going to address what it saw as a stagnating minimum wage now was the 
time to act. 
Joe Wade, the General Secretary was approaching retirement and Tony Dubbins, his 
Assistant and potential successor, was keen to demonstrate strong leadership and a 
more robust approach to employers. Interviewed for this research, Dubbins 
reflected on the mood at the time: 
Thatcher had just been elected and it was clear what track she was on. So if 
you didn’t do this in 1980 you would be in no shape to do it in 1981 because 
of the changes she was going to make. (Dubbins interview 17.8.2017) 
At the start of 1980 the membership was not pressing for action despite a stagnating 
basic wage after several years of government pay restraint. The 1979 National 
Agreement was the first one in four years conducted through ‘free collective 
bargaining’. As part of its monetary policy, the new Conservative Government raised 
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interest rates sharply to 15% to reduce inflation but knowing that this would lead to 
rising unemployment (Matthews and Minford 1987). 
The leadership decided to mobilise for an offensive campaign, led firmly from above 
as Dubbins explains: 
To be fair to the members how can you expect them, just a few months after 
a general election, to anticipate or look in detail at what she is proposing and 
how it’s going to affect you and your families for the next few years. I don’t 
think you could expect members to do it. Members did not in any way 
suggest that we should accept what had been offered but to what extent 
they were on board for the campaign was very limited. And it was not until 
we got the branches on board and we could demonstrate that the employers 
did not have the wherewithal to resist us if we were sharp and pointed and 
went for it and leadership were at one in a determination to make advances 
against employers while the opportunities to do so remained strong. 
(interview 17.8.2017) 
The progress of the negotiations for the National Agreement is summarised in the 
minutes of the NGA National Council and Executive. The union presented the 
employers with demands for a substantial increase in the basic pay and a reduction 
in the working week from 40 to 37.5 hours. The NGA leadership made the case that 
such a settlement would: “restore print workers to a standard of living in accordance 
with their commitment to a successful industry” (Gennard 1990: 410). 
Minimum pay rates had stagnated, and although there was little evidence of rank-
and-file pressure or a grass roots revolt within the union the leadership calculated 
that a campaign of action could be mobilised. The National Council in April 1980 was 
told:  
Wade indicated that as a result of attending branch meetings, it was clear 
that morale amongst the membership was high and they were prepared to 
accept the lead given by the Council in order to progress the campaign.38 
	
38 NGA National Council Minutes April 1980 – see Appendix 2 
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The final offer from the employers would have given a 15.68% increase in average 
pay, below the inflation rate of 19.1%, a phased reduction in hours but with 
conditions attached around working practices. NGA leaders rejected the offer and 
when national negotiations broke down the union pursued a programme of 
industrial action.  
Dubbins explained the situation: 
We had a lot of internal discussions about where we go from here. There was 
a strong lobby that we can only take industrial action – strike or overtime ban 
in the traditional way we’d gone down the track before. Some of us argued 
that, no, this time we’ve got to do it differently, got to do it fast and hard and 
set the standard that will stand us in good stead in the future certainly as far 
as working hours were concerned. Eventually the executive came round to 
that point of view. We went to a meeting of branches and it was not terribly 
well accepted. (interview 17.8.2017) 
Activists on the Left in the union felt all-out action was the best way to proceed but 
Dubbins believed that an all-out strike may only receive partial support. Rather than 
pursue national action, selective hit-and-run tactics were applied including all-day 
chapel meetings, withdrawal of flexibility, overtime bans, reducing running speeds 
and other tactics that chapels could propose in order to exert maximum pressure. 
Employers did not know who would be hit, when or how. 
The tactics meant the union relied on its strongest chapels to take the initiative and 
it built up a momentum of the campaign. The selection of employers was carefully 
calculated to put maximum pressure on the BPIF leadership.  
The NGA offered individual companies industrial peace if they agreed to an ‘interim 
agreement’ that established a minimum earning level of £80 a week and a two-stage 
reduction in hours to 37.5 a week. The union guaranteed to revert to the final 
settlement even if this required concessions to the interim agreements.  
A Special National Council held on 24 April was informed that: 
	 148	
The BPIF and Newspaper Society intended to advise their members to 
suspend NGA members unless the employers’ last offer was submitted to a 
ballot of Association members.39 
Employers refused to make further concessions, particularly as SOGAT and NATSOPA 
unions had settled and their ballots had been carried. The NGA leadership stood firm 
and prepared to face the consequences of the escalating dispute. The outcome of 
the campaign was by no means assured and carried huge risks for the NGA. The 
employers seemed united in their determination to resist the NGA. 
Small craft unions in which most members are employed in the same occupation or 
sector run the risk of financial disaster if they face a long national dispute. They lack 
the option to cross-subsidise a dispute affecting one section of the membership and 
are therefore vulnerable to a united employer-offensive. The NGA had a high 
subscription rate and had built up substantial reserves. Its General Fund in 1979 
stood at more than £6 million but it could not sustain a full-scale national dispute for 
long (Gennard 1990: 238). The Financial Secretary advised the Council: 
That it may be necessary to pay dispute benefit to approximately 45,000 
members at the rate of £20.75 per week. On the assumption that a £6.20 
levy was raised from approximately 40,000 members, this would bring an 
additional £250,000 into the Association’s finances. Therefore, there would 
be a necessity to finance a dispute which would be costing in the region of 
£685,000 per week. 
. . . there was approximately £4 million available by the realising of assets. 
This sum would possibly cover a full-scale dispute lasting six weeks. (National 
Council 24 April 1980). 
The NGA leadership took strategic desicions in regard to the negotiation, their 
breakdown and the overall approach and conduct of the campaign with little regard 
for the position of the other printing unions. Such was its confidence and authority 
	
39 NGA National Council Minutes 24 April 1980 – see Appendix 2 
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to act independently. Having accepted the employers’ latest offer, the NATSOPA 
General Secretary, Owen O’Brien issued a letter to all chapel officers stating that:  
This Society has no intention of being drawn into this dispute40. 
Bill Keys, SOGAT General Secretary wrote to the NGA saying: 
We cannot help but feel that the current dispute can only, in the long term, 
have a damaging effect on the future employment prospects throughout the 
industry (SOGAT letter to NGA 30 April 1980). 
For the Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers 
(SLADE) John Jackson, General Secretary wrote to its branch secretaries: 
SLADE members should continue to do their normal work but they should not 
handle any work diverted to them as a result of the NGA action, nor should 
they handle work from people who are being used as an alternative to the 
normal NGA members (25 March 1980). 
Dubbins told this research that he found the SOGAT posture particularly 
“embarrassing”. The national agreement contained a percentage differential for 
semi-skilled workers so SOGAT members claimed the proportion of whatever the 
craft increase was. The strength of the smaller NGA in achieving a higher rate would 
therefore result in improvements for other groups. But the employers claimed they 
could not afford this knock-on effect. This touches on both the merits and tensions 
of sectionalism. The NGA was able to successfully prosecute the dispute despite the 
divisions between the unions. The resulting increase in pay and reduction in hours 
was enjoyed by all. The ballot votes to accept the employers’ terms by the other 
unions demonstrates the potential difficulties in winning membership support for 
action across the whole workforce. 
The case study confirms the potential effectiveness of sectional action and 
leadership capacity to take decisive strategic decisions. It relied upon extreme 
	
40 Correspondence held at Modern Records Centre, Warwick University 
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positional power and the organisational strength of a disciplined membership loyal 
to its association.  
I was the FoC of the NGA in Orchard and Ind Printers in Gloucester during the 
dispute. Members took industrial action including an overtime ban and refusal to 
cooperate with the company’s collection of work time data. After an all-day chapel 
meeting stopped production, the Managing Director called an all-staff meeting. He 
was also the chair of the regional BPIF. I remember him declaring that he had never 
known the employers so united and determined to resist the NGA’s militant position 
and warned the union’s members that unless they agreed to work normally on the 
terms offered they would be suspended from employment. 
On Monday 28 April 1980, NGA members 
across the industry were suspended – see 
letter from O&I Print. I organised a picket 
line at my place of work in Gloucester and 
was in close touch with other chapels 
around the city and beyond. No NGA 
member broke ranks by accepting the 
employer’s terms.  
Individual employers faced the threat of 
competitors gaining advantage by signing 
the union’s proposed interim agreement. 
Throughout the first morning reports were 
received of employers agreeing to the 
union’s demands. In many small firms, 
neither side wanted to be drawn into industrial action so the employer signed the 
NGA’s Interim Agreement. It was clear that the national employers’ position was 
collapsing rapidly, at least in the commercial printing sector. 
By 30 April Orchard and Ind was the only commercial printing firm in Gloucester still 
in dispute. Michael Orchard, the Managing Director, seemed devastated by the 
failure of the BPIF members to hold the line. He opened discussions with me as FoC 
6.1 - Letter to the author warning of the impending 
lock-out 
	 151	
and quickly agreed to the union’s terms, even settling on a more rapid reduction of 
hours to 37.5 a week that the union sought. 
The National Council, meeting on 6-9 May was informed: 
2,200 firms covering 20,346 members had now signed interim agreements 
and this represented a 40% coverage of Association members.41  
The NGA’s choice of selective tactics divided the employer resistance and it exploited 
the competitive and fragmented nature of the commercial printing industry. The 
newspaper industry, however, showed a more resolute opponent. It was better able 
to bypass NGA craft workers (or at least threaten to) using non-NGA staff and new 
technology. The nature of the newspaper industry with national news publishers 
owning large swathes of provincial papers, however, left them vulnerable to a 
national union able to inflict selective action across the country.  
The National Council met again on 13 May to receive a recommendation that it 
accepted the terms of an agreement with the Newspaper Society – breaking away 
from the joint settlement with the BPIF and offering concessions not made for 
commercial employers. This established an £80 per week minimum earnings 
guarantee and a phased reduction in hours to 37.5 by 2 November 1981. 
The General Secretary warned the Council: 
The settlement had to be viewed against the background that there was a 
grave danger that some members in the newspaper sector would not be 
prepared to follow Council policy coupled with the fact that the Newspaper 
Society were likely to attempt to produce on a widespread scale.42 
In the commercial printing sector it was reported: 
. . . there was a total collapse of BPIF resistance throughout the country, it 
was the officers’ recommendation that the request for a meeting from the 
BPIF should be rejected at the present time. 
	
41 NGA National Council Minutes May 1980 – see Appendix 2 
42 NGA National Council Minutes May 1980 – see Appendix 2 
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On 15 May, Henry Kendall, Director of the BPIF sent a circular to all the employers to 
report: 
The NGA have, however, made it clear that the terms agreed with the 
Newspaper Society are not acceptable to the union as a basis for settlement 
with the Federation and that they require from us the full terms which they 
have been seeking over recent weeks. 
The Council has concluded that it cannot approve a national agreement 
which would require all members to provide terms and conditions which 
many members just could not afford and which would mean that SOGAT and 
NATSOPA would feel compelled to abrogate the agreements already reached 
with them and seek new terms well in excess of anything finally agreed with 
the NGA. 
With no prospect of further negotiation the letter advises members:  
. . . to make their own arrangements with NGA chapels on the best terms 
they can achieve and according to each company’s ability to pay.  
It was in effect a surrender letter. On 19 May the NGA issued a circular to all 
branches: 
It is clear that the vast majority of members who work under the terms of the 
BPIF Agreement, are now covered by interim agreements between their 
employers and the association which meets the NGA’s claim for £80 per 
week minimum . . . and a 37.5 hour standard working week by 23 April 1981. 
A deadline of 28 May was given for any remaining companies to agree these terms 
otherwise: 
In the absence of receiving such an agreement you should, as from Thursday 
29 May 1980, instruct Association members in the employ of these 
companies to withdraw their labour immediately. 
Dubbins in interview in 2017 reflected on the outcome: 
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It would have been nice to split the Newspaper Society up the same way we 
split the BPIF up but the NS held firm for a couple of weeks. We could have 
sweated it out for a bit longer but we all knew what was coming – it was only 
a matter of time before ‘direct entry’ and therefore consequential reduction 
in our influence so you had to do something different with the Newspaper 
Society to address that and as soon as we possibly could. (interview 
17.8.2017) 
Although successful in commercial printing, the dispute had exposed vulnerabilities 
in the NGA’s ability to stop the job completely in newspaper production with new 
technology able to be run by non-NGA labour. Dubbins in 2017 said: 
We got very good support but the employers demonstrated what was to 
come and we all knew there was going to be a lot of fights in the near future 
and as the legislation built up step-after-step our ability to resist that just 
reduced over the years. (interview 17.8.2017) 
The National Agreement all but broke down as a result of the dispute and the 
Newspaper Society broke away from the commercial printing employers. The NGA 
made a separate settlement within newspapers rather than risk escalation. The news 
employers went on to pursue a much harder line to exploit new technology to 
challenge union influence and launched what they called, ‘Project Breakthrough’ 
(Gennard 1984, 1990, Cockburn 1991). 
Chris Newis, NGA National Councillor, believed the big threat in newspapers was the 
division between unions as much as with the employer. In his interview in 2017 he 
intimated that the strength of the NGA based on sectionalism could prove an 
increasing weakness. 
Working it out between unions became a major activity about who was going 
to do this work – less prevalent in the general trade because there was no 
one else to do it but in the provincial newspaper trade, outside of Fleet 
Street, it became a big issue. There was a lot of tension around the intro of 
technology and the relations between unions and how it was going to work 
out (interview 3.12.2017). 
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The other unions were largely bystanders to the dispute, whatever their opinions on 
the NGA’s actions. The employers were also obliged to continue to pay their 
members even though production was halted. The power resources the NGA could 
deploy meant that its leadership had the capacity to determine strategic actions 
largely independent of other players. For many NGA members the campaign 
required little from them except those directly called upon to take action, only those 
members who had won the pay rise were required to pay the temporary levy to 
support those still in dispute. This was, for many, the only sacrifice they made in 
what became the union’s decisive victory. 
Personalities played their part in the episode. In the 1980 dispute Tony Dubbins, 
then the assistant to Joe Wade, General Secretary, proved the chief architect and 
tactician for the campaign.  
I don’t think Joe would have fought it. Joe was the best negotiator but he 
wasn’t a fighter. He could make all the cases but he wasn’t going to get down 
to it and fight it. (interview 17.8.2017) 
Dawson (2014: 388) described Dubbins as a tough, “heroic leader”. Interviewed for 
this research, Owen Coop, West Pennie Branch Secretary and then NGA National 
Councillor saw Dubbins as the driving force behind the campaign: 
I give a lot of credit to Tony Dubbins. And the strategy was absolutely 
brilliant. (interview 14.2.2020) 
 
Union response to the new laws 
The sort of dispute conducted in 1980 would not be lawful under the new 
regulations and the NGA leadership acted ahead of their enactment. The interviews 
over 2014-17 with former officers and activists confirmed that they anticipated that 
the NGA was a key target in the government offensive against union power. Dubbins 
assessed that the union was in the firing line:  
Absolutely top – not top in national importance in the country’s economy in a 
way of the railway workers or dock workers - but from the point of the NGA’s 
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influence and organisation and ability to deal with newspaper employers 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
The NGA welcomed the TUC’s commitment to challenge the new Employment Acts. 
The NGA National Council held a special session to consider the new laws and the 
union’s response to them. Tony Burke, then a NGA National Councillor, explained: 
The general view was we are just going to ignore it. We are not going to 
accept fines and things like that. I wouldn’t say it was arrogance. We had 
never been beaten before. We’d had long hard battles and won (interview 
18.2.2014). 
The TUC had agreed a position of resistance to the new laws and a collective 
commitment to rally behind any union threatened by them. The decision to defy the 
law, however, would be a huge gamble for a small union, especially one that had 
largely stood aloof from the rest of the TUC for much of its history. The 1982 
Wembley conference agreed that no union should participate in ballots under the 
1980 and 1982 Acts, not take public funds for such ballots, members should not 
serve on tribunals arising from the new laws and crucially: 
If the TUC General Council feels that a request for support is justified, to 
coordinate support for an affiliated union in the event of it experiencing legal 
action from an employer under those laws, including industrial action against 
the employer concerned and to provide financial support to the union in the 
event of it experience financial difficulties arising out of such action.43  
The first four years of the Conservative Government saw the new laws enacted but 
not tested. It was a period of protest but stand-off and for much of the time it 
seemed that the unpopular government would not survive. The June 1983 General 
Election, however, re-elected the Conservatives with a massive majority. It was 
determined to pursue the assault on trade union power with fresh vigour. John 
Monks recalled for this research that TUC leaders feared that, with a fresh mandate, 
the Government would press ahead with further trade union reforms and some felt 
the time had come to adopt a different approach from the outright opposition as 
	
43 Report by TUC General Council adopted at Wembley Conference 5 April 1982 – see Appendiz 2 
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declared by the Wembley Conference. Right-wing union leaders such as Alistair 
Graham of the civil servants’ union advocated a policy of ‘new realism’. A change in 
the election for the TUC General Council led to a number of medium-sized unions – 
including, ironically, the NGA – being elected for the first time but most were on the 
‘right’ of the movement (Marsh 1992:153).  
The landslide re-election victory for the Conservatives in 1983 allowed it to pursue a 
more radical reform programme. But some union leaders saw some grounds for 
constructive engagement and argument. The hard-liner, Norman Tebbit was moved 
to become the Minister for Trade and Industry and his place at Employment was 
taken up by Tom King, seen by union leaders as a more reasonable politician. Len 
Murray opened up communications and sought a dialogue with him over any future 
plans for union legislation. 
Interviewees acknowledged that some left-wingers were looking for the fight with 
the Thatcher Government. Dubbins felt the TUC’s initial stance was quite strong, but 
he acknowledged that other union leaders felt that the 1983 election had changed 
the whole picture and a new approach was necessary. Newis believed the new laws 
had to be defeated: 
We felt it would have to be opposed and we also saw it as an extension . . . of 
the Heath’s Industrial Relations Act which we had seen off and we would be 
able to see this off again through our industrial strength (interview 
3.12.2017). 
It should be noted that the NGA had signed up to the Industrial Relations Act and 
Newis refers to the battle fought by the wider movement with his own union 
standing aside. He saw it as a broader battle of class forces: 
Always saw the objective was to undermine industrial power of trade unions 
in order to increase the rate of profit for businesses. Thatcher promised to 
unleash the power of enterprise from the restrictive practices of unions. 
Somebody had to do something about organised labour if global capitalism 
was going to catch on (interview 3.13.2017). 
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The NGA felt confident of its strength even with the threats closing in on it. 
Interviewed in 2017, Dubbins reflected that: 
We had just been through the 1980 campaign, we were seen, I won’t say 
‘vanguard’ of the trade union movement but certainly up around the front 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
The Government viewed the NGA and other print unions as the more militant faction 
within the TUC. But a private Conservative Research memo headed The State of the 
Union written by Shipley in July 198044 made the assessment that the NGA was 
vulnerable: 
The NGA, for all its hot air, is however, in severe financial difficulties, having 
spent more than £1.8 million in disputes benefit since the beginning of 1979.  
It was not dispute pay that was to cause financial concerns in the NGA, however, it 
was the sharp rise in unemployment and the consequential strain on its Provident 
Fund that paid out generous out-of-work benefits. By late 1980 some 1,500 
members were unemployed and the Fund paid them a third of the weekly basic 
wage contained in the National Agreement (Gennard 1990: 243). Members voted to 
pay an emergency levy of £1 a week but this could not be sustained for long and the 
growing recession saw more redundancies and closures. A Special Delegate Meeting 
was called to consider proposals to reform internal finances and break the link 
between unemployment benefit and basic pay rate.  
 
New employers in the industry 
By 1980 new free newspapers were appearing - delivered door-to-door and 
produced using the latest phototypesetting or desktop-publishing systems. The new 
businesses were often using the technology in ways the traditional industry was 
unable to. Dubbins recalled how he opposed the argument made by some at the 
	
44 Confidential memo 26.7.80 from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
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time that without the restrictive controls of the NGA there would be a flourishing of 
new publications (interview 17.8.2017). 
The NGA National Council established a committee to examine the impact of free 
newspapers. It found that the number of free titles had risen from around 300 in 
1979 to 6-700 by 1983 with an estimated circulation of 21 million.45 The response by 
the traditional provincial press was often to take a financial stake in these new 
operations and in many cases take them over.  
Dubbins felt the power still lay in the hands of the major newspaper owners: 
Most independents we were able to strike agreements with and it wasn’t 
long before the provincial press were buying up their local free-sheets. It 
wasn’t a major on-going battle. The rise of the free-sheets got them worried 
and drove them down the path that free-sheets came under their control 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
One new free newspaper operation was the Messenger Newspaper Group that got a 
mention in the free newspapers’ committee after the SOGAT Manchester Central 
branch raised unspecific concerns about the business.46 
Looking back, Dubbins explains that he recognised the challenges the union faced in 
contending with new technology. He believed at the time that employers sought to 
use new technology to eliminate trade unions: 
If we’d had a different political climate we could have regulated them and 
slowed it down. We ran into a whole range of disputes with individual 
newspaper employers – a lot of them parts of major groups clearly with a 
strategy. It was becoming increasingly apparent that that strategy was not 
about new technology, this was the façade being used, but the reality it was a 
de-unionisation scenario (interview 17.8.2017). 
	
45 NGA National Council Minutes March 1983 – see Appendix 2 
46 Ibid 
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Concerns over Messenger Newspapers were correct. The employer, Eddy Shah was 
preparing to break the influence of the NGA on his business and the next chapter will 
explore the dynamics of this pivotal dispute. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The 1980 campaign gained a staggering 28.5% rise in the ‘basic rate’ and a shorter 
working week for the NGA membership. Its success boosted the union leadership’s 
standing with members. The NGA had shown is capacity to act and became the first 
union to reach a thirty-seven-and-a-half hour working week. In Gennard’s 
conclusion: “The industrial muscle of the NGA allied to the determination, loyalty, 
discipline and sacrifice of its members had achieved a significant victory (Gennard, 
1990: 413)”. 
The case study highlights a union leadership shifting its ideological stance to one 
more identified with the ‘Left’ of the trade union movement and more adversarial 
towards employers. Michel’s (1962) critique of union leaders describes how they 
command oligarchical tendencies but this study shows how a leadership can 
transition to a new ideological posture. With the NGA’s positional power under 
threat from new technology the leadership calculated that time was running out to 
deploy it for the purposes of advancing its members’ terms and conditions. 
The study confirms the capacity for a leadership to embark upon a bold, aggressive 
campaign as part of a strategic choice rather than rank-and-file pressure. Its strong 
internal democracy and high membership participation, however, gave the 
leadership the confidence it could mobilise support for its campaign. The union 
leadership highlighted how the pay of skilled workers had been hit by successive pay 
limits and how new technology should lead to a shorter working week, deployment 
of ‘sword of justice’ for collective mobilisation (Flanders and Clegg 1954).  
NGA leaders calculated the level of membership support and how to build and utilise 
it where they had most leverage over the employer federation. Rainnie (2016: 132) 
was right to describe the action as a “guerrilla campaign aimed at taking advantage 
of the highly competitive nature of the general print sector”. The highly fragmented 
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commercial printing industry employers could not sustain a united front against the 
hit-and-run selective action of the NGA. The strategy to sow division between rival 
companies rather than adopt an all-out offensive proved shrewd and effective. 
In taking the action, the NGA clashed with other unions, especially SOGAT, who were 
partners in the National Agreement. Relations between the two unions were 
strained and the NGA leadership calculated that there was little to gain or lose from 
having SOGAT alongside in the campaign. In 1980, the union did not require such 
‘associational’ power. It was also confident that other workers were unable to 
undertake their member’s duties, even though their unions did not support the 
action. The union leaders could direct the campaign with little if any reference to the 
concerns of other unions in the industry. The other unions were largely by-standers 
in the dispute and the differential agreements meant that they stood to gain from 
the NGA’s success.  
This case study is an example of sectional action at its most effective but union 
division, however, posed a threat to the NGA’s longer-term interests. Had the 
dispute lasted longer than it did the fall-out with other unions may have proved 
more damaging especially in newspapers. Dubbins still stands by the position he 
took as leader of the NGA with his criticism of the stance of other unions, especially 
SOGAT. Relations with SOGAT continued to worsen as technology forced a 
competition for union positions within the shifting job roles and functions (Gennard 
1990). 
The NGA paid little if any attention to woo wider union support or public opinion. It 
did not need assistance from the TUC and by and large set the agenda and 
sequencing of the campaign. Its power was based on its structural position within 
the industry and its tight control of the labour market founded upon the closed 
shop. It succeeded thanks to clever tactics to select targets for maximum advantage 
where membership support was strong and exploit the competitive nature of the 
industry to out-manoeuvre the employers. A union without such strong membership 
bonds and collective identity could not have embarked on such a campaign with any 
certainty of the result.  
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The campaign demonstrated the capacity of a small craft union to adopt a strategic 
objective of improved terms and conditions for its members and pursue it with 
determination until successful. It was possible to do this because of its strong 
collective identity and organisational prowess. Its internal democracy and high 
membership participation gave the leadership confidence it could lead a selective 
campaign of attrition against the employers without calling on the support of other 
unions of the TUC.  
In the subsequent three years the fortunes of print workers suffered. The economic 
recession led to redundancies and pressure on pay. High unemployment and falling 
subscription income created a financial crisis for the NGA. Technological change 
threatened to replace many skilled jobs, especially in typesetting and the 
Government instigated its step-by-step sequence of employment laws. The next 
chapter examines the case study of the 1983 Messenger dispute which exposed how 
far those changes impacted upon the power of the NGA and its leadership’s ability to 
determine the course of events through their own strategic choices.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
The dynamics of the 1983 Messenger dispute 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how the NGA waged a highly successful campaign in 
1980 against employers across the commercial and newspaper industries confirming 
its capacity to take strategic actions. It was confident it could count upon the 
positional power and collective organisation of the union.  
The following three years saw profound changes in the political, economic, 
technological and legal environment. The Conservative Government had built upon 
its step-by-step programme of employment legislation as described in Chapter Four 
with far-reaching 1980 and 1982 Acts to significantly restrict union actions especially 
those used by the NGA. 
Unemployment had risen sharply to more than three million. The printing industry 
was in recession and the numbers of unemployed NGA members had risen sharply. 
The number of employees in the industry had shrunk from 315,000 in 1975 to 
249,000 in 1982 (Gennard 1990: 129). 
Printing technology had advanced allowing the user to compose type and pages 
much easier and cheaper than before. New independent publishers entered the 
industry producing free newspapers delivered door-to-door a development 
scrutinised by a special printing unions’ committee47. One such operation was 
Messenger Newspapers, based in Stockport, led by Eddy Shah. 
This chapter examines how the NGA came to be in dispute with Messenger 
Newspapers despite the unfavourable conditions for a successful outcome. Shah had 
calculated the impact of industrial action to his business and had taken measures to 
	
47 Minutes of the free newspapers sub-committee of the Printing Industries Advisory Committee were 
circulated to the National Councils of the unions represented. 
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limit its effectiveness. The chapter questions his independence or whether he had 
the sort of backing some in the union claimed. 
The NGA had many years’ experience of applying external pressure on recalcitrant 
employers but by 1983 these tactics were ‘secondary action’ and could result in legal 
injunctions to desist. The NGA’s power relied on the discipline of solidarity between 
members in an inter-connected industry (Dörre, Holst and Nachtwey 2009, 
Adăscăliței and Guga 2017). The environment in which the union now operated had 
changed to significantly favour the employer.  
The chapter highlights the legal actions taken using the new employment laws for 
the first time and how these rapidly escalated. Failure to conform risked a spiral of 
legal actions but non-compliance was the policy of the TUC resulting from its 1982 
Wembley Conference. The policy contained some caveats and was agreed prior to 
the re-election of the Conservatives in 1983. This led to a shifting in the stance of the 
TUC with those arguing for some form of constructive engagement with the new 
government winning gaining majority support. 
The research considers the strategic decisions taken by the NGA’s leadership and 
how pressures from activists and emotions played their part in escalating the dispute 
into uncharted territory for a small union with a legacy of moderate politics and 
detachment from the wider movement. 
When Messenger production continued despite the strike, the NGA sought to use 
secondary pressures and to blockade the plant with a mass picket. Evidence is given 
from those who organised and attended the picket as well as from police reports. 
This action brought further court actions and a robust response from an emboldened 
and well-equipped police force under pressure from ministers to constrain the 
picket.  
When the NGA refused to comply with the court injunctions, Shah won 
sequestration of the union’s assets, an unprecedented measure. Testimony of union 
officers show, for the first time, the secret measures the union took to evade the 
actions.  
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The State created a legal framework within which individual employers could 
challenge union power and it could claim neutrality. This ‘hands-off’ approach is 
analysed in a section that looks at the role of the police and the state. It considers 
how the employer and union came to opposite views about the role of government. 
The study calls upon interviews, media reports, union minutes, and confidential 
documents between government departments and the Cheshire Police. The 
evidence highlights deliberations around extending police and state powers 
including bringing charges for incitement and riotous assembly. The study records 
how the police and ministers disagreed over the interception of vehicles heading for 
Warrington. 
The chapter uses the testimony of those present, triangulated with press reports and 
government/police records to highlight the escalating mass picket and the extent to 
which its organisation was a strategic decision by the union or whether it grew under 
its own momentum. 
 
Shah the independent 
The provincial newspaper industry was dominated by a few large conglomerate 
employers, often with cross-ownership to national titles. Unions could apply 
industrial action in one workplace to support members in another. From the 
interviews with union officers and activists there was an awareness that an 
independent employer could seek to exploit new technology and the new laws to 
bypass the union but confidence remained high that such a threat could be resisted 
using the union’s tried-and-tested methods. Some independent producers had 
already successfully circumvented the NGA, such as TB Foreman, the publisher of the 
Nottingham Evening Post. Dubbins told the 1980 Delegate Meeting of the pragmatic 
conclusion that: “this is one that we have lost and in time, try to get back and get it 
organised . . . on a proper trade union basis (NGA 1980: 316). 
Shah saw himself an ‘outsider’ not tied to traditional methods, had never seen a 
Linotype machine and used Apple computers. On a trip to the US he saw the page 
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make-up software, Pagemaker, being used to produce a newspaper in Seattle 
Dickinson (1984) who wrote of this visit, makes little of the independent status of 
Shah, preferring to paint him as part of a wider conspiracy. Goodhart and Wintour 
(1986) present Shah as the leader of a newspaper revolution. Neil (1997: 82) also 
credits the “small entrepreneur” with taking a stand unlike the national newspaper 
proprietors. 
Shah said he had no problem recognising the union in the early days of his business 
and he allowed the NGA to meet his staff. Keen to avoid problems getting his papers 
printed he even joined the union himself. He says he didn’t realise that ‘recognition’ 
meant a closed shop.  
As expressed in his interview for this research, Shah grew to resent the NGA and the 
aggressive style of Alan Royston the Father of the Chapel (FoC) and Tony Burke the 
President of the local Stockport Branch, who worked at the rival Stockport Express 
and the Stockport Advertiser. Tensions grew over a range of issues and the more the 
members turned to the union for support, the more hostile Shah became.  
Royston describes a long line of individually trivial but cumulative examples of secret 
deals, broken promises and general pettiness. Shah refused to be bound by union 
rules. The hours crept up to get the job finished. Burke led the initial negotiations 
recalls Shah getting “very ratty and difficult (interview 18.2.2014)”. 
Shah became determined to develop the business without the union. He talked to 
others in the free newspaper business who advised him that to by-pass the union he 
would need a web-offset printing press. He bought a cheap second-hand press from 
the Co-operative Press in Manchester. The company acquired a factory unit in 
Winnick Quay, in Warrington, complete with its own electricity sub-station. Such 
preparations show his determination to be ready for a conflict with the union and 
relations with chapel members deteriorated.  
For this research, Shah explained:  
We got the paper from Finland brought in through a non-union port. Because 
we couldn’t use union staff I went and found unemployed people who were 
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desperate for work and within about three weeks we had taught them to use 
the press and how to make the plates, I learnt as well (interview 7.4.2015). 
By setting up a press in Warrington, Shah took advantage of enterprise grants but 
being in the area of the Manchester Branch meant the union would demand terms 
laid down for national newspapers printed in the city. Burke explained:  
If you were a newspaper you had to pay Manchester national newspaper 
rates which were pretty good. Manchester branch also has all sorts of strange 
rules as to who could go for interview and things like that. It was one of the 
oldest branches one of the founders of the labour movement48 (interview 
18.2.2015).  
The collective strength of the NGA gave them high levels of knowledge of the 
industry. Little happened without the union finding out and in Manchester, the 
Branch Secretary, Arthur Perrin discovered Shah’s plans for the press at Warrington. 
Owen Coop the West Pennine NGA Secretary also learned Shah had established 
another office in Bury and it was a hive of non-union activity. The company refused 
to meet him to discuss the operation so Coop summoned John Ibbotson, NGA 
National Officer, for assistance but it took weeks to fix a meeting. In November 1982, 
after a long delay Arthur Perrin got to meet with Shah over the printing press in 
Warrington. Shah informed him that the machine was already producing papers. On 
19 November Shah met NGA officers and announced he was not going to continue 
with agreements at Stockport including the closed shop (Dickinson 1984, Gennard 
1990).  
The evidence points to Shah preparing to oust the union from the business. Royston 
remembers:  
They advertised our jobs before we were going on strike. I was finishing off 
the Messenger and there was an ad missing. And Steve Hart (the manager) 
walks out and plonks this advert in. I said wait a minute, this is an advert for 
my job, what’s going on? I thought we were still talking and I was getting 
	
48 The Manchester Graphical Society was formed in 1797. 
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angry then. That’s when it was getting more intimidating. If we are being 
pulled out of here, let’s get on with it because I can’t stand this (interview 
2014). 
Dubbins wrote to Shah setting a deadline of 22 June for a settlement or a dispute 
would be called. Dispute pay of £80 a week was endorsed for the members 
involved.49 Shah responded that his company would pursue legal actions against the 
union. The deadline passed but the union delayed hoping still for a change of 
approach. The National Council minutes of 29-30 June 1983 recorded a verbal report 
by Dubbins declaring there was no alternative but industrial action.50  
The nature of the printing industry meant that few employers were entirely self-
reliant and often needed the inter-connected web of suppliers. Cross-ownership of 
newspapers meant that few stood alone. These factors gave the unions additional 
leverage from that emanating from the positional power in the workplace. Shah’s 
independence allowed him to circumvent the union’s direct and indirect tactics. His 
preparations allowed the business to operate despite the NGA’s industrial action 
tactics. The new laws gave him significant new weight against the union and 
propelled the conflict to a higher, more political level. 
 
The dispute and the law 
For most of its history the NGA’s positional power meant that if members walked off 
the job, production stopped. Shah, however, had already isolated the small 
Stockport chapel from his growing non-union workforce in other offices. Far from 
fearing the consequences of a strike, the evidence shows he encouraged it. 
The strike began on 4 July 1983 and on 12 July Phil Daniels, Alan Royston, Kevin 
Sherrin, John Noble, Neil McAllister and Stan Hart, known as the ‘Stockport Six’, 
	
49 NGA Executive minutes 13 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
50 NGA National Council minutes 29-30 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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were dismissed. The Messenger newspaper still appeared, if apparently a little rough 
around the edges (Dickinson 1984).  
A report early into the dispute from Royston as FoC admits: 
So far our picketing successes have been limited. The mail has to be collected 
from the Post Office as the postmen refuse to cross our line. A few 
advertisers have told us they will no longer advertise while the dispute is on 
and we have managed to turn a small amount of artwork away (July 1983 
report by Stockport NGA). 
The union entered the Messenger dispute with its positional power all but gone and 
its usual tactics failed to significantly restrict the business. The union was aware that 
some of these methods were in breach of the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982. 
The 1982 Act, in particular, was wide-ranging and included:  
• Made it unlawful to sack a worker for not being a trade union member in 
a closed shop where the closed shop arrangements have not been 
approved in 1980 Employment Act terms.  
• Outlawed ‘trade union labour only contracts’ and removed immunity 
from those who pressurise employers to inhibit non-trade union 
companies from honouring their contracts. 
• Made trade unions open to civil damages between £10,000 and £250,000 
for unlawful industrial action. 
• Lawful trade disputes were restricted to those disputes between 
employers and their workers concerning working conditions, wages, etc. 
This new definition removed immunity from secondary action to 
pressurise another company where there is no dispute between their 
workers and employers. 
• Empowered employers to fire striking workers and not face unfair 
dismissal claims. 
It is clear from conference debates, union circulars and interviews that the NGA was 
acutely aware of the implications of the new laws and many believed parts been 
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drafted with it in mind. The National Council had agreed to carry on and disregard 
the new laws and it was given a report on the wider trade union response.  
So far there has not been an actual case, but there have been a number of 
‘near misses’. Inevitably there will, at some time be an action by someone 
seeking an injunction or compensation.51 
The National Council reaffirmed its policy to refuse to acknowledge the legislation 
and if faced with sequestration it would:  
Continue its position regarding the refusal to pay any damages or 
compensation and leave open the action to be taken if sequestration 
becomes an actuality arising from such cases (eg consider “persuading” 
employers to pay damages or refund money sequestrated.52 
The NGA issued instructions to members not to handle work coming from or going 
to a company in dispute and the standard circular was sent in regard to the 
Messenger dispute, including to advertisers asking them to desist.  
Unions were reluctant to change their rules to accommodate the new laws but 
instead established systems and instructions to officers to ensure compliance and 
control.53 The NGA National Council instigated ways to impose greater checks on 
branches proposing industrial action.54 
Reed International was a large employer of NGA members in the provincial press and 
it was a shareholder in its rival Messenger Newspaper – a common practice at the 
time. The National Council was informed: 
Following approaches by the NGA, Reed International had agreed to dispose 
of their shareholding in Messenger Newspapers (Northern) Ltd.55 
	
51 NGA Executive 13 June 1983 
52 NGA National Council minutes 29-30 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
53 Unite guide to Industrial Action and UNISON guidelines for example 
54 NGA National Council minutes 29-30 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
55 NGA National Council minutes 10-11 August 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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Shah’s Bury business obtained a writ from Manchester High Court alleging that Reed 
International had been induced by the NGA to repudiate a contract to invest £33,000 
in the Bury Messenger, an act unlawful under section 15 of the 1982 Employment 
Act. Shah sought £13,303 in damages. The judge deferred the hearing before making 
a ruling.  
Interviewed for this study in 2015, Shah said he could not believe that the union 
simply told the court it did not recognise the Acts and they would not pay any fines 
(interview 7.4.2015). 
With production continuing despite the strike the NGA turned to the journalists for 
assistance. The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) were also committed to resisting 
the new employment laws and it instructed its members not to supply copy or 
pictures to strike-breaking production workers. 
The NGA picket at Stockport remained low key but the journalists agreed not to 
cross the picket if it was stepped up. In response Frank Walsh, NGA Regional 
Secretary, sent out a letter to the northern NGA branches asking for support on the 
picket line (Dickinson 1984). 
On 1 September Shah went back to court and using the 1980 and 1982 Employment 
Acts won a writ to restrain the NUJ from: inducing or attempting to induce its 
members to break their contracts of employment. On 6 September Shah won an 
injunction to order the journalists to return to normal working. Royston recalled 
when NUJ Northern Organiser, Colin Bourne had a heated exchange with Shah on 
BBC Look North West.  
I remember seeing Colin Bourne on TV with Shah. And Colin said you signed a 
recognition agreement. Shah went berserk on that programme. He really 
flipped (interview 2014). 
The Stockport Branch of the NUJ successfully urged the chapel to stand by the 
union’s instructions despite the court ruling. Shah stepped up his legal actions and 
on 13 September gained a writ to restrain the NGA from inducing or attempting to 
induce a customer to break a contract with his company. On 16 September the NUJ 
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was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to obey the court’s order. Feeling 
that sequestration was far too draconian a measure, the judge went no further than 
to express his disquiet and reminded the union that the order must be obeyed. The 
NUJ Executive confirmed its decision not to obey the order and the Messenger 
Chapel voted 5-3 to continue the action. Shah offered to drop the legal action if the 
journalists returned to normal working and this time they agreed and stuck by the 
decision in spite of efforts by Ecclestone and Bourne. In Shah’s memory there was no 
real dispute with the journalists: 
NUJ has always chickened out because we then used the law (interview 
7.4.2015). 
When interviewed for this research, Shah explained that his secretary gave him a 
booklet from the Government on trade union laws. He called his solicitor, Mike 
Grearson who said, “yeah, you’ve got them”. This statement is at odds with the 
report of the meeting between Shah and Manchester NGA officers to the NGA 
Executive of 16 May: 
He confirmed that the company were prepared for a siege and stated that his 
company’s lawyers and employees were geared up for this. He explained 
they were getting to a clash situation and stated they were ready to face up 
to it.56 
The report said that Shah concluded the meeting by saying that if the NGA go into 
battle with him, he would win. The NGA Executive met on 13 June and was 
informed: 
Shah warned the union that any action the union took against his company 
would be illegal and he would proceed with court action.57 
Shah’s comments may have been bravado in a negotiating situation but the evidence 
such as the purchase of a press, opening new studies, recruitment of anti-union 
	
56 NGA National Executive minues 16 May 1983 – see Appendix 2 
57 NGA National Executive minues 13 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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staff, points to him having prepared for a conflict with the NGA. It seems rather 
implausible that such preparations did not include advice on the legal position. 
In contrast, the union’s leadership appeared initially hesitant: 
Although this action was contrary to NGA policy on the Employment Act, the 
officers were of the view that before proceeding further in this connection 
that consultations take place with the TUC.58 
The National Council in September was informed of consultations with the TUC: 
It appeared to the officers that there were some doubts and 
misunderstandings among TUC staff. However, further consultation was to 
take place between the Association and TUC legal representatives.59 
This would appear to have been a time for the NGA to take stock of its dispute with 
Shah but the conflict rolled on. Dubbins denied this amounted to any lack of resolve: 
We never had any doubt about what we would have to do but obviously with 
employment law and bearing in mind TUC’s commitment to support unions 
who ran foul of the employment law so there was a need to consult them. 
But we had already made up our minds (interview 17.8.2017). 
On 14 October the High Court granted Shah two interim injunctions against the NGA 
under the Employment Acts. One ordered the union to refrain from blacking work 
emanating from or going to the Group and from asking other unions to black it. The 
other restrained the NGA from interfering with the business of the Messenger Group 
through unlawful picketing. Shah returned to the courts to enforce the injunctions of 
14 October 1983. Shah claims the judge was about to fine the NGA £5,000 but then 
the local official told the court that whatever happened the union would not pay it.  
	
58 NGA National Council minutes 10-11 August 1983 – see Appendix 2 
59 NGA National Council minutes 21-22 September 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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I looked at the judge and his eyes were like a pin-ball machine, and the 
cherries came up. They thought they were above the law and they felt above 
the law unless it’s a really iniquitous law (interview 7.4.2015). 
It is hard to see how Shah would have known what was in the judge’s mind. Shah 
recalls that his solicitor had a list of things they could go for and at the bottom was 
sequestration.  
I didn’t know what it was and he said, we’ll never get that. I said go for it but 
was told I was not going to get it (interview 7.4.2015). 
Judge Eastham ruled that the NGA has been in “blatant breach” but he drew back 
from sequestration. He warned that: “the time might come when this union must be 
taught to obey the law by having all its assets sequestrated.” He fined the NGA 
£50,000 plus costs (Dickinson 1984). 
Dubbins appears generous to the judge in retrospect; in the interview in 2017 he 
recalled that he would have preferred the parties settle the dispute some other way: 
It became a test of the law against this union and undoubtedly the judge just 
took the line: ‘I may not completely agree with this, that there may be other 
ways to resolve it’. But at the end of the day he had to uphold the law and we 
got the fines and in saying ‘we’re not paying them’ we were in contempt, no 
doubt about it, and the consequence was sequestration. I understand exactly 
the position the judge was in, if he is given a law like that to operate 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
Wade made it clear that the union would not pay the fine. The Sun reported: 
Jail me if you dare storms union boss  
Defiant print union boss Joe Wade yesterday stuck two fingers up at the law 
over a £50,000 fine. Mr Wade may now become the first trade union martyr 
in a big confrontation over the Government’s new employment laws.60  
	
60 The Sun 23.11.83 – see Appendix 5 
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Dubbins felt irritated by Wade’s posture and the way the media focused on it: 
Journalists kept going on about it and it was a load of nonsense. This is 
nothing to do with going to jail; all about sequestration and stopping the 
union operating. This government doesn’t want people going to jail – victims, 
people sent to prison – ready-made heroes in that situation. Sticking him in 
the nick was the worst thing they could have done (interview 17.8.2017). 
Shah triggered the first use of the new employment laws. Both government and 
unions had anticipated a battle at some point and there were eager combatants on 
both sides. After decades of failed attempts at trade union reform, the Conservatives 
needed to assert the rule of law and had a fresh electoral mandate behind them. The 
union policy of non-compliance – set in train at the 1982 Wembley Conference – was 
in the process of review with the TUC seeking some sort of accommodation with the 
law. These factors added weight to the significance of the dispute and its outcome. 
 
Union leadership and democracy in the dispute 
The traditional model of a top-down managed institution as described by the Webbs 
(1896) does not do justice to the union’s membership engagement and rank-and-file 
activism. The NGA was a small, tight-knit organisation with an elected leadership at 
every level. Blissett (2013) studied decision-making in unions in the UK and Australia 
and used the NGA as a case study for a comparative analysis of policy making. He 
tests his research against the classical theorists (Webbs 1896, 1920 and Michels 
1962) who see trade unions as oligarchs with senior officers as chief decision-
makers. This research shows the position for a union grounded in high membership 
participation and democracy is more nuanced. The rank-and-file membership has a 
high degree of engagement and influence and is not in a constant battle with the 
leadership to wrest control of decisions (Fairbrother 2015). The 1980 dispute was 
one whereby the leadership took a proactive approach to wage a campaign to 
advance members’ pay and conditions and set out to encourage members into 
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action. In 1983, faced with an employer offensive, the leadership did not command 
the agenda and was obliged to respond with defensive action. 
At the NGA September National Council, Dubbins was declared the winner of the 
ballot for General Secretary61. He took up the position when Joe Wade retired the 
following year. Elected on a more left-wing stance than his predecessor he now led 
the response to Shah’s challenge. 
The structures of the NGA didn’t help the situation, however. The industrial power of 
the NGA lay in the hands of chapels with solidarity action through the inter-
connected industry often directed by the branches. The focus for decision-making 
tended to be at the branch level where chapel reps and activists came together. 
Branches retained the trappings of independent societies in a federated structure, 
even called ‘Graphical Societies’. Their own bank accounts and directly employed 
full-time officers were answerable to local branch committees elected by the 
membership including lay presidents. This structure developed the strong collective 
identity at local level.  
Shah’s studio in Stockport came under the Stockport Graphical Society led by Arthur 
Scott as Branch Secretary and Tony Burke as lay President and National Council 
member. The Branch could trace its roots back to the Stockport Typographical 
Society, an affiliate of the Northern Typographical Union in 1835. Shah’s Bury office 
came under the West Pennine Graphical Society led by Branch Secretary, Owen 
Coop. Warrington, where Shah put his printing press, came under the auspices of the 
Manchester Branch led by Arthur Perrin.  
Coop reflected: 
I don’t know if things had been different and Shah had set up in Bury rather 
than Stockport whether we’d could have done something but irrespective of 
that I believe somebody would have taken us on (interview 14.2.2020). 
	
61 NGA National Council minutes 21-22 September 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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7.1 - Location of Messenger facilities and NGA branch structure 
 
Coop remembers a conversation he had at the time during which another officer 
suggested: 
. . . what we should have done is drawn a circle around it and pushed it to 
one side. It would have happened anyway in my opinion, it would have been 
somebody else (interview 14.2.2020). 
There is no evidence of the leadership considering alternative strategies in the face 
of the new legal restrictions but some signs of hesitancy or anxiety. There is 
evidence of caution:  
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greater care would be taken when issuing blacking circulars. Ensure that in 
any blackings, the full facts are established before action is taken.62 
By this time the TUC’s Annual Report, to be presented to its Autumn Congress, had 
been published. It showed a softening of approach to the new Government and its 
opposition to the law. The NGA National Council had concerns over the TUC’s 
position as expressed in the minutes: 
Also seek to question the TUC’s present contradictory policy by making a 
statement concerning the problems experienced by the NGA in following 
Congress policy under the appropriate section of the TUC Report at the 1983 
Congress in Blackpool.63 
Although one of the wealthiest unions, the NGA was facing a significant drain on its 
finances due to the sharp rise in unemployment benefit payments. The Balance 
Sheet at 24 September 1983 shows the union worth £10,098,186. A Special Delegate 
Meeting was called for November to consider ways to stem the losses and a Special 
National Council was held on 13 October to handle the business of the forthcoming 
Delegate Meeting. The rate paid to out-of-work members was a third of the basic 
weekly wage agreed in the National Agreement. The Council proposed freezing the 
benefit. 
The same Council meeting was informed of the writ served on the Association by the 
Messenger Group. Shah’s recourse to the courts raised the stakes in the dispute. No 
longer was it just a conflict with a small newspaper business and six union members, 
now it was over union resistance to new restrictive employment laws. The 
leadership had to decide whether to engage in battle or seek a pragmatic side-step. 
The TUC’s wavering position could have rung alarm bells. Had the NGA leadership 
wanted an escape route they had one from the September Congress but 
recommendations were endorsed to step up pressure through a meeting of news 
members in the Manchester area including a rallying call to join the picket.  
	
62 NGA National Council minutes 29-30 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
63 National Council 29-30 June 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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On 5 November the NGA held its Special Delegate Meeting in Blackpool to review 
the level of unemployment benefits. Emotions were running especially high for Joe 
Wade, the outgoing General Secretary – the day before the conference he had 
attended the funeral of Les Dixon, the NGA President and a close friend. 
Looking back, Newis felt that passions could have clouded judgements at this crucial 
moment for the Messenger dispute. He recalled the mood: 
We’d been to a funeral of Les Dixon at Bedford Crem. on the Friday and then 
we got on the coach and went to Blackpool. Joe was very cut-up about Les 
and he got pissed. He had to be put to bed (interview 3.12.2017). 
Coop recalled that Wade was: 
Uptight about it all (interview 14.2.2020). 
Wade, still apparently under the influence of too much drink, made a special 
statement on the Messenger dispute. He introduced three of the Stockport Six who 
were given an ovation from the delegates. 
Wade said to the conference:  
So the law now says it is perfectly possible for management to move 
machinery and equipment from one factory to another and that we cannot 
picket where that work is taking place. The law says we must stop instructing 
our members not to send work to this office; that we must ask them to 
become scabs and blacklegs. The law now says we cannot even ask 
advertisers not to advertise in these blacked newspapers.  
We say we are ignoring those injunctions.  
I will be joining our friends on the picket line at six o’clock next Wednesday 
morning. We want as many of you as possible to muster as many people as 
you can possibly get to get on the picket line because that is the only way we 
can have some kind of real effect on this dispute (Special NGA Delegate 
Conference, November 1983).  
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Wade asked delegates to talk to national officers because he didn’t want further 
instructions recorded. For the NGA this was the moment of no return.  
Newis remembers: 
Conference itself was quite emotive and I don’t know what kind of discussion 
there had been between Joe Wade and Dubbins over what he was to say but 
I remember seeing Dubbins’ face when Joe said something along the lines of 
we’re all going to Warrington - summon to arms to stop Eddy Shah. I think 
Dubbins was shocked (interview 3.12.2017). 
Interviewed in 2019, Dubbins confirmed the account believing the way the dispute 
escalated was “bloody ludicrous”. He recalled that once Wade had made such a 
declaration there was no going back.  
Don’t see how we could pull back (interview 17.8.2019).  
The President called Alan Royston to the rostrum. He began nervously:  
I am totally unprepared for this. I am not a speech maker. If we still want an 
industry, if you want to be able to sit in meetings like this, you have got to 
fight this one – you have got to – because it is no longer a dispute between 
just the six of us and Shah. It is a dispute for this industry and this union 
(Special NGA Delegate Meeting November 1983).  
Royston told the conference that Shah had made it plain he would be the first 
person to use the new legislation.  
What Shah does today all the nationals and the jobbing offices will do 
tomorrow. I will guarantee you that. They are all watching. The conference 
gave Royston a long-standing ovation (Special NGA Delegate Meeting 
November 1983). 
Excessive drink and high emotions played their part. In a rather coded and 
ambiguous letter shortly after the conference, Arthur Perrin, Secretary of the 
Manchester Graphical Society wrote to the General Secretary expressing the view of 
its Branch Committee that: 
	 180	
National Officers and National Council should at meetings of this nature 
conduct themselves in a manner befitting the positions they hold.64  
Newis recalled that the dispute took the Council by surprise:  
A lot saw it as business as usual dispute and didn’t realise the consequences 
that it was going to have didn’t realise what they were getting into a lot of 
talk about keeping the dispute on and not back down. Debates about 
whether it should be called off – the right wing and the officers wanted it 
called off. Not including Tony Dubbins. He spoke in favour of continuing the 
dispute – he always defended the union. It wasn’t familiar territory for the 
NGA (interview 3.12.2017). 
The evidence points to a leadership rocked by multiple challenges with its base of 
branch officers and activists still confident in the union’s power. The small, rumbling 
dispute at Messenger was inflamed when big personalities clashed, there were 
complications at least over the fragmented local branch structure, delays and 
prevarications over the negotiations. The dispute escalated through its own 
momentum rather than by strategic decision-making by the leadership. 
 
The escalating picket 
Nearly 600 print members turned up to the New Century Hall, Manchester on 27 
October to hear Dubbins for the NGA, Bill Keys, SOGAT, Ted O’Brien, NATSOPA and 
Ken Ashton for the NUJ in a public display of print union unity. Alan Royston was 
cheered when he spoke for the ‘Stockport Six’. Ray Williams, the NGA’s Liverpool 
Branch Secretary, a left-wing official with a reputation for militancy and for effective 
organisation of the union’s and City’s unemployed gave a passionate address and 
called for more action to win the dispute.  
Williams organised unemployed members into picket rotas and on 1 November 
some 250 turned up at the Stockport offices for a demonstration of support for the 
	
64 NGA National Council minutes 22 November 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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six sacked members. The police warned the union that there were too many in 
attendance but took no further action. It appeared that the police were reluctant to 
escalate matters by intervening. 
After the Special Delegate Meeting and Wade’s rallying call, arrangements were 
quickly organised for coaches from across the country to carry pickets for early hours 
on the following Wednesday 9 November. Convoys of 
coaches pulled off the M6 at the allotted time and, after 
meeting up, they headed, not for the studio at Stockport, 
but for the printing plant at Warrington, in breach of the 
1982 Employment Act. Hundreds gathered at the Winwick 
Quay industrial estate on the cold foggy morning. One lone 
police office turned up in his Panda car but did nothing 
except report on the crowd.  
The NGA parked its ‘battle wagon’ near the printing 
factory, equipped with a PA system and materials needed 
to sustain a picket line. Wade and Dubbins addressed the 
crowd for the van steps.  
Shah’s recollection of that day is of Dubbins as a “thug”:  
His ‘boys’ were on strike and he arrives in an XJS65 so he is getting full pay. 
Why do they have to think they are captains of industry because they are 
not? The NGA were known as the storm-troopers of the union movement, 
more than the miners (interview 3.12.2017). 
The factory itself was all locked up and nothing was going to move in or out. 
Someone painted ‘scab’ on the door.  
Newis explained the argument for a mass picket: 
	
65 At that time the NGA leadership had a high-end car with chauffeur 
7.2 - Lone police officer guards 
the Warrington printing plant. 
Photo: Nigel Costley 
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If you are going to stop lorries you need loads of people. No good sending a 
bloke with a placard. There has got to be lots of you and well organised. 
(interview 3.12.2017). 
Shah, however, interviewed in 2015, described how he had felt alone and without 
support from government, press or the police. He believes this was due to a fear of 
unions. He recalls:  
The thing I found most amazing during the early part of our dispute even the 
police didn't turn up to protect us and we had up to a thousand pickets 
attacking us at that stage. They sent one guy around and he looked like 
Norman Wisdom. It was terrible. No visible support from anyone (interview 
7.4.2015). 
The Daily Telegraph reported Shah as saying that the picket was “nothing short of 
Nazism” but played down its impact. Shah called off meetings with ACAS saying he 
would not negotiate under such duress. Some press reported on the dispute by 
blasting the pickets and the union: “Dawn Swoop”, “Print Plant Siege” and 
“bullyboys” (see media list in Appendix and as cited by Dickinson 1984. 96).  
In the research interview Shah said that he and his staff had felt under siege with 
little protection:  
They tried to break in once they smashed the window, there was no police 
there and we really feared for our lives that night and they pushed one of 
their people got cut and the blood stopped the rest behind. He cut himself on 
the glass. And whatever people say you cannot say fifteen people against a 
thousand is an even battle (interview 7.4.2015). 
Shah engaged a company called Special Security Services to protect his premises and 
vans. Run by an ex-Grenadier Guard, Peter Cope, the firm used Land Rovers, 
uniformed security guards and Alsatian dogs. Royston found them very frightening:  
Shah hired these lads to guard the car park. Built like a tank, one guy, this old 
lady came past and said ‘Doctor Death’ – he’s a wrestler (interview 2014). 
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In the research interview Shah described how he arranged the security through a 
Liverpool bouncer and acquired the uniforms from a TV series called Redcap. He 
laughed at how the guards could barely control the dogs they were using. 
For this research Williams described one incident with the firm:  
We followed them up onto the roundabout to see where they were going. 
They stopped and saw us. They put it into reverse into the car and caved in all 
the front in (interview 4.2014). 
Royston also recalled their actions:  
I remember being surrounded on motorway. Going past van carrying 
Messengers. Two Land Rovers front and back (interview 2014). 
As the numbers gathering outside the plant grew, more arrests were made and 
tensions grew between police and pickets. Burke reflected that:  
We needed night pickets – mobilised from around the North. We had lots of 
support from Fleet Street, dockers and the like (interview 18.2.2015). 
Williams organised the night shift picket by running cars and coaches said:  
I was getting the unemployed guys up every night. We had about three 
buses. I was giving them £10 a night, we agreed this at Branch level, these 
guys didn’t have any money, they wanted something to eat (interview 
4.2014). 
It was late at night when the printed papers emerged from the factory so this was 
the critical time for the union and Shah. Williams felt he had become a ‘target’ for 
the police and they were keen to arrest him. If so, they seized their chance when he 
threw a brick at one of the vans. Police rushed at him and he knew he was in for a 
beating:  
And this particular sergeant was screaming his head off, going crazy. With a 
boot into his tackle which had the effect of putting him and the other one 
was trying to hit me with his stick so I managed to knock him down with a 
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well-rehearsed right hook and he went down like a bag of spuds then they 
pounced on me, the rest of them.  
I was covered in bruises and bite marks and kept over night and got bailed 
(interview 4.2014). 
Williams’ defence that he only threw a pork pie failed to convince the court and he 
was fined £1,000 and made to pay £740, damage to the vehicle and the attack on 
the sergeant with three months suspended sentence.  
On 22 November a brick wall collapsed and a police officer suffered a broken arm 
and facial cuts. Shah had a bouquet of flowers sent to him and a group of pickets 
sent a ‘Get Well’ card. The Deputy Chief Constable emphasised that the officer was 
not injured deliberately. The next day another officer was injured, his arm broken 
when the pressure of about sixty pickets pushed him against a vehicle. The next day 
The Daily Mail ran a story under the headline: 
Pickets Clash with Police.  
It described the dispute as:  
The first major test of the new Employment Act outlawing secondary action. 
It reported that the NGA risked having National Council members and officers jailed 
and the seizure of the union’s £11 million assets.  
In a private government note: 
The police say that their relations with the pickets are generally good. The 
pickets’ main tactic is not to use violence but to try to stop vehicles entering 
or leaving the premises by sheer weight of numbers66  
An anonymous account from a member of the Bristol NGA published in the Somerset 
Clarion (1986):  
	
66 Confidential memo from Home Office F4 1983 – see Appendix 4 
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On my first trip the atmosphere was relaxed, even with a hint of friendliness 
between the fifty or so Bristolian NGA members and the police as we stood 
around all day warming ourselves by the braziers and even having a kick 
around with a football. 
The TUC General Council met on 23 November and was uneasy about being drawn 
into support for unlawful action despite the brave words of the 1982 Wembley 
Conference.  
The movement would be drawn into a conflict that would prove vastly 
expensive and out of all proportions to the original dispute.67  
The evening of 23 November saw up to 350 pickets with 334 police officers68. Two 
vehicles left the factory with one damaging the roller door of the exit. As the vans 
were leaving, a picket lay in the road and was arrested for threatening behaviour. He 
was later taken into hospital where his leg was found to be broken after being hit by 
one of the vehicles. The Sun reported the incident:  
Injured picket is held in cell. A picket in agony from a broken leg was arrested 
and put in a police cell. Print worker Bill Trainer was knocked down by a van 
bursting out of the Messenger plant. 
There were close contacts between the Institute of Directors, apparently acting on 
behalf of Shah, and the Government. A private note to the Home Secretary, said: 
. . . information gleaned from contacts in the Institute of Directors.  
We agreed that the right course was to sound out the police about their 
relations with Mr Shah without revealing that we had any sources of 
information of our own . . . But the police clearly do not trust Mr Shah whose 
reaction they regard as unpredictable.69 
	
67 Minutes of General Council, 23 November 1983 
68 Confidential memo from Home Office 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
69 Confidential memo from Home Office F4 1983 – see Appendix 4 
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NGA minutes indicate the leadership still held the view that the weight of pressure 
on Shah would force him to concede ground. Its Dispute Extra, newsletter of 
November carried the headline: 
MASS PICKET SHOWS THE WAY AT THE MESSENGER 
The Conservative Party archives show the extent to which they anticipated industrial 
conflict including mass picketing and large demonstrations as part of their 
preparations for trade union reform. Police training and resources had been 
provided with this in mind (Wiles 1985). The initial reluctance by ministers to get 
involved in the Messenger dispute quickly turned into significant pressure from the 
Home Office, encouraged, apparently, from the Prime Minister. In the confidential 
internal memos, the chief constable appears irritated by the degree to which 
ministers wanted to dictate policing tactics on the ground – arguing over whether to 
stop coaches some distance from the picket for example70 (memo to SoS 29.11.83). 
The police reassured ministers that they had the situation under control and had 
more than sufficient resources to deal with any attempted blockade.  
The dispute Organising Committee, comprising local and national officials, issued a 
leaflet explaining:  
This demonstration is to show your continuing solidarity and support for the 
six NGA members sacked by Selim Jehan Shah for seeking to uphold Trade 
Union Agreements. 
On behalf of the Organising Committee it is requested that the 
demonstration remains peaceful and you are asked not to attack the building 
or be provoked into using violence. 
Shah was especially angry at the way campaign leaflets used his full Arabic name to 
stir racist opposition:  
	
70 Confidential memos between police and Secretary of State 29.11.83 – see Appenxix 3 
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Everybody knew me as Eddy Shah. But they were saying ‘Selim Jehar Shah’ as 
if I was some foreign person. I was born and brought up here. They made it 
racist (interview 7.4.2015).  
 
7.3 - Part of one of the campaign leaflets produced by the NGA using Shah’s full name 
 
With increasing appearances in the media, Shah seemed to relish the role of small 
businessman taking on the mighty trade union in the name of freedom. In the 
research interview Dubbins explained how he had found Shah almost impossible to 
deal with: 
Shah . . . needed to be seen as a bit of a crusading hero. I think that was part 
of the reason we couldn’t find any reasonable accommodations. He had a big 
ego and found it very difficult to compromise in face of the dispute and the 
way it was raging. The reality was he wanted to build up the victim scenario 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
As the dispute intensified through November and December, Denis Boyd, chair of 
ACAS made a number of proposals to try to resolve the dispute and Dubbins claimed 
the NGA went further than it had ever gone in concessions to Shah.  
The TUC and others argued that the employment laws encouraged conflict rather 
than promoting negotiation (Dunn 1985). In Parliament, Neil Kinnock, then Leader of 
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the Labour Opposition, blamed the government for the escalation in the dispute. He 
said:  
It is your legislation above all matters that is the major cause of the nature 
and scale of this dispute.71 
In reply, John Biffen, Leader of the House, retorted that the legislation had provided 
a more equitable framework for dealing with the relationship between unions and 
employers.  
Minutes of the special meeting of the TUC’s EPOC Committee on 28 November 
record that Murray explained the NGA’s picketing did not conform with the 1979 
TUC guidelines and its intention seemed to be to blockade the premises. He 
criticised the way the NGA had conducted the negotiations and stressed the TUC 
could not support unlawful action. That was the inside position, the public statement 
said: 
The present case shows clearly how a small localised dispute, involving an 
intransigent employer, who has not been prepared to observe established 
arrangements, can explode into a major issue involving major constitutional 
and legal questions. The capacity of these laws to be used by employers to 
try to trample on practices which unions have established over many years is 
damaging and dangerous – and the Government should re-think these laws 
urgently.72  
The Morning Star headline on 29 November declared: “All roads lead to Messenger 
demo” in what was “the biggest class confrontation since the early ‘70s”. Numbers 
attending Winwick Quay on the night of 29-30 November rose to some 4,000. An 
anonymous Bristol NGA member described how about 150 members in three 
coaches set off about six in the evening.  
	
71 Hansard 29 November 1983 
72 TUC EPOC minutes 28 November 1983 – se Appendix 2 
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The scale of police presence against us became apparent when we pulled 
into a motorway service station fifteen miles or so from Warrington. We 
noticed we were being tailed by a police Land Rover. 
The Cheshire Police had acquired an empty unit on the industrial estate for its 
command centre and holding cells for 30-40 people. There were Instamatic cameras 
with which plain-clothed crews could identify targets for the snatch squads and 
video equipment including roof-top cameras. In 1983, this sort of technology was 
new and never been used before in an industrial dispute. A large canteen and 
relaxation area were available for the police with chefs capable of providing 2,000 
meals. The police were prepared for whatever the union could mobilise (Wiles 
1985). 
Andrew Neil lobbied the Home Secretary ringing him at home to demand more be 
done. Neil claimed Brittan behaved like a lawyer, refusing to interfere in operational 
matters (Neil 1996). Dubbins recalls: 
Brittan was not regarded as a hard-liner, anything but. I remember being told 
the story that he (Neil) got hold of him and had a real go on the basis that we 
are here to protect free enterprise, the economy, freedom of speech and the 
usual bollocks and had a real go at Brittan for not giving the sort of support to 
Shah to publish his newspapers (interview 17.8.2017). 
On the cold November night the crowd was ‘entertained’ by a running banter by 
George Jerrom, NGA National Officer from the NGA control van. NGA activist, Megan 
Dobney remembers: 
My abiding memory was George Jerrom who was taking leadership in spite of 
the union’s limpness on it. And the sight of him on the back of the union 
caravan in his sheepskin jacket issuing instructions which people were very 
willing to try to carry out (interview 13.8.2016). 
The mass of pickets had little to do but mill around, stamping their feet to keep 
warm. Left wing newspapers were on sale and the contingent of police chatted to 
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the crowd. Union officers carried walkie-talkies and reported into the control van 
with reports of the police build-up and crowd numbers. Burke described the scene:  
George Jerrom was whipping it up from the van. London Central SOGAT 
arrived and was greeted like royalty with lots of cheering. It was not that well 
organised. Lots of people were going down the pub. The hot dog sellers did 
well (interview 18.2.2014). 
It was apparent that the NGA’s sixty or so stewards would not be sufficient to 
control the crowd. An attempt to organise a sit-down occupation of the entrance 
was soon abandoned. There was pushing and shoving between police and the crowd 
and a few stones were thrown. Dubbins in the research interviews said he knew 
there was always a chance of outside interests getting directly involved: 
What do you do, just stand back? You’ve got to go ahead and do the best you 
can and frankly, at that stage, it was the only pressure point we had. You can 
never guarantee you can control a picket line (interview 17.8.2017). 
Towards the end of the night police rushed at the NGA Control Van. After a short 
skirmish they entered the van and disabled the communication equipment. A crush 
of bodies surged towards the back of the vehicle and having disabled the PA system 
the police retreated. The scenes are shown in the photographs in Chapter 9. Furious 
National Officers contacted Dubbins and the union’s lawyer who drafted a formal 
complaint against the police. 
Shah was told afterwards and embellishes the story: 
First thing they did was rip out the speakers and threw them in a skip. It was 
like a Nazi rally. Then they went in and picked out the ring-leaders (interview 
7.4.2015). 
When Darlington (1994: 155) interviewed union reps at Bemrose printers in 
Liverpool, he heard how the tale became exaggerated with the police acting as a 
militia and how the NGA ‘hut’ “got turned over, smashed to bits”. 
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Shah said that James Anderton, the Manchester Chief Constable later told him he 
was going to be all right and that: 
Special Branch were following me which I didn't know. Winnick Quay, was 
quite a big estate and they had nearly a thousand police (interview 7.4.2015). 
The Bristol contingent unfurled their banner to the cheering crowd. One member 
was chatting to a police officer about the closed shop when there was an order to 
advance.  
The policeman stopped talking to me, went thin lipped and white in the face 
and punched me squarely in the chest sending me reeling backwards. I found 
it hard to believe what I was seeing. Those pickets directly facing the police 
were subjected to a kicking, their feet were stamped on and their testicles 
were grabbed and twisted, the women were pulled by their hair. Now and 
again a picket was pulled through the police lines where they were made to 
run the gauntlet out of sight being beaten on the limbs and even stabbed up 
the anus, where it does not show, with truncheons. They were spat upon and 
physically and verbally abused. 
Another anonymous ‘eye-witness’ account by ‘Wildcat’ in Libcom.org said:  
From early on in the night the pickets were left pushing the police backwards 
and forwards for many hours using up a lot of valuable energy. The police 
were content to pull pickets from out of the front of the line. They did not 
arrest them but just gave them a good thumping. 
Vince Scott, an FoC from Dunstable when interviewed for this research said: 
I went up there three times and I was up there on the final night with the 
police charge. It was terrifying. 
I saw this girl, she had a camera in her hand trying to take a picture of this 
policeman charging at her. She took a photo ‘cause I saw the flash go and he 
went up to her, he grabbed the camera off her and punched her straight in 
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the face. Pushed the camera on the floor and stamped on it. I thought blimey 
this is like East Germany.  
Then they started charging, chanting and moving forward. These screams 
they made walking forward like a Zulu with riot shields. Ohh, ohh, ohh, ohh 
they would bang their shields (interview 24.6.2015). 
A number of protestors interviewed claim that police prevented filming or interfered 
with photographers. The images in Chapter Nine provide a range of perspectives but 
there is a noticeable gap in them at the point the police charged into the crowd. This 
may confirm the allegations of the protestors or may simply have been the speed 
and ferocity of the police action took people by surprise. 
At around 2am the police line parted and a platoon of officers wielding batons raced 
towards the crowd. Pushing and hitting out the police knocked people to the ground 
and panicked them into running. Demonstrators were chased away from the site in 
fear. 
Participants that night interviewed for this research expressed their shock at the 
ferocity of the police reaction. They saw their action in trying to blockade the factory 
as a peaceful protest against Shah and his business and took no account that the 
police would use every measure to prevent them. 
Dobney recalls: 
I remember the police chasing us. It wasn’t just a nice flat field it had all 
bumps in it, it was a mess and with land rovers chasing us across this field 
(interview 13.8.2016). 
A Bristol NGA member described the scene: 
They arrived in close formation, at the double, with helmets and truncheons 
drawn. They charged the pickets from the road trapping hundreds between 
them and the police lines. The carnage that followed was disgusting to watch. 
The truncheons came down again and again on screaming men and women 
trying to protect their heads and bodies. We were halved, then quartered 
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and finally scattered to all parts of the battlefield. We were beaten back in 
total disarray and finally we drifted off, licking wounds, utterly depressed and 
in a state of severe shock.  
At 5am the roller shutters to the factory opened and Shah’s vans roared out. The 
Chief Constable reported:  
At times, it was a riot with twenty-five police officers taken to hospital and 
many others receiving injuries. Three police Range Rovers were damaged by 
riotous behaviour by 300 demonstrators. They were stoned upon arrival, one 
suffering £1,300 of damage to the window and bodywork.73 
Lord Harris addressed the House of Lords in December 1983 to decry the NGA’s 
action at Warrington as abusive. He said: 
I believe that what has happened in Warrington this week has shocked public 
opinion in this country. It has been one of the worst episodes of industrial 
violence which we have witnessed in this country for several years. 
I have, I hope, made it clear what I believe the dispute is not about. It is 
whether powerful men and powerful trade unions are exempt from the laws 
of this country. It is about whether the British people, or the National 
Graphical Association, will decide what legislation Parliament will he 
permitted to pass. My Lords, it is about whether we are to maintain the rule 
of law74 
In January 1984, Lord Harris became a Board Member of the Messenger Group. 
The sight of police officers in riot helmets charging into the demonstration was a 
shock to many. The scenes that night were confirmation of the Government’s 
determination to break any attempt to blockade premises as part of industrial 
action. The police had been trained and equipped for this purpose. A Financial Times 
	
73 Confidential memo from Home Office F4 1983 – see Appendix 4 
74 Hansard 1 December 1983 
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report was headed: “Police learn the lesson of facing up to mass picketing” It went 
on to say:  
The police tactics at Warrington show clearly that they have learned the hard 
lessons of mass picketing. Saltley in particular, where perhaps 15,000 pickets 
led a completely overwhelmed police contingent to order the shutting of a 
picketed coke depot, had a deep effect on the police. It was seen by the 
police as a defeat and indeed entered police vocabulary as a shorthand term 
for all the problems on how the police and the state were to maintain law 
and order. 
In the end, police commanders accept they would have to respond to 
management requests for assistance in lawfully getting goods in or out of a 
factory. The early lesson of Warrington is how far the police have now 
perfected their techniques for doing so (Bassett FT 1983). 
The NGA made a formal complaint about the way the police ‘attacked’ the 
communications van and the matter was raised in Parliament by MPs Bob Clay, 
Dennis Skinner and Dave Nellist. Clay and Skinner complained to the Home 
Secretary:  
That the police wilfully forced their way into the van, dismantled and broke 
or removed a considerable amount of radio communications and PA 
equipment; that this occurred at approximately 1am, one-and-a-half hours 
before any disturbances took place.75 
In his explanation to the Home Secretary, the Chief Constable denied forcing into the 
van to dismantle and break PA equipment. He claimed the equipment was being 
used to incite violence. 
A number of demonstrators then began to rock the caravan very violently 
with the apparent intention of turning it over with police officers inside. If it 
	
75 Correspondence with Bob Clay and Denis Skiner to Homes Secretary 
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was damaged it was likely to have occurred then through the actions of the 
demonstrators76  
Monks confirmed that many on the TUC General Council thought the mass picket 
was counter-productive. As the violence grew the company withdrew its previous 
offers to the NGA; Shah claimed that the events had so disturbed existing employees 
that they were no longer prepared to work with any NGA employees. 
The NGA called off mass picketing pending talks through ACAS. Dickinson describes it 
as the “longest day in the life of the National Graphical Association’s history and its 
reverberations have shaken the union to its core” (Dickinson 1984: 159). 
Interviewed in 2015, Monks recalled the TUC’s view at the time of Messenger 
dispute:  
We didn’t like it, intimidation, we know the scenes it produces, pickets 
fighting police. Once you get to that state you’ve probably lost (interview 
12.3.2015). 
The picket, designed to blockade the plant had grown beyond the capacity of the 
NGA to manage peacefully. Relying on weight of numbers was a strategy made 
without an assessment of the resolve of the police to defeat it. The symbolic victory 
of the mass picket at Saltley Gate during the miners’ strike was in the imagination of 
the union protesters but the police had learnt a lot since then and had a government 
determined not to allow such mass action to succeed. 
 
Sequestration 
The escalating mass picket was responding in part to the spiral of court actions 
engulfing the NGA. On 25 November Justice Eastham declared:  
Whatever the union’s feeling about the legislation no one is above the law. 
The court has no choice but to grant a writ of sequestration. 
	
76 Report to Home Office from Cheshire Constabulary 1983 – see Appendix 4 
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Further the NGA was fined £100,000 plus costs. 
Dubbins recalled the sense of inevitability about the action but was shocked by its 
reach: 
We didn’t quite know how sequestration would work and how they would 
address it but we knew exactly where it was heading (interview 17.8.2017). 
Four commissioners, partners from Price Waterhouse and Company, London 
accountants, were appointed to handle the seizure of the NGA’s assets. 
NGA chapels in Manchester and Fleet Street downed tools and no national 
newspapers appeared over the weekend of 25-26 November. But this was not the 
spontaneous protest reaction that Wade had warned of as Dubbins admits: 
Fleet Street chapels didn’t see it as anything to do with them. Fleet Street 
stopped. It was an instruction! There was a requirement – pretty tough but it 
was done. Last time it was ever done (interview 17.8.2017). 
Fleet Street press owners knew it to be ‘induced action’ and increased the legal 
pressure on the NGA by seeking injunctions under the Employment Acts. Some 
newspaper owners issued dismissal notices to NGA reps but they were unable to 
maintain their own unity and four papers broke ranks and appeared as usual on 28 
November. Some failed to appear for several days: On its return, The Sun said: 
Yes, we’re back, folks77. 
The Times returned on 30 November apologising for the non-appearance on the 
previous three days. 
All the local societies of the NGA had separate bank accounts, independently 
audited. On the Monday morning branch secretaries discovered that all accounts 
were frozen. Banks were instructed to suspend any account that was suspected as 
being part of the assets of the NGA. Some SOGAT accounts were seized along with 
chapel funds, Christmas and holiday accounts. 
	
77 See list of media reports in Appendix 5 
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Shah remembers watching the television and seeing NGA staff reacting to the 
sequestration order. He laughs:  
They looked stupid and I thought, you walked into that one. They were all 
running to their cars with their typewriters (interview 7.4.2015). 
The union was unable to have access to funds to pay staff or pay provident benefits. 
Interviews with officials recall how they quickly asked members to pay subscriptions 
in cash. A system of transfers was put into place with chapels collecting the weekly 
subscriptions and passing them to branch officers. Regional secretaries collected the 
money due to the national union and over the next few weeks large quantities of 
cash kept the union going.  
Burke remembers the sequestration process:  
Ian Kershaw (NGA lawyer) advised the National Council on the limits of the 
order. But every account was stopped. We had to rely on cash. The T&G paid 
the retired members. Spurious bank accounts were set up such as bowling 
clubs (interview 18.12.2014). 
Dubbins explained how the union was able to revert to its tradition of cash 
collections to avoid the banks and how money was borrowed from other unions. 
T&G were very good. Ron Todd, no matter what was said he managed to 
produce money from the T&G to assist us (interview 17.8.2017). 
The TUC assisted by providing funds to maintain unemployment benefit payments. 
Dubbins thinks it was not unsubstantial, around a million pounds, but he thought Len 
Murray hoped it was a sweetener that would buy the union off. 
Royston recalled the reaction of his Branch Secretary, Arthur Scott:  
. . . he shot off to see a solicitor because he was frightened they’d take his 
house off him. Went down to bank manager: Have our funds gone? How 
much will you let us have on one cheque? Can we have £8k? We will leave 
£50. We put it in a plastic bag. Then we went back with another cheque to 
get the rest out. Go liquid, get whatever cash you can get. Frank Walsh 
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outside Manchester Free Hall had a bag with £25k. Loads of money, like we’d 
done a bank robbery (interview 2014). 
The Three Shires Branch Office in Gloucester was one of a number around the 
country where large safes were fitted into the floor – one for Branch funds and the 
other to hold national cash if necessary.  
Coop explains how his branch kept going: 
We went into the Co-op Bank in Manchester and said we want to withdraw 
£10,000 out and were told you can’t do that, that wasn’t a normal 
transaction. So what is a normal transaction? Closing the account? Well close 
it. And we walked out with about £70,000 in plastic bags. I went along to the 
Nat West bank opposite the office and saw the assistant bank manager there. 
He said, I’m a Labour Party member and as far as I’m concerned you can put 
it in our safes and if there is any sequestration or they’re thinking of coming 
to get it, I’ll give you a ring. So we did that and also I opened a bank account – 
Trustee Bank. There is a place next to Bury called Wyefield and Prestwich and 
our initials were WPGS – so it was Wyefield and Prestwich Golfing Society 
and we asked all the companies and FoCs etc to put the money through this 
account. And every one of them did it. They were as good as gold, even the 
larger companies (interview 14.2.2020). 
The NGA was warned that Price Waterhouse’s costs could be as high as £12,000 a 
day. Cash was the main currency for the union and branches made arrangements for 
unemployed members to collect their benefit rather than be sent cheques. Full time 
officers did not get paid as usual.  
Newis remembers an account of fears within the union’s officer corps and a report 
of the former-SLADE General Secretary, John Jackson warning Dubbins at a 
motorway service station about pensions.  
If the union was sequestrated how was it going to meet its obligations to 
officers. All sorts of machinations at the top of the union (interview 
17.8.2017). 
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Dubbins recognised the culture shock all this was to a very conservative institution: 
People were anxious about their jobs. Not just staff, officers were very 
concerned. Fair to say we didn’t have an entire left-wing office-corps. There 
were people around the more traditional approach, the old NGA was 
gentlemanly and the litho was more free masonry. Just not for them. 
(interview 17.8.2017). 
In anticipation of sequestration, the National Council had been advised:  
steps had been taken to protect the Association’s assets, funds and property 
for as long as it was possible.78 
The NGA represented members across the whole of Ireland and it was assumed that 
funds held in the Irish Republic would be outside the scope of the sequestration 
order. When this appeared to be under threat too, Colin James, Financial Secretary 
was despatched to Dublin, accompanied by Alf Parish, National Officer. They were 
met from the plane with some local officers who acted as protection. The bank 
manager requested time to gather the large quantity of cash requested but he 
refused to release the funds when they returned. After an altercation in the bank the 
cash was released and some rubbish bin liners were hastily found to hold around 
£750,000. 
The Manchester NGA Branch successfully appealed against the seizure of its funds 
and the court agreed to lift three of its four bank accounts but only on the basis that 
the Branch highlighted the whereabouts of NGA assets. The leadership baulked at 
such a prospect and instructed other branches not to follow suit arguing that, if 
repeated by all its branches, national subscriptions would go into the hands of the 
sequestration (Gennard 1990). 
JB Shaw, the Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Employment 
said in a letter to Andrew Turnbull, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and 
copied to the private secretaries to all Cabinet Members dated 9 December 1983: 
	
78 NGA National Council minues 22 November 1983 – see Appendix 2 
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Because all the union’s funds have been sequestrated the fines can be (and 
have been) extracted without the possibility of union obstruction. At this 
morning’s hearing the Court ordered the NGA, at the sequestrators’ request, 
not to move any money into or out of the NGA account with the Bank of 
Ireland in Dublin79 
On 19 December the High Court refused a request from the union to relax the order 
to allow retirement and unemployment benefits to be paid unless the whereabouts 
of funds sent to the Republic of Ireland were disclosed. Union officers were 
continuing to sustain the organisation through cash collections and through 
assistance from other unions. In the New Year the TUC’s Employment Policy and 
Organisation Committee (EPOC) agreed to provide £420,000 for retired and 
unemployed members.  
The Government had drafted the laws to allow employers to pursue injunctions 
through the civil courts. When these are ignored or breached the employer can claim 
contempt of court that can lead to fines, imprisonment and sequestration. The 
unprecedented use of sequestration was a target on the union’s assets rather than 
making arrests and imprisonment of officials. 
The evidence shows how the collective identity and sense of solidarity helped the 
union switch to cash transactions and operate as a clandestine organisation. With 
the assistance of other unions this lasted several weeks but it was not a sustainable 
position and the sequestrators had reserve powers to seize physical assets had they 
chosen to do so. 
 
Role of the state and police 
Conservative policy, drawn from the lessons of earlier conflicts, was not to get 
directly involved in industrial relations matters. But how could it honour this position 
and, at the same time, show succour to employers in the offensive against union 
	
79 Confidential memo 9.12.83 see Appendix 
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power? A private Conservative note considers the risks of the ‘non-intervention’ 
policy and how to reduce them. A briefing to Conservative MPs in November 1983 
suggests MPs stress the unwillingness of unions to reform themselves. The hazard of 
the hands-off approach is the impression of a “carefree indifference” to the crisis 
and that it might be seen as the government:  
standing back from events in deference to some barmy economic dogma80. 
There was tension between ministers and government departments over the 
dispute. One note complains about a statement by the Secretary of State for 
Employment’s failure to consult on the text at either official or ministerial level81 
As the evidence gained by this research shows, ministers were caught off-guard by 
the rapidly unfolding events. Yet it suited the NGA’s mobilisation to paint Shah as 
part of a wider anti-union campaign by the Government. Newis explained:  
It was the severity of what Shah was doing and almost immediately being 
seen as being run from Downing Street and by the Institute of Directors (IoD). 
Saw it all as building on Heath’s IR Act that had been knocked back and we 
can knock this back as well (interview 3.12.2017). 
Coop remains convinced that: 
Somebody was behind all that. It wasn’t just Shah (interview 14.2.2020). 
Shah claimed he was alone in the battle but the interviews with union activists claim 
a wider conspiracy. Royston recalled the prevailing atmosphere:  
Shah was determined to get us out because he’d set up in Bury and 
somebody was advising him there. I don’t know who it was. I was starting to 
think there are other influences, other people leading Shah around here 
(interview 18.2.2014). 
	
80 Confidential memo from Utley to Howarth 22.2.80 – see-Appendix 3 
81 Confidential memo from Home Office 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
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The suspicion that Shah was being manipulated or used by larger, external forces 
features in the union-side narrative since the 1983 conflict. Coop remains convinced 
that: 
He was advised by somebody. I know he had a meeting in London, but I never 
found out who it was, prior to him taking us on. To me he was being 
supported and advised by somebody (interview 14.2.2020). 
Shah was a member of the Institute of Directors that was pressing government for 
tough restrictions on trade unions at that time but there is no evidence that his 
actions were being determined by them. It supported Shah once the dispute got 
underway but it does not appear to have played a significant role in the run-up to 
the dispute. Dubbins gave his opinion: 
I don’t believe it was a conspiracy to start with. They wouldn’t have bothered 
with a minor freesheet but once it happened I’m absolutely sure there were 
major newspaper proprietors egging it on and the Government. This was an 
opportunity for them to achieve more than just the defeat of the NGA in a 
small minor dispute (interview 17.8.2017). 
The union’s view that the dispute was part of a wider government conspiracy was 
supported by the belief that the secret state was already operating against it. 
Royston says, when interviewed, that he was convinced his phone was bugged. 
Other NGA branch offices noticed strange things happening to their phone calls. 
Williams said:  
We knew we had our phone tapped. You could hear the clicks (interview 
4.2014).  
From my own experience at the time, the Three Shires Branch phone started to drop 
calls without reason and the telecoms union reported that something strange was 
going on in the switchboard, beyond their reach. 
The private papers seen in this study show how the Cheshire Police prepared for the 
growing picket in 1983. Leave and rest days for officers were cancelled and they 
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were put on 12-hour shifts. Neighbouring forces were alerted to the possible need to 
activate the mutual aid system.82 Shah, however, felt vulnerable and largely 
unprotected. The Home Secretary was informed that Shah was, “none too happy” 
with his protection offered by the police.  
Last night, he says, petrol bombs were thrown into his premises83 and he 
allegedly fears for his staff.84 
Shah recalls speeding through the area called ‘Death Valley’ near Prestwick. A police 
car pulled him up and says: “You're Eddy Shah aren't you? We've all got your number 
to watch for you.” The police officer didn’t book Shah, saying:  
I’m not going to book you, we can't afford to lose people like you from 
crashing and then he said, my wife will kill me if I book you. Because your 
overtime is paying for my holiday this year (interview 7.4.2015). 
Shah felt Leon Brittan, the Home Secretary, was not helpful to him, wanting the 
dispute to be a matter between the union and the company and not get the 
Government involved (interview 7.4.2015).   
Brittan was advised:  
So far you have judged it right to limit your personal involvement to an 
expression of sympathy for the injured police officer. Some public gesture or 
statement maybe required.85 
An anonymous memo later that day from F4 Division said: 
We agreed that the right course was to sound out the police about their 
relationship with Mr Shah without revealing that we had any sources of 
information of our own. The picture is not particularly reassuring. The police 
have had virtually no direct contact with Mr Shah.86  
	
82 Confidential report from Cheshire Constubulary to Home Office – see Appendix 4 
83 This is the only reference to this allegation. 
84 Confidential report from Cheshire Constubulary to Home Office – see Appendix 4 
85 Confidential memo to Secretary of State 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
86 Confidential memo to Secretary of State 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
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Unless the police guaranteed a free path to his premises, Shah told the police he 
would use a private security firm to do so. The police had warned Shah that they 
could not contemplate the use of a private firm for this purpose and that any 
security guards should operate only within the premises. The note goes on to record: 
the police clearly do not trust Mr Shah whose reaction they regard as 
unpredictable.87 
On a separate point, the confidential note mentions that a pattern is emerging of 
those arrested living a considerable distance from Warrington and that: 
one or two significant left-wing associations had emerged.88 
Shah recalls a conversation a long time after the dispute with an ex-SAS soldier:  
He said they were called in, about five of them as SAS and they were told to 
keep a watch on me. ‘We were told by the Lady I don't want see a hair on 
that boy’s head harmed’. We followed you.’  
Shah says he got some 3,000 Christmas Cards that year. One of the cards was from 
the 'boys at Hereford' that Shah took to be the SAS (interview 7.4.2015). 
Both sides in the dispute believe that secret forces were involved in some form but 
there is little evidence to support this. For activists, the anecdotes back-up the 
conspiracy theories of state power used to crush the union.  Papers have since been 
released or information discovered about operations such as Shield, the secret 
committee to advise Thatcher on how to tackle left-wing ‘subversion’ (Powerbase 
2018), secret blacklisting against union activists (Chamberlain and Smith 2015) and 
the covert contingency plans to beat strikes in essential services or a general strike89. 
This research found no evidence of a wider role played by secret police but it cannot 
be ruled out. 
	
87 Confidential memo to Secretary of State 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
88 88 Confidential memo to Secretary of State 24.11.1983 – see Appendix 4 
89 Confidential memos from Conservative Party archive – see Appendix 3 
	 205	
There was deliberation within government and the police about the powers to 
intercept people as they travelled towards Warrington. The police considered the 
tactic unnecessary. The Home Secretary made it clear that police had the power to 
limit the number of pickets in any one place where they have reasonable cause to 
fear disorder. The Attorney General added his advice in Parliament:  
If they consider there are enough or too many pickets they can stop the 
buses. It may be a matter of conspiring to incite but each case would have to 
stand upon its own merits.90 
The Chief Constable did not wish to divert police manpower away from Warrington 
and resisted pressure from the Home Office. The Government was determined that 
the mass picket must not succeed. Local police authorities are autonomous from 
central government (Wiles 1985) although as seen in the Conservative Party papers 
there had been deliberations over how to respond to national industrial action and 
how to direct police resources. The Home Secretary offered complete support for 
the Chief Constable including if he required additional logistical support but 
threatened:  
The Home Secretary said that if, notwithstanding this explicit support, things 
went badly wrong as a result of the failure of the Chief Constable to take 
appropriate action, he would not then be able to support the Chief Constable 
publicly.  
The note went on to point out that Conservatives controlled the local Police 
Committee:  
by virtue of commanding a majority of the magistrates’ votes.91 
The pickets continued to complain about Shah’s heavies. Williams lobbied an MP on 
the matter:  
	
90 Hansard 1980 
91 91 Confidential memo 28.11.83 to Cheshire Constubulary from Home Office 
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The fact that Shah’s heavies seem to be exempt from the law in that they can 
drive their vans at pickets or vehicles with impunity – the police are just 
turning a blind eye. I believe that if it’s allowed to continue someone will be 
killed (interview 4.2014). 
In a report on the policing of the dispute by the Deputy Chief Constable described 
complaints from Shah about his lack of protection. Shah’s solicitor:  
Mr Greerson suggested to the police at this time that they should arrest all 
pickets to relieve the obstruction, indicating that if the police were unable to 
do it, they – the company – would have to bring in their own ‘private army’92 
Shah believes that the increased police protection stemmed from intervention from 
Andrew Neil and Fergus Montgomery MP.  
Even the newspapers were against us apart from the Sunday Times and that 
night I thought that somebody was going to get killed. I rang Andrew Neil and 
I said I’m sorry to ring you, ‘I’ve never spoken to you before I really need 
some support, tonight someone is going to get killed’. We were scared stiff 
but we had a resolve (interview 7.4.2015). 
This version of events contradicts Neil’s who explains that he called Shah first, 
Griffiths (2006) believes it to have been Shah. Shah said he called Montgomery very 
early in the morning. The MP had been elected at the same time as Thatcher and 
Shah believed that the Prime Minister trusted him. Shah believed that Neil rang Leon 
Brittan to press the case for more action. 
Brittan maintained his line that the dispute was a private matter but Maggie 
then called Brittan and said if that Eddy Shah hasn't got any work in the 
morning he will no longer be Home Secretary (interview 7.4.2015). 
Neil (1997: 83) takes an uncritical view of Shah. He presents him as a hero in 
desperate need of support, “an innocent man being hung out to dry” and a “kindred 
spirit”. Neil presents himself as some form of saviour, pulling strings in government 
	
92 Report to Home Office from Cheshire Constabulary 1983 – see Appendix 4 
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to marshal support in the form of a riot squad to rescue the beleaguered Shah. He 
slams other newspaper employers and politicians for their failure to rally behind 
Shah in taking on the “hard left including militant miners and students”.  
The dispute was the centrepiece of a rowdy Prime Minister’s Questions in the House 
of Commons on 1 December. Neil Kinnock asked the Thatcher to intervene to settle 
the dispute and waved a photograph of her meeting Shah on 14 October, the day he 
obtained his first injunctions.93  
Kinnock asked:  
We have heard much of the Prime Minister's policy of non-intervention. On 
14 October Mr Shah obtained his first two injunctions under the 1980 and 
1982 legislation. That was also the day on which the Prime Minister met Mr 
Shah in the north and if the Prime Minister wants photographic evidence I 
have it here. The Sale and Altrincham Messenger of 21 October carried two 
photographs of the Prime Minister in deep conversation with Mr Shah. So 
much for non-intervention. When she met Mr Shah, did she counsel peace or 
conflict? Did she advise him to pursue industrial relations by litigation or by 
negotiation? 
Seemingly wrong-footed by Kinnock’s revelation, Thatcher replied:  
I advise everyone, employer or employee, to keep within the law, because 
the law is their best protection. I do not discuss particular industrial relations 
problems with particular employers. Will the right honourable Gentleman 
advise the NGA to obey the law and to purge its contempt of court? 
Shah later told News at Ten that he met Thatcher at a meeting of some 400 
Conservative Party members and he had gone along to see what was happening 
I just happened to be near the door as she went out. She said hello to me. 
	
93 Hansard 1 December 1983 
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This evidence highlights the contradictions in the Conservative policy at the time. 
They wished to keep out of industrial relations matters but at the same time wanted 
to support employers. In the Messenger dispute the policy of non-intervention was 
the source of confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the employer and 
disbelief from the union. 
 
Incitement and intimidation? 
The confidential internal government and police memos highlight tensions over the 
degree to which the law and police should be used to control the picket.  
In an exchange on 28 November over a reply to the Institute of Directors there are 
references to officials seeking to ‘strengthen’ the letter with the draft: 
In the light of your conversation with the Chief Constable you would see 
difficulties in the passage: [There can be no doubt that hundreds of pickets 
outside the Warrington Messenger must run the very gravest risk of being 
arrested for committing these offences].94 
In the actual letter this passage is removed and instead there is an explanation of the 
legal powers of the police to prevent breaches of the peace and: 
In addition, those taking part in unlawful mass picketing may be guilty of 
intimidation or of unlawful or riotous assembly.95 
The internal memos feature a discussion over whether the NGA might be prosecuted 
for incitement to commit criminal offenses. The pressure for this course of action 
appeared to be coming from the top: 
In my conversations with No.10 I stressed the difficulty and sensitivity of this 
issue. I also avoided giving an assessment of whether any activities 
	
94 94 Confidential Home Office memos 28.1183 – see Appendix 4 
95 Confidential letter from Home Secretary to Goldsmith, Walter IoD 28.11.83 – see Appendix 4 
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concerning Warrington might come into a category where prosecution for 
incitement would be on the cards.96 
The Home Secretary made an uncompromising statement to Parliament about the 
powers the police and warned those taking part in unlawful mass picketing may be 
guilty of intimidation or of unlawful riotous assembly. 
Home Office officials continue to consider the potential of an incitement charge 
including asking the Deputy Police Constable about such action in respect to what 
was ‘broadcast’ from the NGA’s ‘control van’ on the night of 29/30 November. The 
potential controversy of such a charge: 
May influence the pace at which the police reach their conclusions on 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to submit to the DPP.97 
In all the correspondence and confidential notes between the Home Office and the 
police there is no description of the nature of the communications broadcast from 
the van. The archives show that the Home Secretary, however, remained keen to 
explore the potential for a charge of incitement to be brought against the union. In a 
note to the Deputy Chief Constable a Home Office official said:  
We have, of course, spoken more than once about this possibility in respect 
of the use of the NGA control van on 29-30 November. I think there may be 
some who also wonder their action to encourage people to go to Warrington 
to participate in the gatherings was illegal.98 
A note from the Home Office Private Secretary said:  
The Home Secretary has asked that you continue to keep him informed of 
the progress which the Cheshire Police are making in assembling material on 
possible incitement charges and forwarding it to the DPP. The Prime Minister 
has expressed interest in this.99 
	
96 Confidential memo 2.12.83 – see Appdix 4 
97 Confidential memo from Home Office F4 12.12.1983 – see Appendix 4 
98 Report to Home Office from Cheshire Constabulary 1983 – see Appendix 4 
99 Confidential memo from Home Office 13.12.83 – see Appendix 4 
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Lord Elton was keen to press the Home Secretary on these points and described the 
union’s actions to pay expenses for unemployed members to attend the picket and 
public support for the demonstrations as “flagrant breaches of the law”. In his reply 
Brittan said:  
I entirely agree that incitement of this kind does damage the standing of the 
law and could prolong the violence centred around the dispute. It may be, 
though, these calls are signs of increasing anxiety among union officials about 
their capacity to sustain the levels of intimidation (amended from the word 
‘support’) that have conjured up hitherto.100 
The Chief Constable, in a letter to the Home Office stressed the nature of the crowd 
outside the printing works:  
What took place was not ‘picketing’ but an unlawful assembly at common 
law. As a civil injunction was in force against the National Graphical 
Association the gathering of member of the union, and others, was unlawful 
in itself. However, even ignoring that those who gathered had a common, 
unlawful purpose – the preventing of the movement of the printed 
newspapers by physical obstruction which, on the part of many, turned to 
violence. In fact, at times it was a riotous assembly.101 
The police reported that 146 arrests had been made during the course of the dispute 
– 91 on the 30 November.102 
The official history of the NGA merely states:  
Although the night of 29/30 November saw a picket of some 4,000 people 
outside the Warrington plant, police ensured that there was little disruption 
of the group’s papers (Gennard 1990: 488). 
This evidence shows a government and police preparing to go much further to 
protect the employer’s operation and restrict the union protest. Arresting people 
	
100 Secretary of State speech to Parliament 14 December 1983, Hansard 
101 Report to Home Office from Cheshire Constabulary 1983 – see Appendix 4 
102 Report to Home Office from Cheshire Constabulary 1983 – see Appendix 4 
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just for being in attendance at Warrington would have raised the stakes of the 
dispute still further. 
The evidence highlights the extent of serendipity involved in the dynamics of the 
dispute. The Government had put in place the framework within which employers 




The evidence from the interviews confirms that union leaders and activists believed 
the NGA was a target in the government-led assault on union power. Even after the 
Conservative victory in the 1983 General Election, the union still felt confident it 
could assert its control over the labour supply through the closed shop and its tactics 
of secondary action and picketing. The records show that there was no real 
deliberation over the potential risk or assessment of the potential threat given the 
new political environment and softening stance of the TUC. The case study shows 
how the leadership under-estimated the structural and political change. 
The union was embroiled in a financial crisis and a number of serious challenges over 
new technology as the dispute with the Messenger dispute unfolded. Shah, having 
agreed to the union’s terms when he was building up his businesses, came to find 
them obstructive and irritating. As he recruited non-union workers, the balance 
shifted against the NGA’s positional power. There is evidence of some hesitancy by 
the leadership in pursuing industrial action, perhaps with some anxiety over Shah’s 
claims of preparedness for a dispute.  
The small union chapel seemed eager to take on a management with whom 
relations had soured. It looked to the union to support them and by tradition 
expected it to deliver. There was, however, a sense of ‘better to go down fighting’. 
The members had reached breaking-point with Shah and any outcome was better 
than continuing in an increasingly unbearable workplace environment. Their 
experience of their union finding members alternative employment as assistance 
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through strikes and unemployment must have provided some assurance that their 
interests would be secured. Despite the unsure ground for the union, it was unable 
to draw back from the escalating conflict. 
Although hesitant about the unravelling of relations with Shah, the union’s 
leadership endorsed strike action without much debate over possible outcomes. The 
strategic choices for the union, once the dispute was underway, was how to deploy 
its traditional industrial action tactics knowing that these were now unlawful. 
The Government built its legal framework so it could remain at arms-length from its 
enforcement. That was a key lesson learnt from the failure of the previous Industrial 
Relations Act. But the research discovered that this approach initially caught 
ministers off-guard. The insistence on standing aloof from the dispute led Shah to 
believe he did not have Government support. The confidential papers show 
ministers arguing with each other and the police reluctant to engage in the 
escalating dispute.  
The NGA anticipated an employer would use the new laws against it and it held firm 
to what it believed was the TUC policy or resistance. For activists in the union there 
was a high level of confidence it would win and that there was sufficient inter-
dependence between employers that would force Shah to retreat.  
The industrial action methods were embedded in the mind-set of the union and had 
proved successful in 1980 the leadership did not contemplate alternatives. The 
action proved ineffective in halting Messenger’s production but faced with a union 
declaring that it would not comply with the law, Shah pursuing court action. 
The injunctions and fines grew until the court imposed the unprecedented sanction 
of sequestration of the union’s assets. This legal process went further than the union 
and its advisers believed. The research has obtained the accounts of the process for 
the union and how it tried to circumvent it. 
The chapter has described how the picket line failed to persuade the rest of the 
workforce to join the strike and how it became an attempt to blockade the plant. As 
numbers attending grew, the dispute became a test for enhanced policing 
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techniques (Wiles 1985) and it became a centre-piece for national news. The NGA 
faced criticism from the TUC and increasingly violent scenes at Warrington – and the 
newspapers were still being published. The leadership called off the mass picket. 
 Until the final act of the dispute there was no real debate within the National 
Council over the tactics or escalation of the dispute. 
The NGA made a call to arms to defend itself and activists responded with a 
remarkable level of discipline and devotion. But this was no match for the 
determined authority of the State.  
The next chapter uses photographs collected for this research to illustrate the key 





W8.3The NGA picket line featuring 
some of the ‘Stockport Six’ strikers 














Warrington. The author is featured 
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W8.10A lone policeman guards 
a side door into the plant with 
ĂĚĚĞĚŐƌĂĸƟ͘/ƚǁĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƉŽůŝĐĞ
presence as well as the minor 
damage. There was no other 
ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂƩĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
or anyone in or around it.
Photo: Nigel Costley
S8.11Joe Wade, NGA General 










The photograph shows a 
modest-sized crowd milling 
ĂďŽƵƚǁŝƚŚůŝƩůĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ


































in Bedford is guarded by 
volunteers in fear of seizure by 
ĐŽƵƌƚŽĸĐŝĂůƐ
Photo: Newsline
W8.17The locks are 
strengthened at the 




wishing to process 
ŝŶũƵŶĐƟŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƵŶŝŽŶ
Photo: Newsline
W8.19Following the Court decision to 
ƐĞƋƵĞƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞE' Ɛ͛ĂƐƐĞƚƐ͕ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ
ŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ Ɛ͛ŶĂƟŽŶĂůŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌƐ
based on Fleet Street in London stop 














8.20 The mass protest on the night of 
29th-30th November 1983. The scale 
of police presence is clear from the 
photographs.
Photos: John Smith, Report Digital
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W8.25Protesters sit down in front of 
police lines on 29th November. Peacefully 
ƐŝƫŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŽƵůĚĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞ
police to physically move each person 
but it also requires a well-disciplined 
protest and witnesses spoke of stone-
ƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂĚĞƚŚŝƐƚĂĐƟĐŚĂƌĚƚŽ
deploy. Later pictures show the protesters 
ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ͘
Photo: Newsline
W8.26Police and pickets on the 
ĞǀĞŶŝŶŐŽĨϮϵƚŚEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ͘ dŚĞ
ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞĐƌƵƐŚ
between the two sides.
Photo: Newsline













W8.29Police and pickets on 
the evening of 29th November
Photo: Newsline
dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚŐĂƉŝŶƚŚĞ
images at the point the police 
charge into the crowd. This may 
ĐŽŶĮƌŵĂůůĞŐĂƟŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐĞ
acted to stop photographers or 




van carrying copies of the printed 
newspapers emerges through the 
police lines
Photo: Newsline
W8.30Police seize control of 
ƚŚĞE'ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƟŽŶƐǀĂŶ͘












From positional to associational power –  
the NGA and the 1983 Messenger Dispute 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Seven described the dynamics of the dispute between the NGA and 
Messenger Newspapers with key aspects illustrated through photographs in Chapter 
Eight. The thesis charts how the employer sought to bypass the union’s traditional 
positional power through new technology operated by non-union members. 
Production continued despite the strike of six NGA members. The union had very 
little other leverage as the company had prepared to print using its own press and its 
traditional pressure through secondary action had minimum impact. 
The thesis has described the spectrum of powers acquired by unions due to the 
position members hold within the labour process, organisational strength, 
institutional and associational power. With its industrial action strategy unable to 
bring Shah to a resolution, the NGA turned to associational power through allies in 
the wider trade union movement. 
This was unfamiliar territory for the independent union whose legacy was one of 
detachment from the TUC (Gennard 1990: 283-286). Tony Dubbins was elected 
General Secretary with a commitment to increased engagement and he positioned 
the union within the left of a trade union federation struggling with how best to 
respond to the Conservative reform agenda, industrial restructuring and 
technological change (McIlroy 1990: 256). 
The NGA had rarely been in the public eye and was not accustomed to winning 
public support or engaging with the media. This chapter reviews this factor in a 
dispute that was played out in the glare of publicity and with the national press 




Interviewees on both sides of the dispute believed that the national press coverage 
was intertwined with industrial relations within the newspaper industry. Shah 
expressed the belief that newspaper bosses were cowered by the power of the 
union whereas NGA officers and activities assumed the union would receive a hostile 
press and that there was little they could do to influence it. 
Shah felt the Daily Mail especially unhelpful. On 25 November the Daily Mail carried 
a feature headed: “Six men at the centre of a storm”103  
It described how the family men didn’t consider themselves as militants and stressed 
their long service in the industry. It is a neutral, even sympathetic, article from the 
Daily Mail, one of the newspapers that didn’t dismiss NGA chapel reps who refused 
to commit to normal working.  
On 29 November there is a feature on Shah:  
And the man at the centre of it all gets on with his job. 
 Shah is quoted as saying: 
I’m not giving up – law is my only defence and I’ll use it. 
The Sun also seemed to tread carefully in its initial coverage with a headline:  
Union chief hits at Shah  
The Morning Star gave solid support to the NGA and stressed the TUC’s backing for 
the dispute with headlines104: 
TUC throws weight behind print workers 
Full TUC backing to NGA, Print workers big challenge to Thatcher  
In the copy it referred to TUC statements and quotes from Murray which showed the 
TUC support was far from unequivocal. On 28 November it issued a rallying cry to 
	
103 Media reports are list in Appendix 5 
104 Ibid 
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“Back the print workers”, declaring the Tory government and the Fleet bosses were 
out to smash the NGA.  
Newis still adheres to the wider conspiracy theory of the dispute but understood the 
complicated calculations being made by all sides. He believed the newspaper 
employers were in some way sponsoring Shah but were nervous or inflaming their 
own chapels: 
Behind the scenes they were saying go on Eddy, have ‘em. If they produced 
biased copy it wouldn’t have gone out. I think probably the London officers 
were playing it down because the Shoe Lane Progressives - the broad left 
group – took a lot of persuading to support the one-day strike to keep 
tensions down in Fleet Street. (interview 3.12.2017). 
Dubbins believed the media balance was tipped against the union. 
If they are bad enough when their interests are not involved what did we 
expect when they had direct interests (interview 17.8.2017). 
As the dispute escalated it dominated the media. The front page of the Daily Mail on 
30.11.83 declared: 4,000 pickets defy the law and inside: “The phoney war is over, 
now it’s become a union battle the Tories can’t afford to lose.” The report described 
4,500 pickets confronting 1,000 police in the “biggest challenge yet to the 
Government’s trade union laws.” Its 1 December edition was headed with: “New 
clash as pickets mass again” and “The darkest hour on Winwick Quay”.  
Daily Mail Comment column (30.11.83) was headed: “Mob rule or the rule of law” 
and called the picket an “attack on parliamentary democracy and the authority of 
the judiciary It recognised that: “the Warrington dispute has become the first real 
test to the point of destruction of the efficacy of industrial relations legislation 
enacted by the first Thatcher Government.  
TV and newspaper photos at the time of the dispute show the scenes of battle at 
Warrington. The Times (1.12.83) carried a large picture of an injured policeman. 
	 228	
The dispute continued to be the main story across the media through November and 
December 1983.  
A four-page “Battle of Warrington” centre-spread ran in the Sunday Times, 4 
December, including a damning leader article on Fleet Street describing its  
. . . pusillanimous management, pig-headed unions and archaic technology. 
Woodrow Wyatt’s column in the News of the World, (4.12.83) ‘The voice of reason’ 
was to be on the theme “Mr Shah’s fight is our fight against union tyranny”, but the 
column ran a black space after the NGA chapel refused to set the type.  
See list of media coverage used in this research in the Appendix 5. 
The case studies for this research are long before the arrival of social media and 24-
hour news. The significance of the Messenger Dispute was not realised immediately 
but after some initial confusion the main newspaper outlets realised its political 
importance and potential to damage the NGA to suit their own interests. Even this 
was not clear cut with news employers calculating the impact on their own internal 
industrial relations and the intense competition between the titles and proprietors. 
Shah believed they were beholden to the print unions. The Fleet Street chapels did 
not want to get drawn into the dispute but were instructed to do so. 
The focus for the NGA leadership was upon industrial matters and it had little if any 
experience or resource for managing its approach to the media. Mass brawls with 
the police were the ambition of some on the left but played badly when viewed on 
TV and newspapers. The lack of engagement and assumption of an unfair hearing in 
the media made it harder to win allies beyond the NGA’s traditional support. 
 
Associational power and the TUC 
The September 1983 TUC Congress took stock of its position following the re-
election of the Conservatives. It rejected a resolution calling for all-out opposition to 
the Government. The TUC’s commitment to the ‘Wembley Principles’ had, to all 
intents and purposes, been shelved.  
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Len Murray, TUC General Secretary advised the Post Office Engineering Union 
(POEU) that it was not TUC policy to encourage unions to break the law and it could 
not grant the union substantial financial assistance in its dispute with Mercury 
Communications. The POEU’s National Executive Committee was divided but after its 
General Secretary advised that defying the law and facing sequestration would bring 
financial disaster it decided to comply. The TUC was in little mood for a 
confrontation with the new Government and it would not support unlawful action. 
A composite motion reaffirmed opposition to the laws but proposed reasoned 
argument with ministers. This was a marked softening of the policy. Motions and 
amendments that called for non-compliance with the laws were defeated.  
The NUJ attempted to propose an emergency motion at the TUC’s September 
Conference seeking industrial and financial support but the General Council refused 
to table it. The National Council heard doubts that financial support in opposing the 
High Court Ruling would be forthcoming from the TUC (National Council September 
1983). 
With the Messenger dispute escalating an emergency meeting of the TUC’s Print 
Industries Committee (PIC) backed the NGA’s request for support. This was the first 
stage of the procedure under the terms of the 1982 Wembley Conference 
agreement to oppose the Employment Acts. The report to the NGA National Council 
of 3-4 November included an exchange with David Basnett, a representative of the 
key TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee (EPOC): 
Association representatives had stated they considered that widespread 
support was necessary and that there should be an industrial response from 
the TUC if NGA funds were sequestrated. 
It was the view of the officers that the TUC representatives were luke-warm 
in their support for the Association . . . and they were attempting to back 
away from the implications of the dispute.  
If the strategy depended upon the wider support from the TUC it seemed that it 
would be unsuccessful. It was perhaps at this point that the union could have tried 
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to stop the dispute escalating out of control. Perhaps the TUC was too ambiguous? 
Building a dispute that would rely on its support would seem ill-conceived but the 
NGA leadership stuck to its course. 
The National Council was informed that NGA officers had met with Murray, TUC 
General Secretary to insist on the support promised under the Wembley Conference 
agreements. Murray offered support within the law and declared his belief that 
there would not be widespread support for unlawful action. He thought the fines 
should be paid. 
The TUC had been advised that it risked being ‘joined’ in legal action for damages if it 
backed the NGA’s unlawful action (Monks interview 2015). Shah recalled how he had 
felt that Murray was not happy with the situation but had to give some taciturn 
support to the union.  
He was trying to say: ‘we’re not really like this’. But he was stuck and there 
were reports of big infighting between certain trade unions and the TUC. I'm 
not against unions I just don't like extremism. The extremists appeared to 
have taken charge of the TUC (interview 7.4.2015). 
The TUC’s EPOC met on 21 November and was informed that the NGA was not 
seeking financial support from the TUC to pay the fine. It sought financial and 
industrial assistance in order to win the dispute and called for an immediate 
statement of support. Murray explained that he was not in a position to commit the 
General Council to this. The meeting agreed to back the NGA’s right to recognition, 
opposition to victimisation, and efforts by ACAS to resolve the dispute and report to 
the General Council (Minutes of EPOC 21st November). 
The next day the NGA National Council considered reports on the mass pickets and, 
as the Minutes indicate, claimed: 
the police had advised Shah not to attempt to publish his newspapers105 . . . 
the police were under pressure from the company and had assisted the firm 
	
105 There is no evidence to substantiate this claim 
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in the distribution of the newspapers by ensuring the vans left the factory 
(National Council 22 Nov 1983). 
The letter from the NGA’s lawyers, Kershaw, Gassman and Matthews on the 19 
November,106 was given to National Council members stressing the draconian 
implications arising from the Sequestration Writ. It warned that: 
in the final analysis non-compliance could lead to imprisonment of National 
Officers and National Council members. 
It explained the legal position and that the court was only concerned with the issue 
of contempt of court. The letter advised the union to abide by the terms of the 
injunction.  
Once Messenger Group have obtained their writ Mr Shah will have achieved 
all that he wishes and will have put the Association out of business.  
It qualifies the risk of committal to prison of officers or members with the comment: 
I do not believe that Messenger Group would fall into that error. 
The legal advice concluded: 
The consequences of the Association continuing its contempt would be 
disastrous to the Association and I would recommend very strongly that the 
Association does now comply with the Order. 
The Council was again advised of the “muted” support from the TUC and that union 
should comply with the law. Wade advised that the union was unlikely to receive full 
unconditional support from the TUC.  
Letters and motions in support of the leadership’s stance were received from 
chapels and branches. Despite the clear legal advice and warnings over the lack of 
wider trade union support the NGA National Council on 22 November voted without 
dissent not to pay the £50,000 fine.  
	
106 Legal advice presented to NGA National Council as listed in Appendix 2 
	 232	
Wade warned of a “spontaneous explosion” amongst the membership should the 
union be sequestrated (Daily Mail, 1983). John Fryer, BBC Industrial Correspondent 
described the NGA as a “tough nut to crack”. He predicted that: “What started as a 
little provincial dispute is heading for a major confrontation between the unions and 
Mrs Thatcher (as cited by Dickinson 1984: 103)”. 
 
All-out strike summoned 
NGA minutes show that on Saturday 10 December a crisis meeting of NGA National 
Council debated whether a national print strike would bring pressure on Shah. Such 
a strike call would open the union up to thousands of injunctions, fines and damages 
that would mean almost certain bankruptcy. The Newspaper Society and the 
Newspaper Publishers Association were already in the process of obtaining court 
orders and preparing to sue for the maximum damages – total claims amounting to 
around £4 million. 
In their interviews, Newis and Dobney recall how they and other left-wing members 
of the National Council urged for an all-out strike. The National Council was advised 
that a ‘sounding-out’ exercise indicated members would support a one-day strike 
but not selective strikes or an all-out stoppage. The members debated the options 
for the union and recognised the dispute with Shah was not going to be won. They 
saw Shah being egged on and championed by other employers and the government 
who wanted to see the NGA broken. A one-day strike would put down a ‘marker’ to 
other employers who may feel inclined to follow in Shah’s footsteps (NGA National 
Council Minutes December 1983).  
Dubbins in interview reiterated his belief the newspaper employers were complicit 
in the dispute: 
Newspaper employers have got vested interests and probably acting 
individually and together to put pressure and give support to Shah and 
Government and we had to counter-act that by demonstrating to them this 
was not just an issue with Shah this was an issue we had, they were giving 
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support to Shah and there would be a penalty to be paid. And we had to put 
down a marker to be sent. It was the only way we had (interview 17.8.2017). 
The legal advice to the union was clear and forthright: 
I would be failing in my duty to the Association not to stress the 
consequences of a strike instruction with the utmost vigour. There is no 
doubt in my mind that any such instruction would destroy the Association 
utterly. The cumulative total of fines and awards would certainly exceed the 
total of the Association’s assets, any money from the TUC fighting fund and 
any money that may be available from sympathetic unions.107 
Dubbins interviewed for this research recalled his belief that an industrial solution 
was unlikely and the pressure had to focus on a political resolution through the TUC. 
The next meeting of the TUC’s EPOC Committee was set to meet on the Monday 
evening and he wanted to go with a clear mandate for more action. The National 
Council agreed to call a 24-hour strike across the entire printing industry on the 
following Wednesday, 14 December. But tellingly, it arranged to meet again on 
Tuesday morning to review the position after the EPOC Committee.  
Dubbins explained: 
We never went to the TUC to close down power or stop delivery of 
newspapers on the railways or anything like that. We just asked for a 
statement of support but this is we ran into trouble because Murray in 
particular was very much a constitutionalist and would not put the TUC at 
risk. The thought of the government sequestrating the TUC is absolute 
bollocks – never would have happened, it would have caused such a reaction 
to it people would have said the government has gone potty. But to have a 
go at one individual union and six people was a different matter and so we 
needed the TUC support and we got it (interview 17.8.2017). 
	
107 Legal advice presented to NGA National Council 9.12.83 as listed in Appendix 2 
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Legal costs and fines were stacking up for the union and this would have escalated 
significantly had it pursued wider strike action across the industry. In 1980, the NGA 
levied its working members to support those locked-out. It is hard to see how such a 
tactic could have been adopted in 1983, with the same degree of support. Even if the 
working members were prepared to pay an emergency levy to sustain the wider 
struggle, the union would have faced the additional challenge of dealing with it in 
hard cash transactions. Such a banking-free operation is barely conceivable today 
but even in 1983, with the tight discipline of the NGA, it proved extremely difficult 
and as Dubbins recognised, was not sustainable beyond a few weeks. The 
sequestrators or courts would have soon closed in on some of the ways union 
officers were using to hide or disguise funds. Subsequent sequestrations, such as 
with SOGAT and the NUM, proved much harder to evade (Land and Dodkins 2011, 
Milne 2014). 
The 24-hour strike would have escalated the dispute into uncharted waters. It is still 
not possible to judge whether the strike call was a gesture to strengthen the union’s 
hand with the TUC and would never have been actioned.  
The conflict had grown beyond Shah and the battle was to stop other employers 
following his example. From the testimonies of Newis and Dobney, the Left on the 
union’s National Council made the case in class-war terms, that it was a battle the 
working class had to win or it faced catastrophic consequences. Decades later it is 
hard to argue that such analysis was inaccurate but whether victory was possible at 
the time is another matter.  
Dubbins did not think Shah was affected one way or another but the union had to 
counterbalance the support from newspaper proprietors and the Government.  
The closed shop was a big, big, big prize – the basis of the industry. Even if 
they could put a dent in that let alone smash it up completely, you have won 
a major victory (interview 17.8.2017). 
The Left rallied support for the NGA and held it up as a dispute that must be won. 
Socialist Action devoted most of its 9 December edition to the cause arguing that 
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challenging the law by breaking it was part of a long tradition in the development of 
democracy. But the only tactic called for was more mass picketing. It railed against 
the TUC and the Labour Party leadership for failing to back the blockade. Arthur 
Scargill is quoted calling for “the most massive picket ever seen” (Socialist Action 
1983).  
The research highlighted the way the NGA National Council was divided between 
those who thought the dispute could not be continued without active TUC support 
and those who believed that seeking TUC endorsement for unlawful action was a 
maneuver by senior officers to “extricate themselves from the dispute by proxy” as 
Blissett described (2013: 157). 
In his appraisal Gennard commented:  
Some contend that the NGA approached the TUC to get them off the hook of 
a dispute which was in danger of getting out of control. Although this is an 
obvious conclusion to draw it is a false one (Gennard 1984: 17). 
He was writing this in a book commissioned by the General Secretary to celebrate 
the history of the NGA.  
If Dubbins, the shrewd union negotiator, believed that a refusal by the TUC to back 
the union would provide an escape from the hole that the union was in he does not 
acknowledge it. He worked hard to win support from other union leaders especially 
on the Left of the TUC. Some within the NGA National Council such as Newis wanted 
to continue to escalate the conflict. 
It would have changed the consciousness of the workers across the NGA. 
That we were under attack and we had got to support each other. We were 
building towards a general strike. No conclusion that it would lead to a 
general strike but the one-day strike would have been a precursor for others 
– two-day strike (interview 3.12.2017). 
Newis dismissed the risk of bankruptcy:  
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We would have had to face that. It would have meant we would have gone 
out of business a bit sooner. We had to face that anyway (interview 
3.12.2017). 
Shah recalled being called by two or three Fleet Street editors or owners.  
They asked me what I was going to do. Maxwell especially. I said I wish I 
could print five million copies because the whole country would buy them 
whatever I put in them. Maxwell hated me. When we heard they were pulling 
Fleet Street, I could have cleaned up a fortune. Stopping Fleet Street wasn't 
going to put any pressure on me. People get so immersed in the game they 
lose sight of what it's about. I wasn't going to get hurt and I don’t know why 
they thought that closing down Fleet Street was going to affect me (interview 
7.4.2015). 
Strike circulars were despatched to all chapels on Sunday 11 December along with 
plans for a demonstration in Warrington. Joe Wade hinted that the action may lead 
to an indefinite strike which all TUC unions may be called upon to join. 
It struggled, however, to connect wider strike action with an independent free-sheet 
publisher in Stockport. Many of the interviewees still believe in a magic thread that 
bind an employer class and that Shah would somehow be forced to retreat. The NGA 
clung to the hope that other printing employers could bring pressure on Shah but it 
was hard to see a line-of-sight to such an independent business. From the records 
and interview with Shah it seems that the action was actually reinforcing his 
determination to hold out. Dickinson recognised the dilemma and called Shah a 
“self-contained independent with allegiance to no-one but himself (1984: 172)”. 
Lord Marsh, Chairman of the Newspaper Publishers’ Association told Radio 4’s 
‘World this Weekend’ that the NGA is “on a dangerous hook” and urged the TUC to 
get it off. John Monks recalls:  
There was a rumour that Joe Wade was looking to the TUC. He couldn’t call 
Dubbins off, he was on the charge. He was posing to the left of Joe and the 
TUC might do it (interview 12.3.2015). 
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On Monday 12 December the glass-fronted reception of its Bedford headquarters 
was littered with injunctions posted by process servers who were refused entry.  
Before the critical meeting of the TUC EPOC that evening Dubbins joined a pre-
meeting with the left-wing members to bolster their support. He recalled: 
Did a hell of a lot of work on that. In making it clear we wanted a statement 
of support and nothing beyond that. There was a Left meeting before hand – 
all on board and we went to EPOC and we got the support, despite Len’s 
reluctance (interview 17.8.2017). 
Bill Keys, SOGAT General Secretary, who chaired the EPOC suggested the NGA had 
reached the end of the road. Murray again stressed the need to bear in mind 
General Council policy. Wade told the committee that if it did not give full support it 
would destroy his members’ morale (TUC EPOC Minutes 12 December 1983). 
The Left in the NGA believed the TUC’s aversion to bold action against the law could 
still be shifted. Newis explained: 
They weren’t asked to sanction the breaking of the law. They were only asked 
to support the one-day strike which would have been legal. If you can’t have 
a one-day strike across industries we should have packed it in if that’s where 
we are. 
This was about the ability to represent workers and if we backed down now 
then the future would be parlous. All of my life I’ve been told – an injury to 
one is any injury to all – if it’s not true, take it off the banners (interview 
3.12.2017). 
Moss Evans, TGWU General Secretary, made the case for a simple statement of 
support. The right-wing union leaders believed that this would be a ‘blank cheque’ to 
the Government. Tony Christopher, General Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff 
Federation questioned the NGA’s strategy after the planned one-day strike saying it 
seemed to be an escalator to nowhere. He believed that there was no basis for mass 
	 238	
industrial backing and the committee should not promise more support than it could 
deliver (TUC EPOC Minutes 12 December 1983). 
Monks was the Secretary to the Committee and recalls that the NGA wasn’t sure 
how things would turn out:  
They had Bill Keys lined up, unhappily, but lined up. They had a lot of people 
trying to find a middle way. Christopher in particular, Jenkins trying to find a 
middle way of wording which was neither any use to Joe Wade, who needed 
to be clear with the National Council who were meeting the next day. Len 
Murray was not going to have weasel words, he was very strong on that. It 
needs to be black or white, he said this is not a time to fudge. The NGA don’t 
deserve a fudge, they deserve a clear answer and Jenkins and Christopher 
were trying to fudge (interview 12.3.2015). 
Murray again told the Committee to stay within the terms of the General Council 
statement and an adjournment was called. A form of words including a declaration 
of support was drafted but Murray amended it to expressing “sympathy”. Murray 
advised the committee that:  
Any declaration of support by the TUC would bring the TUC into contempt of 
court, damages could be unlimited and the TUC could face further legal 
actions instigated by the NPA, the Court or even the Attorney General (TUC 
EPOC Minutes 12 December 1983). 
Wade argued that a sympathetic statement would not be sufficient and the 24-hour 
action would be called off. Clive Jenkins, General Secretary of ASTMS proposed 
“sympathetic and supportive” to which Murray again warned the committee that he 
would not risk bringing the TUC into contempt and would have to repudiate such a 
statement. This angered the Left union leaders who felt the committee had primacy 
over the TUC General Secretary until the General Council could consider the issue 
further. But this would be too late for the NGA as it had to make a final decision on 
strike action the next morning. With the committee split a vote was taken and the 
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Left won nine votes to seven to include the words: “sympathetic and supportive” 
(TUC EPOC Minutes 12 December 1983).  
A number of members were absent, mainly from the Right, who would have been 
expected to resist such a statement of support. Monks felt that:  
. . . the Left wouldn’t mind being outvoted and were a bit surprised that 
they’d won it (interview 12.3.2015). 
The decision was a shock and just after midnight Murray read a statement to the 
gathered media:  
I’ve informed the committee I will be making it clear that the Employment 
Policy and Organisation Committee does not have the authority to go beyond 
a decision taken by the General Council and the decision cannot therefore be 
interpreted as endorsing the NGA National Council’s decision to take 
industrial action on Wednesday. That will be a matter for the General Council 
to discuss and determine when it meets (cited by Dickinson 1984). 
Monks recalls: 
Murray believed he was getting the NGA off the hook. And there was nothing 
he could do to get them off the hook other than what he did. He couldn’t 
mobilise an army of labour (interview 12.3.2015). 
Newis recalls his shock: 
Enormous battles on the National Council to get the Left to call the strike. I 
didn’t advocate a strike on the basis the TUC would do us a favour and get us 
off the hook. I was completely shocked to see Murray on the steps of 
Congress House. 
Alan Royston, Stockport Six FoC, was at a rally in Warrington that evening:  
I got this whisper through what Len Murray had done. I thought this is 
curtains for us. Although the Committee had supported, Len was going the 
other way. I thought this was the end. If he is not going to stand by us it’s 
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going to crumble. I thought the momentum would build and the other unions 
would support us because they could see the bigger picture (interview 2014). 
Dubbins’ view now, and at the time of the dispute, is that the TUC is just a 
coordinating body. 
TUC learned its lesson in 1926 and has never recovered from it. That’s true in 
terms of never being a general staff – always been out there in the fucking 
pay corps rather the front line (interview 17.8.2017). 
The NGA was served with more than one hundred injunctions that could have 
resulted in more than £30 million fines (Dickinson 1984, Dunn 1985: 102, Gennard 
1990). The NGA might have hoped to avoid such costs from other employers by 
threatening further industrial action but the very existence of the union would have 
depended upon such a gamble. 
NGA minutes record that at 9.30 am on Tuesday 13 December, the NGA National 
Council met briefly to call off the 24-hour strike. Wade explained the surprise 
statement by Murray had put: 
the matter into an entirely different light and which caused bewilderment 
and confusion (National Council minutes 13.12.83).  
Wade told the NGA National Council he felt there could well be a move to seek 
Murray’s resignation.  
 
End game for the union and TUC 
In Warrington the Stockport Six led a demonstration that attracted some 3,000 
people in poor weather108. The special meeting of the TUC General Council heard 
Murray recommend it reject the EPOC decision. The NGA had already called off its 
one-day strike but the Council still needed to determine its position. 
	
108 Granada TV report and PRINT newspaper 
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Dubbins accepted that the TUC could face legal action but argued it must face up to 
its obligations under its Wembley Conference decisions. In his autobiography, Clive 
Jenkins, the General Secretary of ASTMS (1990: 281) wrote that TUC general 
secretaries had long been afraid of somehow exposing the national centre to legal 
action of any kind. “It was their virginal horror of this which led to the problems of 
Len Murray over the Messenger dispute”. Dubbins argued that the TUC owed the 
NGA after its own unlawful action in support of other unions, such as health service 
workers, ignoring its earlier shortcomings in this regard. He accepted that the NGA 
could not win the dispute without TUC support. He warned that other employers 
would take the opportunity to attack the NGA and the whole trade union movement 
would be severely weakened. 
The minutes record:  
It was asserted that the General Council had reached a crucial stage in their 
development of the campaign against the Employment Acts.  
The 1982 Wembley TUC Conference declarations foresaw the prospect of unions in 
breach of the law and the minute goes on:  
These policies did not commit the General Council to remain within the law. 
Trade union development had, on previous occasions, been won by breaking 
the law and the General Council must recognise that a bad law must be made 
inoperable by demonstrations against it. If the General Council did not 
support the NGA, it would mean they had reversed the policy made at the 
Wembley Conference and the 1983 Congress: in effect they would be 
instructing unions to act within the law. Unity could no longer be obtained by 
working out a compromise which was unsatisfactory to everyone. The 
General Council therefore had to take a clear decision (TUC General Council 
December 1983). 
After nearly six hours in session the Council voted 31 to 20 to ‘refer back’ the EPOC’s 
recommendation. The TUC would not support an unlawful strike.  
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That evening Dubbins squared up to Shah on Channel 4 News. Dubbins accused him 
of only becoming converted to a defender of individual freedoms when he found the 
pay of NGA members were £70 above the rate he had to pay to non-unionists. Shah 
called Dubbins: 
An out-and-out liar and I’m sick and tired of the double-dealing attitudes of 
professional negotiators like Mr Dubbins against small companies like myself. 
He then took out his ear-piece and walked out (Dickinson 1984). All routes of action 
against Shah had failed and the NGA had no choice but to accept defeat. The union’s 
National Council met on 15 December and decided to continue the dispute but only 
by lawful means. Joe Wade recognised the dispute was a watershed as far as the 
employment legislation was concerned.  
Later the next year there was a telling moment when Alan Jordan, the influential 
Secretary of the Birmingham Branch, rose at the 1984 NGA Conference to ask a small 
but significant question of Dubbins:  
This is not meant to be a nit-picking question, Mr President, but is not the 
penultimate paragraph slightly inaccurate? It says: “The TUC General Council 
did not support the decision of its own Employment Policy and Organisation 
Committee and in the subsequent confusion that resulted, the National 
Council decided to call off the proposed 24-hour stoppage.” If my memory 
serves me correct, the full General Council met on 14 December, and yet our 
National Council called off the stoppage, allegedly because of the confusion, 
on 13 December. Is that paragraph slightly inaccurate? 
Dubbins angrily replied:  
With the greatest respect to you, Alan, I do not know what the rest of our 
colleagues at Conference here thought but if anybody is suggesting that after 
that diabolical statement by Len Murray on the steps of Congress House 
there was not confusion, not only amongst the membership of the NGA but, I 
would suggest, amongst the entire trade union movement, we are quite 
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entitled – and in my view it is quite legitimate – to include that phraseology 
within that report (NGA 1984 Delegate Meeting: 262-263).  
This exchange touched the nerve over the NGA’s apportionment of blame onto the 
TUC. There was no reflection on whether the union had done enough to garner 
support around the General Council or if it they had any realistic chance of winning 
support capable of turning the dispute in their favour. This sequence of events has 
become part of the narrative. For example, Marsh (1992: 93) records that: “The 
General Council of the TUC refused to support the NGA action and the NGA called off 
the proposed strike”. 
At the Conference Ray Williams moved a motion applauding the Stockport Six and 
the support members showed. It condemned the “treachery” of Len Murray and 
called for immediate and decisive national action.  
Dubbins responded by saying:  
On 14 December 1983, whether you like it or not, and we are not using the 
TUC as a scapegoat, what they did was to give the green light to the 
Government and the employers to rip this union apart. We were left 
isolated. . . the TUC abandoned the NGA at a crucial stage in the Messenger 
dispute. This Council was not prepared to ask our members to commit 
suicide (NGA 1984b: 267-269). 
The motion was defeated 211 to 157. With the TUC blamed for the defeat, Dubbins 
kept his reputation largely intact as he became NGA General Secretary.  
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9.1 - The cartoon shows the miners giving support to the NGA. It clearly links Eddy Shah with the National Coal 
Board, Rupert Murdoch and the Thatcher Government. - Tony Dubbins’ private collection 
The 18 January meeting of the National Council was informed the dispute had to 
that date cost the union £2 million and the National Newspapers were pursuing 
claims for damages in the region of £3 million. Added to that would be further court 
costs, sequestration costs and further claims from Shah.  
The National Council agreed to purge its contempt of court and abide by the 
injunctions. The NGA reaffirmed its opposition to the Employment Acts and 
announced that it would press for a reversal of the TUC decision at the September 
Congress. On the same day, Shah despatched dismissal notices to the seven 
remaining NUJ journalists. 
A week later, on 25 January, the Foreign Secretary announced that independent 
unions would be banned at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
Mike Grindley, who became the chair of the GCHQ sacked workers, was convinced 
that this was no coincidence. In a conversation regarding this research he felt sure 
the sequence was no accident and that it was part of the ‘Ridley Plan’ to take on 
trade unions (interview 2014). 
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On 27 January Wade apologised to Manchester High Court and purged the union’s 
contempt. The judge ordered the funds to be released, less £625,000 to pay fines 
and costs. The next day there was another demonstration in Warrington. Technically 
the dispute continued and the Stockport Six continued to picket. In May this was 
stopped and alternative employment was found for the six members. The 
Messenger Group returned to court to claim compensation for damages to its 
business bringing the grand total in fines and damages to more than £1 million. 
In March 1984 the National Council minutes record the decision to expel Shah E. 
(S.19066) under the provision of Rule 41 for carrying on working for Messenger 
Newspapers after receiving an instruction from the Branch Secretary. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The TUC was divided between those who wanted to confront the Government and 
its new laws and those who wanted to find some form of containment and 
compliance with the freshly elected Thatcher regime. As a small union, marginal to 
the policy shifts taking place within the TUC, it failed to detect that the ground had 
moved. 
As a result of the Messenger dispute, the new employment laws passed their first 
real test. The refusal to comply with the law left the NGA in an impossible position in 
court and Shah made the most of his one-sided prosecution. The civil proceedings 
ratcheted up until the court made the unprecedented ruling to sequestrate the 
union. The employer facing a strike of a handful of workers was given control of the 
NGA’s financial assets. The reliance on civil actions, injunctions and the target upon 
bank accounts not people was all part of the lessons the Conservatives had learnt 
from previous failed attempts at industrial relations reform. 
With industrial action ineffective, the NGA stumbled into escalating mass action 
outside the Messenger printing plant in Warrington. The protests grew under their 
own momentum and beyond the control of the union. Scenes of picket line violence 
were proving counter-productive as the TUC had advised they would. The shock of 
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NGA activists who faced the robust police response was palpable in the testimonies 
and confirmed their belief their union and their class was under attack by all the 
forces of the state. 
The TUC tried to show support without straying into potentially legal challenges 
itself. The research found it was reluctant and slow to say no to the NGA and in its 
efforts to avoid giving succour to Shah it led the union to believe it could count on 
greater support than it was ever going to provide. But the study also found that the 
TUC provided useful cover for the NGA leadership in its surrender at the end of the 
dispute.  
There may have been rhetorical expressions of support but other unions were not 
prepared to expose themselves to the sort of escalation of legal action that faced the 
NGA. They watched the unfolding events with alarm but it took some time for the 
significance of the dispute to be reflected in a change of industrial tactics. 
The case study demonstrates the weakness of associational power in contrast to the 
sort of positional power the NGA enjoyed. It also demonstrates the investment in 
time and resources needed to be deployed over a long period to develop allies and 
be able to assess the potential support amongst the wider movement.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
The aftermath of the Messenger dispute 
 
Introduction 
To assess the significance of the 1983 Messenger dispute it is necessary to review its 
aftermath and the direct links to subsequent events for trade unions, employers and 
government. 
Interviews given for this research included reflections on the dispute and its 
ramifications. Key points are featured in this chapter alongside a review of the 
assessments made in the contemporary literature. It highlights what new knowledge 
has been gained and what the thesis adds to the current debates over trade union 
renewal, mobilisation and social movements theories.  
The chapter highlights the consequences flowing from the outcome of the dispute, 
confirming its significance. For trade unionism, the defeat was a heavy blow, marking 
the start of a series of further conflicts which saw the movement beaten and much 
reduced in size and stature. 
The research confirms how the confidence held by members in the capacity of the 
NGA to maintain it traditional strength was broken by the Messenger dispute but the 
strategy to place the burden of blame on the TUC dodged the true causes: new 
technology and the failure to recognise the changed political and legal environment. 
This chapter examines how the Messenger dispute impacted upon industrial 
relations, especially in printing and newspaper production. Shah was propelled into 
national prominence and he was encouraged to start a new national newspaper, 
Today (Goodhart and Wintour 1986, Neil 1997). This heralded News International’s 
transfer of production away from Fleet Street to Wapping (Lang and Dodkins 2011). 
The NGA recognised the threat from non-unionists (and competition from other 
unions). It sought to reach out to new recruits and belatedly address systemic levels 
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of inequality and the exclusion of women. It also pursued a strategy of joint 
protocols with other unions leading to amalgamation (Gennard 1990). 
Unions struggled to find an accommodation with the laws that restrained their 
traditional actions. For many the choice was between what they saw as properly 
representing their members or breaking the law. Outright non-compliance as a 
strategy, however, was lost, even if some continue to argue for it. From that point 
unions made representations to the courts against restraining injunctions and with a 
few exceptions abided by the rulings (Evans 1987). 
Emboldened by its success, the Government pressed ahead with further restrictions 
on union activities opening up wider opportunities for employers to pursue court 
orders to stop union disruption, and imposing conditions on internal union 
democracies. 
For the Government the Messenger dispute was a defining moment in its policy 
towards trade union reform and employment law. The step-by-step policy was 
accelerated with further laws to constrain union actions and on tactics in industrial 
conflict. The Messenger dispute proved a testing-ground for handling disputes and 
mass pickets as was seen during the year-long miners’ strike. 
 
The aftermath and reflections on the dispute 
The impact of the dispute was felt most keenly by the six workers on strike. They 
were supported by the union financially and helped to find other work in the trade 
(NGA National Council minutes, Royston interview 2014).  
The NGA analysed and argued over what had gone wrong far more than it had done 
over the preparations for the dispute. Bryn Griffiths in his Presidential Address to the 
NGA’s Biennial Delegate Conference in November 1984 stressed the argument of 
‘betrayal’ and blamed Murray’s outburst at the TUC for the union’s defeat and 
subsequent events:  
That was truly a night of treachery, as far as this union was concerned. 
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Colleagues, that green light was all Thatcher needed from the movement to 
encourage her to launch her attack on the union members at GCHQ and to 
gain greater confidence for the battle against the NUM (NGA 1984b: 118). 
Dubbins acknowledged that the union could have acted earlier: 
Was the initial strategy, the softly-softly approach used for too long? Is it 
considered an error to wait until Shah had his own printing press? Yes, in 
those circumstances of course it is an error. It is an error in the sense that if 
we had taken action before we might have had more effect on Shah (NGA 
1984b: 261). 
He acknowledged, when interviewed for this research, that Shah could have been 
left go non-union as others had done. Yet little attention was given to whether the 
NGA should have pursued an alternative strategy including opting to dodge the 
dispute or recognise its futility at an early stage. Goodhart and Wintour (1986) 
suggested the NGA could have avoided the fight and tried to play down a small 
business running a non-union print facility. Dickinson (1984) leaves the reader with 
the impression that the union was the victim of a deliberate attack for which it could 
only defend itself as best it could. He presents a sense of inevitability and it makes 
no suggestions of missed opportunities for the union to take a different course and, 
if so, what options might be available. The evidence shows how difficult such a 
strategy would have been given the strength of feeling amongst officers and 
activists. The power of internal democracy, so valuable to the NGA in 1980, tied its 
leaders’ hands in 1983. 
In his reviews of the dispute, Gennard (1984) found it was an industrial dispute that 
escalated out of control into a wider political conflict and not a deliberate action to 
challenge the Employment Acts. 
When a law changes clashes with the basic philosophy of an organisation it 
becomes difficult to immediately change its rules and behaviour. These far 
reaching implications for the NGA from the Employment Acts helps explain 
why it felt unable to comply with injunctions granted against them during the 
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dispute (Gennard 1984: 12).  
This point raises the question of whether a democratic membership organisation 
with such long-held methods of organisation could have transformed its modus 
operandi as required by the new laws without a major configuration. In a choice 
between maintaining activist support and legal compliance, the leadership opted to 
break the law. The research shows how such deeply embedded practices were not 
going to be dropped without a major existential crisis. Such a surrender to the 
Thatcher reform agenda was also unlikely given the confidence the union had in 
itself. The defeat was to rock such self-belief as Burke explained: 
We had never been beaten before. We’d had long hard battles and won 
(interview 2014).  
The Messenger dispute “damaged the aura of uncontestability (sic)” of the NGA 
described by Gennard and Hayward (2008: 4).  
The study shows how difficult it was for the NGA to abandon even a small number of 
members. The democratic force of activists and officers, stirred into action in 
defence of the union, meant the leadership was unable to adjust its approach to 
meet new unfavourable conditions. The democracy and high levels of participation 
within the union combined with a strong, if confusing, federated structure of local 
branches restricted the options open to the leadership. 
In 1983, as the minute books and the interviews show, the NGA had not prepared 
the activist base or its wider membership for any form of accommodation with the 
new regulations. All those questioned believed the NGA to be a key target in the 
Government’s assault on union power but it did not contemplate any other strategy 
other than outright opposition. The NGA had more to lose by way of its traditional 
conduct in disputes than other unions. The study finds the factors that made the 
union so strong made the acceptance of change hard to accommodate. 
From all those interviewed there is a strong belief that the fight was anticipated and 
inevitable, if not Shah, someone else. Dodging or side-stepping it in some way would 
have been the much harder decision to take than allowing the dispute to take its 
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course. The new leadership came from a more militant orientation and had not 
prepared the membership, activists or officers for any accommodation with the law. 
John Monks, the TUC Officer in charge of the Committee, and later to become TUC 
General Secretary, recognised the critical nature of the dispute:  
Well it was the signal that unions were under the law, they were going to 
observe the law. Who rules? After that it was the government rules, the rule 
of law rules. It was a massive dispute in my recollection and set the 
framework for the rest of the 80s (interview 12.3.2015). 
Despite the significance of the defeat, Monks knew the TUC could not back the 
action and had to act to get the NGA ‘off the hook’. He gives his view of what would 
have happened had the TUC backed the NGA in the way the Left wanted:  
It would have been a revolutionary situation. There could have been a great 
general strike on this, we could have stopped the car industry, the mines and 
the railways and so on and it would have built up.  
What they missed was the pre-entry closed shop, that was at the heart of this 
but it was important to only a small minority within the TUC. So once people 
opened up with what it was about: so you could only get a job if you were a 
white nephew of a bloke who has already got a job there. And that was in 
Murray’s mind as well.  
Frankly it was not the way he wanted to take the TUC and he wanted to make 
it clear (interview 12.3.2015). 
The TUC has long mastered the art of crafting carefully worded statements allowing 
union leaders to escape difficult entanglements with employers. It is by nature risk-
averse and compliant with laws and regulations. It has to find points of consensus 
across all its affiliates. The rhetoric in the call for class solidarity and mutual support 
simply did not match the mood or capacity of the union movement. McIlroy 
acknowledged “that the direct independent action from below of a decade ago 
(1970s) was simply not there.” – a situation he partly blamed on the ineffectiveness 
of the TUC-led campaign to make the ideological case for resistance to the law 
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(McIlroy 1984: 31). He acknowledged, however, that the debate between Left and 
Right was never about “pulling the troops out”. The hopes for escalation to the point 
of a general strike were fanciful.  
Lang and Dodkins (2011: 24) repeat the NGA position that: “The TUC’s first major 
confrontation with the anti-union laws had been met with a resounding back-down 
and the NGA were left high and dry with no alternative but to call off the strike”.  
Murray, who announced his retirement shortly after this episode, confirmed the TUC 
was never going to stand up to the law and acknowledged the democratic process as 
distinct to revolution (cited in Darlington and Lyddon 2001). The argument that the 
NGA was denied support because it did not have a strong enough case and that the 
next union threatened by the law would get a better hearing was “pure whimsy” by 
McIlroy (2001).  
Marxism Today (February 1984) carried a debate on the aftermath of the dispute 
called: The Unions: is there life after Warrington? McIlory argued the TUC position 
set a “disastrous course” and marked Thatcher’s greatest success since the election. 
He stressed that if the law was to be broken, there would need to be a propaganda 
offensive by the TUC to counter Thatcher’s own assault. He believed the resulting 
campaign was insufficient. McIlroy argued that “the terrain for a conflict offered by 
the NGA dispute could not have been bettered.” This is challenged by John Lloyd’s 
article that argues that the centrepiece of the dispute: the closed shop, was not the 
cause on which to mount such a fight (Lloyd 1984). 
McIlroy (2001) argued that the Left had failed to counter the rise of ‘new realism’ 
within the trade union movement. Lloyd rebuts the Left’s assumption that all that 
was lacking was firm, militant leadership. He believed the active assent of the 
majority to militant action of the kind was not available and that the TUC saved the 
NGA the considerable embarrassment of asking for it. This research confirms how 
passionately the NGA activists and officers held to the closed shop and secondary 
action as key features to maintain the union’s levels of control. But these were not 
shared by most of the other unions and they were the tactics the Conservatives and 
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its media supporters had sought to demonise – with success as shown in the Party’s 
archives. 
Lloyd warned that with individual choice, many will choose against unions because 
they have been given no reason to choose for them (Lloyd 1984: 33). He challenged 
the assertion that all that was lacking was firm, militant leadership.  
Newis acknowledges it was not the best ground on which the union could fight a 
major battle but stands largely by his stance at the time which was to summon up 
solidarity support. 
People saw it as a series of events rather than a set of activities linked behind 
which there was a political intent to defeat the organised working class in 
order to unleash capitalism. It had got to start with the praetorian guard of 
the labour movement. They had got to be beaten first (interview 3.12.2017). 
Dickinson mentions the raw nerve that remained over the way the dispute ended: 
“Three months later Dubbins was still bitter about the General Council’s decision. If 
he was secretly pleased it did not show” (Dickinson 1984: 177). Gennard argued that 
the competitive pressure on commercial printers presented difficulties for 
employers to take a united stance, as it had in the 1980 dispute, and the 
membership would continue taking action until any threat of legal action was lifted 
(1984: 18). This, however, would require extraordinary levels of loyalty to the union 
and would risk hundreds if not thousands of individual disputes and court orders. 
It now seems absurd to think that the TUC, not established as the trade union high 
command, would summon a general strike to oppose a government that had just 
won a landslide general election to sustain the closed shop.  
The leadership had positioned the NGA alongside the ‘Left’ unions in a movement 
increasingly divided over how to respond to the Conservative agenda. There appears 
to have been little assessment, at times when it mattered, of the likelihood of the 
sort of backing from the TUC that would have made any material difference to the 
outcome of the dispute. If the tactic was to lay the blame on the TUC for the defeat, 
it worked, at least for NGA members. Blissett (2013: 158) notes that NGA activists 
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and members blamed the TUC, not their leadership but he also found that, more 
than thirty years later, the issue is still shrouded in “ambiguity and acrimony”. 
The thesis argues that the NGA had lost the dispute from the outset when Shah 
continued to produce newspapers despite the strike of NGA members. The stoppage 
of six workers was ineffective and so the union sought to apply pressure from the 
outside. McIlroy (1991: 71) was right when he concluded that the law made it 
extremely difficult for unions to win disputes outside the struck workplace. 
McAlevey (2016) stresses the need to organise for super majority strikes in which 
the overwhelming proportion of the workforce stops work to generate a crisis for 
the employer. The hard lesson for the NGA at Messenger Newspapers was that they 
no longer had the sectionalist positional power to stop the job and they were not 
able to persuade other workers, let alone a majority, to support its dispute. Indeed it 
appeared that the chapel was almost as hostile to the non-union workers as it was to 
the management. 
The dispute is seen through the lens of a battle between Shah and the NGA. The 
voice of the workforce Shah hired is not heard and this research was also unable to 
provide that. Shah admitted the ease to which he was able to exploit high levels of 
unemployment in the area from which to recruit and how the new typesetting 
systems required skills akin to typists (Shah interview 2015). Union officers 
interviewed were convinced the new workforce had been recruited or persuaded to 
oppose any approaches they might receive from the union and that their role was to 
help Shah by-pass the NGA. 
With production maintained, Shah survived the NGA’s secondary action regardless of 
its unlawful status. The escalation of the dispute to national prominence was 
because the laws were used but they made little practical difference to the union’s 
efforts to halt Shah’s production. The union was fined for taking action that wasn’t 
even effective.  
Megan Dobney acknowledged this point: 
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Both sides claim the dispute was significant or critical because of the use of 
the employment laws against the union. But it was technology that Shah 
used to bypass the union (interview 2016). 
Although still stressing the importance of the new laws in the case, Shah also 
acknowledged: 
It was my idea that won, whether the law was there or not we would have 
won (interview 2015). 
The ability to by-pass the union using new technology was the critical factor in the 
outcome of the dispute but its significance was because of the role of the law. A 
similar conclusion was reached by Pencavel (2003: 23) who found the closed shop 
was not beaten by the law alone but by technological change. 
The Institute of Directors told Dickinson (1984: 181) their view of the important 
change in the balance of power between employers and employees due to the 
enactment of the employment legislation. Goodhart and Wintour (1983: 8) also 
found that Warrington had become the long-awaited trial of strength over the new 
legal framework. The dispute, which the union had already effectively lost, was 
made into a trial of strength over the legislation by both sides. 
Dubbins reflected on the outcome: 
It wasn’t the end of craft unionism. It did tilt the balance of power in the 
newspaper and media industries away from the union (interview 2017).  
Burke’s reflections included: 
The problem now looking back was we were putting off the evil day. The 
union tried various things. We proposed an arrangement where we would 
share the technology a third, a third, a third between the other unions, NUJ, 
SOGAT and NATSOPA. The other unions didn’t like that, they thought they 
would inherit the power of the compositor. But the power wasn’t the 
compositor typing keys, it was the closed shop and the fact that they held 
together and stood by each other (interview 2014). 
Newis set the outcome in wider political terms: 
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Thatcher’s philosophy was that she would defeat organised labour and 
unleash technology such as the ‘big bang’ leading to the ascendancy of global 
capitalism and the inability of working people to defend themselves against 
it. . . . And where we are today in terms of inequality and the creation of the 
global elite stems from that point (interview 2017). 
In hindsight, the ground on which the union fought was weak. Shah successfully by-
passed the NGA to maintain newspaper production. Had it stopped there, the 
dispute would have been of little consequence. Shah’s recourse to the laws on which 
unions were intent on breaking raised the stakes and as a consequence increased 
the significance of its outcome for all concerned. 
 
The impact on printing industrial relations 
After the use of the Employment Acts by Shah, the union feared that this would be 
repeated by other employers but there was no immediate rush to follow in Shah’s 
footsteps. Rainnie (2016: 122) encountered employers trying to exploit the moment 
with one account of management trying to talk the workers out of the union 
because of the trouble with the Messenger Group but this was an exception and 
half-hearted at best. Blissett interviewed officers and activists and found that there 
was a shift in attitude after the dispute. Employers were “cockier” than before and 
the dispute had made the union less certain of its ability to defend itself (2013: 159). 
Dunn (1985: 113)  believed that after Messenger, “dismay and bitterness gripped the 
union” and this made it less amenable to accepting technological advance. He 
argued that a long-established problem of British industrial relations was the lack of 
trust between the parties and the use of the new employment laws in the 
Messenger dispute had given this feature new life. 
In his immediate post-mortem, Gennard argued that larger employers would be 
cautious of taking on the union using the laws. He played down the implications of 
the dispute by brushing off Shah as another rare example of a maverick non-union 
firm. He suggested only a narrow range of employers were likely to use the new 
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legislation and that it was too early to conclude that it was a ‘watershed’ in the law’s 
influence on UK industrial disputes. Gennard further calculated that the dispute 
could mark a short-term effect and eventually both employers and unions will accept 
the ‘new game’ (Gennard 1984: 14-15).  
After Messenger, unions became much more cautious in breaching the law and 
opted to seek legal defence against court orders. Employers used injunctions to stop 
industrial action, a device where the case against the union does not have to be fully 
proven. Evans (1987: 425) analysed the use of injunctions in industrial disputes 
between 1984 and 1987 and found eighty recorded with the printing unions, NGA 
and SOGAT receiving twenty-nine. In thirty-one cases the union lifted the action 
immediately. In nine cases, the employer-initiated contempt of court proceedings 
after claims that the unions had refused to comply, including NGA and SOGAT. Evans 
believed that it was in printing where the unions’ tactics of the closed shop and 
blacking made them especially vulnerable. 
Contrary to the stated aims of the Government, the new laws reinforced central 
control by union bureaucracies rather than strengthening worker democracy, as 
seen in the various union procedures for initiating industrial action. Far from shifting 
power down, the laws have centralised decision-making within unions and have 
made union bureaucracies more risk-averse. Undy et al described this as: 
“encouraging oligarchic rather than democratic tendencies” (2011: 230). McIlroy 
(1984) believes this to amount to “a big nail in the coffin of effective trade 
unionism”. 
For most printing employers, industrial relations continued within the framework of 
a national agreement and the most pressing matters were economic and 
technological change, international competition and the rise of digital publishing. 
 
Time for Today 
Thanks to the Messenger dispute, Shah became a national figure, to many the 
champion of individual freedom against an over-powerful trade union (Lang and 
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Dodkins, 2011: 22). In the 1983 annual BBC Today poll for ‘man of the year’ he came 
second. He set his sights higher than running some local freesheets. On 7 February 
1984 Shah met Andrew Neil at the Savoy Hotel and shared with him a two-page 
paper on how a national newspaper could be produced using new technology (Neil 
1997).  
Neil is said to have told Shah: “Fleet Street can only be reformed by an outsider” 
Goodhart and Wintour (1986: 23). It might seem strange for the new editor of the 
Sunday Times to meet Shah to plot the birth of a rival newspaper. Shah, when 
interviewed in 2015, believed Murdoch would have known of the meeting, if not 
exactly what it was about. 
Trace the line between the Messenger and Wapping disputes and it is peppered with 
mutual contacts and interests. Neil felt that there was no good reason why, with the 
employment laws and new technology, a green-field site, non-union, national 
newspaper could not be produced and suggested Shah go to see the anti-union USA 
Today (Goodhart and Wintour 1986: 22-24, Melvern 1986: 97-98). Shah developed 
links with Bruce Matthews, Murdoch’s senior executive in the UK and Lord Rees-
Mogg, editor of The Times (Goodhart and Wintour 1986: 147). With News 
International already making plans to move production the Today project was a test-
bed for the new technology on the scale of a national newspaper (Griffiths, 2006: 
368-371). Murdoch later used the threat of competition from Today as part of his 
justification for the move to Wapping and the break with Fleet Street unions 
(Melvern 1986: 148-149). 
Today failed to breakthrough the mass circulation of existing newspapers and within 
four months Shah sold out to Tiny Rowlands, the controversial Chief Executive of the 
Lonrho conglomerate. After a succession of different editors, the paper closed in 
November 1995 (Goodhart and Wintour 1986).  
 
Wapping move 
By the autumn of 1985, with secret preparations to produce newspapers at Wapping 
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well under way, Murdoch told the unions that Shah’s planned paper, Today, 
demonstrated that competition could enter the marker with the overwhelming 
advantages of modern technology, one union and a no-strike agreement (Lang and 
Dodkins, 2011). Murdoch gave the unions three months to agree to transfer to 
Wapping saying the deadline had been set by Shah (Melvern 1986: 148-149). 
The national press used British Rail to distribute newspapers and SOGAT members 
operated closed shops in the wholesale warehouses. The unions could still call upon 
their positional power even with the threat of legal action. Shah considered 
distributing Today using road transport but believed it was not feasible (Goodhart 
and Wintour 1986). News International was a far bigger operation and Murdoch 
approached his partner in Australia, the TNT transport group, to prepare an 
alternative distribution system (Lang and Dodkins, 2011). The first TNT lorries rolled 
down the floodlit ramp at Wapping on 25 January 1986 carrying three million copies 
of the News of the World and one-and-a-half million copies of The Sunday Times.  
Brenda Dean, the new SOGAT General Secretary told the chapels in London that no 
other national newspapers would be hit and she called for non-violent picketing 
(Dean 2007). There would be no point in concealing union funds in fear of court 
action and she wanted no repeat of the scenes from the Messenger and miners’ 
picket lines. She wanted to set the tone for what she knew would be a massive 
dispute and she sought to win public opinion (Melvern 1986: 161, Richardson 2003). 
As with the Messenger dispute the employer had recruited an alternative labour-
force to exploit new technology to bypass the union and maintain production. 
SOGAT faced a stark choice between unlawfully seeking to disrupt the distribution 
chain or observing the law and effectively giving up on a dispute of such magnitude. 
Not to try to use its membership to stop the papers getting out was a step too far for 
the union’s leadership (Dean 2007). An instruction was sent to SOGAT members in 
the provincial warehouses not to handle the papers (Lang and Dodkins, 2011). 
In the first few weeks the newspapers were sometimes late and in short supply. In 
some warehouses, management stepped-in to handle the papers and in Coventry 
SOGAT members who refused to touch the work were fired. Fear of dismissal and a 
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lack of support for the union’s Fleet Street membership meant distribution went 
largely unhindered.  
Despite the failure of the union to enforce solidarity action – or perhaps because of 
it – the company turned to the courts. News International launched a dozen legal 
actions. SOGAT refused to obey the injunctions and just two weeks into the dispute 
the company won an order to sequestrate the union’s £17 million assets as well as a 
fine of £25,000 for contempt of court.  
Dean agreed not to obstruct the sequestration and it soon took grip on the union. 
SOGAT offices and vehicles were seized, phones were cut off and pensions not paid 
to retired members. Dean argued that there was little point in being strangled by 
sequestration for an instruction that was being ignored by a significant number of 
members and not having the impact needed on News International in any event 
(Dean 2007, Melvern 1986). Like the Messenger dispute, it demonstrated that even 
with the overwhelming force of the state against the union, the members involved 
still clung to hopes of victory. 
On 8 May 1986 Dean apologized to the High Court, purging the union’s contempt 
(Lang and Dodkins 2011: 111). She met angry striking members who felt abandoned 
by the action (Dean 2007). It was not just the recognition of the power of the law but 
acknowledgement that SOGAT members up and down the country were ignoring the 
union’s instruction and handling the newspapers (Blissett 2013). 
The dispute lasted more than twelve months with regular violent scenes at the 
picket lines in Wapping and at distribution depots around the country. The 
newspapers, however, continued to appear (Lang and Dodkins 2011). 
When the SOGAT National Council called off the dispute, Dean was heavily criticised 
for the defeat (Lang and Dodkins 2011). Blissett (2013) interviewed SOGAT officers 
who believed that Dubbins and the NGA had deliberately left Dean to take 
responsibility for a dispute they knew could not be won. The NGA leadership was 
able to exit the dispute as it had the Messenger dispute, damaged yet united and 
untarnished.  
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Dubbins recalled his belief that: 
We always had to keep in our minds that although the newspaper industry 
was politically critical it only made up of about 10% of our membership so it 
wouldn’t put the union down in the earth if we lost the entire industry 
(interview 2017). 
Shah claims Murdoch said:  
Eddy Shah won the war, of which I fought the final battle (interview 
7.4.2015). 
The Newspaper Society ended the National Agreement in 1991 in parallel with a 
wave of de-recognitions at company level with the imposition of severe cuts in pay 
and conditions (Gennard and Hayward 2008: 296). NGA and SOGAT members voted 
to amalgamate their unions and in 1991 the Graphical Paper and Media Union 
(GPMU) was established. Despite coming from the smaller of the two unions, 
Dubbins beat Dean in the election to become General Secretary.  
New technology allowed newspaper employers to reduce employment overall and 
replace a largely unionised workforce with a non-union one. Technological change 
altered power dynamics between workers and employers and largely empowered 
the employer. Far from threatening capitalism as Cockburn had speculated (1983: 
218), the balance of bargaining power shifted substantially away from organised 
labour for men and women. In 1983, Cockburn didn’t question whether an 
institution with such well-established and firmly held structures as the NGA was 
capable of transforming itself into an organisation that would be able to attract 
‘new’ women workers.  
After the dispute, Gennard believed the union would need to reach out to new 
workers and to come to terms with firms and workers not accustomed to the ways 
of the trade (1984: 13). The implication was also clear that the union needed to be 
more open to women recruits. Cockburn (1983) highlighted the challenge for a male-
dominated craft seeking to protect itself from change, including from women 
recruits. In these terms the Messenger dispute looks like a closing stand for male 
	 262	
dominance but the aftermath has little cause for feminist celebration. New workers, 
many women, did not enter the industry through the traditional apprenticeship 
route with its in-built teaching of the practices of the union. Such workers were not 
only unaware of the practices and customs the NGA held dear, but they were 
exposed to negative opinions of the role of the union from the employer and the 
wider media. Their pay and conditions were, as a consequence, significantly lower 
(Cockburn 1991, Dawson 2014). Shah claims it was easy to recruit typists in a period 
of high unemployment to do the jobs of NGA compositors. Their story is not told in 
this research, an omission matched in the other literature, and the status of women 
in the printing industry since the early 1980s warrants further study. 
Traditional ink-on-paper printing was in decline and the GPMU was unable or 
unwilling to recruit and organise in the growing sector of web designers and 
internet-based publishers. Dubbins, interviewed in 2017, didn’t believe this was a 
plausible strategy. 
Cockburn added an Afterword in 1991 to her 1983 seminal book Male dominance 
and technological change in which she acknowledged the dismissal of NGA craft and 
overwhelming white male newspaper compositors to be replaced by largely younger 
female workers employed at about half the previous pay rate for an extended 40 
hours and reduced holidays (1991: 238).  
In her revised edition Cockburn (1991: 248) wrote of the development of women’s 
committees and the appointment of women’s and equality officers. But she 
highlighted how unions remained largely run by men and the collective bargaining 
agenda still failed to give women justice, points also made by Dawson (2014). Boston 
(2015) found most unions slow to respond and used a quote from Margaret 
Prosser’s warning to unions including her own, the TGWU as Assistant General 
Secretary for one of her chapter titles: “Become feminine or we become fringe”.  
Faced with technological change, the new workforce lacked positional power and 
the collective identity that helped form the craft unions. Cockburn correctly 
summarises that as individuals, “women climb out of their disadvantage only by 
exploiting other low-pad women in their turn (1991: 252)”. 
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In the end the NGA did not follow the job into the rapidly expanding digital world but 
merged with Amicus which in turn joined the Transport and General Workers Union 
to establish Unite the Union. The printing industry is now subsumed into the 
engineering, manufacturing and services sector within the union109. 
 
The impact on government trade union reform policy  
The significance of the 1983 Messenger dispute was that it enshrined the authority 
of the law, breaking the hopes of unions that outright opposition might neuter its 
effectiveness. The sweep of new trade union laws since 1980 severely weakened 
union power imposing a burden of regulation and limiting the range of industrial 
action tactics (Auerbach 1993). Rising unemployment and the restructuring of 
industry also helped secure the quiescence of labour. This research, however, 
questions the assumption that the law was the critical factor in the outcome of the 
Messenger dispute even if it became the central issue. Despite both sides citing the 
significance of the new laws, the real factor in the Shah’s favour was new technology 
enabling him to by-pass union controls using non-union labour. That the law was 
seen to win heralded a sequence of further regulations to restrict union power. 
The Right saw little role for trade unions and continued to pursue every avenue to 
isolate and marginalise them. Hyman (1989: 199) described the approach of the 
governments of this period as “coercive pacification”. Some union voices still claim 
the right to break what they believe to be unjust laws and that collective action 
trumps state regulation. Unite the union, for example, has changed its rule book to 
remove the qualifying words in its objectives: “so far as may be lawful”110. Len 
McCluskey, the union’s General Secretary, posed the question at the Lord 
Wedderburn Lecture in 2015: “Can unions stay within the law any longer”. Yet 
unions, Unite included, have adapted to the legislation and even used some of the 
measures to strengthen their bargaining power with employers (Undy et al 2011). 
	
109 Unite the Union national industrial sectors 
110 Unite Rule Book 2018 
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They have centralised control over industrial action in large part to ensure legal 
compliance.  
Hanson and Mather (1988: 29) hailed the success of the Thatcher reforms and 
pressed the case for individualised contracts rather than collective agreements. 
Metcalf (1989) found that whilst productivity had improved during the 1980s it was 
not possible to link this to trade union reforms. He concluded that the reforms had 
strengthened the hand of managers and weakened union resistance to change but 
he found highly unionised sectors, including printing, had not seen the sort of 
performance rise he expected. The changes were not about performance or even 
employment levels but power. The period had not produced sustainable 
improvements in UK productivity or competitiveness, instead had widened 
inequalities and had entrenched employer failure to invest in skills and human 
capital (Evans, Ewing and Nolan 1992). Issues around unionization and productivity 
or performance are matters for other research to examine. 
 
Policing lessons 
The Messenger dispute was the first real test of new police tactics and resources in 
handling industrial conflict and the experience of the Messenger dispute was used 
later during the miners’ strike and at Wapping (Wiles 1985: 173).  
Officials from the National Union of Mineworkers kept a close watch on the fortunes 
the NGA in its battle with the Messenger Group. Arthur Scargill, NUM General 
President was particularly anxious to learn the lessons from the courts’ 
sequestration of NGA assets. The union drew up plans to protect its cash and assets 
in the entirely anticipated event of court action against it (Milne 1994: 179). 
Despite the failure of the mass picket at Warrington, the NUM still hoped the tactic 
would provide a rallying-cry victory as it did at Saltley Gate in 1972. In the wake of 
the Messenger dispute, the Financial Times concluded that the police had learned 
hard lessons on mass pickets and how the defeat at Saltley had “entered police 
vocabulary as a shorthand term for all the problems on how the police were to 
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maintain law and order” (Bassett 1983). For the NUM, the stockpile at the Orgreave 
coking plant became the battleground, literally. On 18 June thousands of miners 
faced some 8,000 police in what Milne described as “the single most dramatic and 
violent physical confrontation of past war industrial relations” (Milne 1994: 22). 
It was a battle the police again won. Just as at Warrington, some on the Left argued 
that a bigger mass picket could have succeeded. Darlington felt that the NUM had 
not put enough effort into mobilising support for the mass picket. Had the union 
galvanised sufficient numbers it would: “have marked a symbolic political and 
psychological (albeit not necessarily industrial) turning-point in the strike similar to 
Saltley” (Darlington 2005: 84). 
Unlike Shah, the Coal Board management opted not to use the new employment 
legislation directly. Instead two working miners, Ken Foulstone and Bob Taylor took 
the NUM to the High Court with funds arranged by David Hart. The judge ruled the 
strike unlawful due to the lack of a ballot and when the NUM National Executive 
refused to recognise the judgment a writ was granted against the union.  
The legal process against the NUM moved quicker than it did against the NGA. The 
union was fined £200,000 and Scargill personally £1,000 for contempt of court and 
on 25 October Justice Nicholls ordered the sequestration of the NUM’s assets. 
Aware of what the NGA had gone through, the NUM had moved much of its money 
overseas, including into Swiss bank accounts. The NUM had been expecting 
sequestration and had prepared for it (Milne 1994: 327). Like the NGA, the NUM 
continued the strike as an ‘outlaw’, collecting cash in carrier bags and using secret 
donations. Miners’ support groups across the country ‘twinned’ with individual pits 
in order to pass on cash or deliver food parcels.  
The full force of the secret state was ranged against the miners’ union (Milne 1994). 
Weir (1986: 135-136), however, believed that it was not the law that defeated the 
miners’ strike, it was the miners themselves who went back to work. “They did that 
because the strike was futile, not because it was illegal.”  
As with the Messenger dispute attempts to widen the action beyond the mining 
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industry proved unsuccessful leaving some to blame the TUC for its defeat. The NUM 
had refused to allow the TUC any direction in the dispute fearing it would seek a 
settlement unacceptable to it.  
The miners’ positional power was being diminished by strike breakers and its 
associational power divided over the strike’s legitimacy without a ballot, the 
impotence of other unions to garner industrial support, a hostile media and the 
force of the state through the police and courts. 
For this research, John Monks reflected on the defeat for trade unions:  
The regiments were knocked off, they were put in their place. Not without 
power and influence but by the end of it we were not a threat to anybody, 
other than the Labour Party – with the money and the political votes. I think 
we knew a defeat when we saw one and they knew a victory when they saw 
one. We don’t know how much there was a grand plan behind it. If you talk 
to some of the senior Conservatives around at the time there wasn’t really a 
grand plan. There were bits of it, like Ridley on coal stocks. They knew there 
would be a showdown on coal at some stage. 
The trade unions were in the premier league of influencers, leaders in the 
country and after the miners’ strike, we were relegated and we’ve been 
relegated ever since. At the moment we are barely in the Championship. 
Things like zero hours contracts, low living standards, inequality are about 
trade union weakness. That is the significance of our relegation and loss of 
members (interview 12.3.2015). 
 
Chapter conclusion 
This chapter studied the reflections of the participants for this research, contrasting 
it with the assessments made in the contemporary literature.  
It confirmed the significance of the Messenger dispute in establishing the 
employment laws and breaking the union policy of outright non-compliance. The 
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step-by-step approach of the Conservative Government secured its first major 
success and whether as a direct consequence or coincidence further steps were 
pursued through the banning of unions at GCHQ and more restrictive legislation. 
As the dispute emboldened the Government it had a similar, if not immediate effect 
on employers, especially in the newspaper industry. The research has found no 
evidence that Shah was being used or manipulated by government or other parties 
to breach the union’s defences but once underway those who supported the assault 
on trade union power sought to back the independent businessman. In the 
aftermath of the dispute Shah proved a useful Trojan Horse, especially for News 
International, by developing a new national newspaper that by-passed the printing 
unions. Messenger was to prove a test-bed for police tactics and court actions 
against the miners. 
The chapter reviewed how the NGA evaluated the defeat. The research confirmed 
how the NGA’s leadership successfully deflected blame onto the TUC in its refusal to 
back the union. The dispute justified those who argued that government policies 
discouraging negotiated settlements to disputes and made conflict more likely 
(Gennard 1984). 
The post-mortem argued over whether the dispute was the best ground on which to 
wage a battle over the new employment laws. This thesis argues that the hill on 
which the union had to fight had already been lost but its leadership had little choice 
but support the six strikers and came under intense pressure from its activist and 
office base to prosecute the dispute using its traditional methods.  
Any recognition that the NGA had to do more to reach out to new workers, 
especially women, came too late to turn the tide that was to sweep over it during 
the next few years.  





After attending a number of retirement parties, I realised I had been the youngest of 
a cohort of NGA officials and activists who lived and worked through events that 
traumatised the union in the early 1980s. It was a period that was to shake the 
foundations of not just the powerful print unions but the whole trade union 
movement. I was an activist and Father of the Chapel in 1980 and in 1983 the 
youngest elected officer of the NGA. I went on to become the South West Regional 
Secretary of the TUC.  
Encouraged to research and write the story of these events, I set about unearthing 
archives and interviewing those I knew had been involved. My career helped open 
doors and gain access to participants and, with the help of my university, the union’s 
archives that had been locked away for 70 years.  
The thesis is partly a historic account with fresh revelations about events and partly 
contemporary industrial relations research. The research examined two contrasting 
case studies involving the NGA in the early 1980s. It was a model of a craft union 
with significant positional power and had built up highly effective organisational 
strength. These clashed directly with technological change and the Conservative 
political project to diminish the effectiveness of trade unions. 
This research sets out to answer the following questions: 
• What factors underpin positional and organisational power and how did the 
changing environment of the early 1980s impact upon them? 
• What was the NGA’s capacity for strategic choice and how far did legal, 
political and technological change constrain it? 
• What new knowledge can be gleaned from the NGA case as to the role of the 
state and police in industrial relations? 
• Where did decision-making lie within the NGA between national, branch and 
chapel levels and were there tensions between them? 
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• Does a constant tension exist between rank-and-file members and their 
union leaders? 
• To what extent was the NGA’s strong collective occupational identity and 
solidarity based on sectionalism and how far was this a constraint in its 
survival?  
• What contribution do the features outlined above add to the wider debate 
over the future of trade unions? 
The NGA was a well-organised craft union at the zenith of its powers in 1980 but by 
1983 the challenges posed by unemployment, technology, industrial, political and 
legal change exposed vulnerabilities.  
The first case study in 1980 was a national campaign for an improvement in pay and 
conditions and was led by a strong and decisive leadership. It was able to mobilise 
the membership and resources to conduct an innovative action that exploited the 
competitive nature of the printing industry and successfully secured its objectives. 
Just three years later, the Messenger dispute proved a turning-point not just for the 
NGA but for British industrial relations, pre-empting the 1984-85 miners’ strike and 
the Wapping dispute.  
Since the 1980s, the NGA and many other occupational specific unions have merged 
into more general, conglomerate unions. This poses questions as to the consequent 
loss of collective identity based upon the job role and suggests further research into 
this feature of trade unionism. 
The research found collective occupational identity to be a strong organisational 
power resource for trade unions but it can prove a double-edged sword for unions 
facing significant change. Solidarity based upon sectionalism can be a highly 
successful for those on the inside but its exclusion can prove a source of conflict and 
division within the wider trade union movement. 
The model of craft unionism, with its emphasis on self-reliance from the employer 
and ‘cradle-to-grave’ membership proved a successful model to build strong 
organisation strength and with it came enhanced capacity for leadership and 
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strategic choice. But this model relies upon a stable occupational structure based on 
the means of production and its technology.   
 
Positional and organisational power 
• What factors underpin positional and organisational power and how did the 
changing environment of the early 1980s impact upon them? 
For the NGA up to the 1980s, positional power flowed from its control of key parts of 
the printing production process. At workplace level, leverage came from its capacity 
to deny the employer essential skills and stop the job. This was based on age-old 
technology and the system of apprentice recruitment (Musson 1954, Child 1967, 
Gennard 1990). 
The NGA’s positional and organisational strength were mutually self-reinforcing. 
Overwhelming membership density was buttressed through the closed shop. Cradle-
to-grave benefits, especially for those out of work provided generous support and 
fortified the union’s control of labour. These in turn built social capital from 
membership networks and enhanced internal democracy. Winning almost all 
appropriate workers into union membership was achieved through measures, 
positive and negative, between the union and the recruits – not between the union 
and the employer (Dunn 1985). The employer was largely forced to accept the fact 
that the workforce needed was in the union. 
Much of the power of the NGA relied on solidarity support across an inter-connected 
industry. NGA members were used to a time-honoured rule that they should not 
handle work going to or coming from a company in dispute with the union (Gennard 
1990). As confirmed by the interviews with a number of activists and officers, 
chapels didn’t even need explicit instructions to ‘black’ work, and they reacted in a 
traditional manner to a notice informing them of a dispute.  
The tight and effective networks gave the union's leaders with the deep knowledge 
of the industry, its key employers, technological change and membership attitudes. 
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This research found that these factors made possible the leadership's strategic 
decision to wage a major campaign in 1980 to achieve significant advances in paying 
and working time. 
The leadership took a calculated decision to embark on such a bold campaign 
believing that it had to act before the technological, legal and economic 
environment turned against it (Dubbins interview 2017). It knew it faced a hostile 
climate and without being forced by rank-and-file pressure pursued a successful 
campaign mobilising the membership as required. This does not decry or downplay 
the important of agitation from below (Darlington 1994, 2018, McIllroy 1990, 1991, 
2009) but it is not a pre-requisite and the study demonstrates the capacity for 
strategic action led from the top. 
Its positional, or structural power, meant the NGA could go it alone in 1980. 
Members of other printing unions had voted to accept the employers’ offer and 
remained at work – and paid – an additional financial pressure on businesses. 
Despite opposition from other union leaders to the NGA action, their members 
gained from the success of the dispute through reduced hours and differential pay 
knock-ons (Gennard 1990). The dispute shows the complicated nature of sectional 
bargaining and the difficult balance between positional strength at critical points in 
the production process and wider workforce unity. Having a union to cover all 
workers doesn’t prevent it from organising selective action to exert maximum 
pressure on the employer but it dilutes membership density and weakens 
organisational power. 
As predicted, the fortunes of the NGA suffered in the years after 1980 with 
economic, political and technological factors undermining its positional power and 
organisational strength. In 1983 it faced a threat to its closed shop from an 
independent newspaper publisher, Eddy Shah. Despite poor prospects of success, 
the union embarked upon strike action that escalated under its own momentum, 
driven by inflated self-belief and the passion of the union’s activist democracy. 
The combination of an independent employer, not reliant on unionised resources 
with the ability to exploit new technology to by-pass the NGA, defeated the union’s 
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traditional method of strike action and ‘blacking’. It was non-unionists using new 
technology that beat the union but the significance of the dispute lies in Shah’s use 
of the new employment laws against the NGA. 
The dispute highlighted the fundamental need for a union to be able to stop the job 
in industrial action – the core of positional power. Without it, the case showed the 
weakness of other forms of power especially for a union not used to having to win 
allies or rely on institutional protection from the law. 
 
Capacity for strategic choice 
• What was the NGA’s capacity for strategic choice and how far did legal, 
political and technological change constrain it? 
The contrasting case studies show how the changing environment impacted upon 
the union’s capacity for strategic choice. The 1980 dispute was an exercise in 
leadership pursuing a strategic objective. Its success reinforced the sense of 
invincibility and bolstered the cohort of branch officers and activists that 
represented a powerful force within the democratic structures of the complicated 
federation that made up the NGA. 
The thesis argues that these ‘strengths’ prevented the leadership from considering 
any accommodation with the new employment laws of 1980 and 1982 and led it to 
escalate its actions when faced with Shah’s determination to by-pass the union. 
The dispute was notable in forcing unions to accept the rule of a law hostile to their 
traditional actions. It extinguished the hope that the strategy of obstruction would 
render the laws ineffective would prove successful for the unions as they had been 
in the 1970s. The research shows the tight, collective body of activists and wider 
membership of the NGA found it difficult to adjust its position without being forced 
to do so by an external crisis. The evidence shows that there was no deliberation 
over any sort of accommodation with the law, the only strategic choice offered was 
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outright defiance. When this policy failed it was easier to deflect the blame to the 
TUC.  
This research concludes, however, that the new Employment Laws were not as 
significant in the union’s defeat as both sides present it. Shah successfully continued 
to produce newspapers despite strike action, blacking instructions, pressure on 
investors and the mass picket. Measuring the extent to which the new laws gave 
Shah the confidence to do this is confused by contradictory evidence from him. He 
boasts of making advance preparations including threatening to utilise the laws but 
also claims ignorance of the new laws until the strike was underway. 
Exactly at what stage he prepared to take legal action is not clear from the research 
with contradictory statements. Shah claimed there were discussions over using the 
laws as early as 1981 and he had apparently restructured the company to strengthen 
his position against secondary action (Goodhart and Wintour 1986: 127). The 
Conservative Party archives, recently released, cite Shah as preparing in the event of 
the NGA calling a stoppage. His early warnings to the union may have been bluff and 
bluster but his later claim that he stumbled across the law after the strike had 
started seems implausible. Once the dispute began Shah was keen to be portrayed 
as the victim of union bullying rather than the instigator of the conflict. 
The TUC had argued that the new laws would encourage employers to confront 
unions rather than seek compromise agreements (TUC 1982) and this appears to be 
borne out by the Messenger experience. But this research concludes the truth is not 
that clear cut. Shah gives credit to the law for his victory and the union cites the law 
for its defeat. Both sides had interests to take this position. Making the new law the 
principle issue of the dispute was the NGA’s only hope of getting wider trade union 
support. Once on the escalator of court actions, however, it found no escape. For 
Shah, the circumstances offered an open goal. With the union declaring its refusal to 
comply with the law, Shah had nothing to lose in pursuing court action. The dispute 
made him a national figure, a hero of the Right and was the launchpad for the 
project to establish the new national colour newspaper, Today (Goodhart and 
Wintour 1986) which was a Trojan horse for News International’s move to Wapping. 
The threads that followed the Messenger dispute can now be clearly traced.  
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As seen from the minutes and union’s own journal, the NGA blamed the new laws 
and lack of TUC backing for its defeat. Yet it used all its traditional industrial tactics in 
defiance of the laws and still failed to stop Shah’s production and lead him to reach a 
resolution. Although rare, Shah wasn’t the first to bypass the NGA using the latest 
technology.  
As the research shows, the laws were constructed to empower individual employers 
to pursue civil actions, especially the use of injunctions to restrain union actions. 
Given a union’s refusal to comply, the laws of contempt of court apply. This led to 
the unprecedented use of sequestration powers. 
This research has been able to outline the measures the union took to continue to 
function during its sequestration. The contemporary literature was unable to chart 
this as the NGA would have been understandably reluctant to disclose details of new 
bank accounts set up to hide the money and the stashes of cash held in underground 
safes around the country.  
Through my special access to the participants I have been able to show how the NGA 
survived under sequestration through the inventiveness of its chapel representatives 
and officers, cooperation of the members and financial and administrative assistance 
from other unions. It required a considerable degree of trust and discipline amongst 
the membership and its officials at every level to switch to cash transactions and 
clandestine methods of financing the operation of the union. It was, however, not 
sustainable beyond a few weeks and almost inconceivable today. 
The union was surprised when not only national funds were seized but also the 
quasi-independent branch and chapel funds. Gennard (1984: 17) noted the court 
ruling to free the accounts of the Manchester Graphical Society on condition it 
handed over national funds. He raised the idea of a non-centrally funded union able 
to live with sequestration and the spectre of a bankrupt national union leaving 
employers to deal with 120 independent branches. Loose, unofficial groups of 
workers able to flout or dodge regulations and the stifling of union bureaucracies 
might appear attractive to some but such an approach cannot offer the sort of 
assistance expected in today’s employment relations let alone develop the sort of 
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collective organisation sustained by unions. 
Chapter Four reviewed the background to this period, especially the debates inside 
the Conservative Party on industrial relations reform. It settled on a step-by-step 
attack on union power but there is no evidence that Shah was part of a pre-planned 
attack or conspiracy. The laws had simply provided the framework within which an 
employer could challenge a union. The Government provided employers with the 
ammunition without knowing who would be the first to fire. The Conservatives had a 
plan to develop a more and more restrictive legal framework on unions, but it would 
be wrong to conclude they had the sequence fully mapped out with a clear 
destination in mind. It was an opportunistic process adding layers every time they 
could. 
The Government pursued an ‘arms-length’ or non-interventionist policy in regard to 
disputes between employers and unions and stressed the role of management 
prerogative (Dorey 1995). This was in contrast to the earlier Industrial Relations Act 
legislation where direct government actions led to it being the target for trade union 
opposition (Undy et al 2011). Previous governments had accepted responsibility to 
seek resolutions to significant industrial conflicts and the Conservative assessment 
found this drew ministers into being blamed and led to the adoption of the role of 
unions and compromise with them. The new government approach sought to rely on 
employer actions leaving it to stand aside.  
This study has shown how this approach caused confusion at the start of the 
Messenger dispute. Government records show how ministers were unsure of how to 
respond and Shah took this non-intervention as indifference and a lack of support. 
Union activists, on the other hand, claimed the union was a victim of an orchestrated 
campaign of attack by an employer in league with the Government. The NGA 
leadership had been warning its members to anticipate a coming battle with an 
employer using the new laws. It felt it was on the Government’s hit-list of unions to 
be brought down. Most of the participants on the NGA side gave evidence of the 
sense of wider conspiracy against the union. It demonstrates the danger of making 
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events fit a pre-determined narrative even if the final outcome appears to fit the 
hypothesis. 
Dickinson (1984: 31) shared the view taken by the union that the clause in the law to 
stop action against non-union firms was authored by the British Printing Industries 
Federation that was still reeling from its defeat against the NGA in 1980 and eager to 
restrict the union’s tactic of ‘blacking’ work from non-union sources. He presents the 
conflict as a premeditated action by the employer, with apparent government 
backing, to break the union but was unaware of the initial ministerial confusion and 
hesitation.  
Shah was a keen Conservative but had few political connections and no contact with 
government before the strike began. Much was made of his brief encounter with 
Thatcher but there is no evidence that this was anything more than proof of his 
political leanings rather than a conspiracy between them. The mechanisms were in 
place and the encouragements made for a small employer such to challenge unions 
but this did not mean that Shah was directly supported by the Government. 
 
Role of the state and police in industrial relations 
• What new knowledge can be gleaned from the NGA case as to the role of the 
state and police in industrial relations? 
The Messenger dispute demonstrated the reach of the courts, the fresh resolve and 
enhanced resources of the police. The small chapel organised a picket of their 
workplace from the outset of the dispute but it failed to persuade anyone else in 
Messenger Newspapers to support the strike. The journalists were initially drawn 
into the dispute but soon opted to work normally. The new law permitted strikers to 
only picket their direct place of work but Shah’s production involved a number of 
premises, perhaps deliberately. For some months the dispute dragged on with little 
impact. It wasn’t until Shah won court orders against the union that the dispute 
exploded. In response, the union decided to focus upon a mass blockade of the 
Messenger printing plant at Warrington, further ignoring the legal restrictions. This 
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was not a picket to persuade workers to join the strike but an attempt to physically 
blockade the printing plant to prevent a time-critical product from leaving. 
Shah describes feeling beleaguered by government, police and media at the start of 
the dispute. Reviewing the evidence around the initial period of the dispute he has 
grounds for such a view. Dubbins believed that the police were deliberately playing a 
low-key role. Shah took the lack of police presence to be a further demonstration of 
the lack of establishment support. 
The confidential papers seen by this research expose the tension in policy between 
non-intervention and the over-arching objective of undermining union power. The 
conflict took ministers and police by surprise and they were reluctant to get drawn 
into it. The records uncovered by this research show how the police found Shah a 
difficult and unpredictable character to deal with. Shah credits Andrew Neil, the then 
editor of the Sunday Times, and his local Conservative MP for their lobbying of the 
Prime Minister and Home Secretary. The union’s decision to escalate the mass picket 
brought it hostile headlines over violent struggles with the police which ministers 
were eager to exaggerate and condemn the actions. 
There was little consideration given to the potential consequences of building a mass 
picket against TUC advice. The NGA had used the tactic in previous disputes with 
mixed results111 and the membership of skilled print workers were not, especially on 
their own, going to supply sufficient numbers of people to overpower a determined 
police operation. Since 1983, the tactics of mass protest and their policing have 
changed significantly including through the miners’ strike, anti-Poll Tax actions and 
climate change protests. The questions these raise are for other researchers to 
pursue. 
The police action to seize and immobilise the union’s communications van prompted 
questions in Parliament and complaints from the union. The evidence from those in 
close proximity – including the author – show the police lied about their actions on 
the night but also how the story became exaggerated in the telling by union activists. 
	
111 Disputes at Parrett and Neves 1968, Sharman’s 1975, TB Foreman 1979,  
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Interviews with people who attended the largest protest highlight their surprise at 
police tactics and the level of force used against them. The violent picket-line scenes 
on the night of the 29/30 November, proved a critical point in the dispute. Lang and 
Dodkins in Bad News (2011) claim the police ordered the arc lights turned off to 
prevent filming. Interviewees talk of police smashing cameras and shutting down 
filming. In this pre-mobile phone era, the police had greater control over where and 
what photographers could film. Footage of baton-wielding police may have 
presented different images from those taken from behind police lines. There is a gap 
in the photographic record of that night, the few hours between the immobilising of 
the communications vehicle and the first van leaving the premises with printed 
newspapers. This was the time when police charged into the crowd and dispersed 
people over a wide area. Further research is needed to answer whether this was the 
result of deliberate police tactic to sabotage and prevent photographers from 
working or a result of the pace of operations catching people off guard. 
The police tactics, equipment and deployment at Warrington showed they had 
learned the lessons of the 1972 mass picket at the Saltley coke depot in Birmingham 
when pickets overwhelmed the police and were resolved not to be defeated by 
weight of numbers (Monks interview 2015).  
This thesis does not share the view that the union could have secured a resolution 
had it mobilised more pickets given greater support from the TUC. The mass picket 
was perhaps the tactic of last resort but the union had to balance its potential 
impact with the loss of public opinion. It is clear that the police had reserve capacity 
to deal with a much larger protest. Attempts to blockade the printing factory failed 
not because of the Employment Acts or the lack of protesters but due to the robust 
police response. The decision to call off the picket was inevitable. For Shah, the siege 





Tensions in union decision-making 
• Where did decision-making lie within the NGA between national, branch and 
chapel levels and were there tensions between them? 
The thesis examined the formation and development of the printing craft unions and 
the central role played by the chapel and local society. Chapter Three reviewed how 
the union’s organisational strength came from its positional power and its collective 
identity across the craft was not restricted to the individual workplace. It was the 
need to regulate the assistance to out-of-work members that led to the 
establishment of the first national typographical union and in its formation the local 
societies retained a high degree of independence (Musson 1954). As shown in 
Chapter Seven, this fragmented structure added confusion to the decision-making 
when dealing with an employer with sites across three different society areas. The 
tiers of power: chapel, branch and national union were key to encouraging and 
accommodating high membership participation and democratic oversight. The 
research, however, considered the differences and tensions between them during a 
period of conflict and change. 
In large newspapers the industrial power was exerted more independently at chapel 
level. The power of the chapel sometimes superseded that of the national union 
(Blissett 2013) and this could restrict the authority of the national union to take 
strategic choices. ‘Unofficial’ action in a time-critical production process was in the 
hands of chapel officers despite efforts by the employer and union to constrain it 
through procedural arrangements.  This positional power at chapel level was 
supplemented by the organisational strength of the union and its capacity to enforce 
controls through the recruitment process and secondary action. This was largely 
orchestrated at branch level through its complex federated structure. The union was 
not a simple hierarchical structure with an oligarchic leadership and these case 
studies demonstrate a much complex set of relationships than outlined by Michels 
(1962). 
The 1980 campaign conducted by the NGA proved an example of a national 
leadership determining a strategic approach to achieve substantial advances for its 
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members and executing an industrial action campaign with imaginative tactics. This 
was not an action demanded by grass-roots power but one where the leadership had 
to win over and mobilise membership support for its plans. It did so by relying on the 
traditional discipline and collective support of the membership. The leadership 
successfully mobilised members deploying arguments over the unfairness of a 
stagnating minimum wage rate and the case for a shorter working week in the face 
of advancing technology. The tactic confirms the basis of Kelly’s mobilisation theory 
which lays stress on the need to exploit a grievance or sense of injustice. 
Personalities and micro-politic factors cannot be over-looked as Blisset (2013) 
believes them often to be. The chief architect of the 1980 campaign was the rising 
figure of Tony Dubbins, the then Assistant General Secretary. He was a shrewd 
negotiator and strategist, keen to make his mark in the union ahead of the 
impending retirement of the General Secretary. The research touches on the 
tensions between the powerful personalities at the start of the Messenger dispute 
and how decisions to escalate the dispute were made in an almost ad hoc manner in 
the haze of drink and passion at a tense conference of union delegates. The thesis 
agrees with Blisset that in the search for overarching theories to explain events, 
these factors cannot be ignored. 
 
Leadership and rank-and-file tensions 
• Does a constant tension exist between rank-and-file members and their 
union leaders? 
In the 1980 national printing dispute, high levels of membership participation and 
activist democracy served the union well. The evidence demonstrated a leadership 
making an assessment of the looming threats to the union and concluding the time 
was critical to mount an offensive campaign to advance pay and conditions. Such a 
campaign required a thorough knowledge of the industry, its key employers, other 
unions as well as levels of likely support at every level. The size, structure and 
discipline of the NGA allowed its leaders to calculate the potential support for such a 
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campaign, plan the tactics and assess the risks. The findings contradict those who 
argue that union leaders are under constant pressure from the rank-and-file and 
only act when pressured to do so (Darlington 2018, McIllroy 1990). 
The 1983 dispute, in contrast, was a defensive action against a small business. The 
evidence shows a lack of preparedness and risk assessment before either embarking 
on the strike or the tactics used. The thesis describes how the relationship between 
the levels within the union were complex and cannot be described in simple rank-
and-file/leadership relations. In a union of members in small workplaces, the rank-
and-fil are the chapel officers, branch delegates and other activists. The decision to 
escalate the dispute in this way was taken at a critical conference of delegates from 
the whole union. The research found that raising the stakes in the dispute was not as 
a result of a considered deliberation at the National Council or even within the 
leadership team. Passionate speeches during an emotional conference created the 
momentum that turned the dispute into a pitched battle against Shah and with it the 
Government’s reforms. This was a ‘call to arms’ that ‘bounced’ the union into 
ratcheting up the action. 
The activist and branch officer base of the union were mobilised into action and the 
evidence supports the argument that the leadership had the support of the broader 
membership. Had the leadership wanted to pursue a different or softer course of 
action, they would have faced severe internal criticism. The strength of the union’s 
internal democracy therefore restrained the leadership from adopting any variation 
from its traditional responses to the conduct of such a dispute. 
 
Collective identity and sectionalism 
• To what extent was the NGA’s strong collective occupational identity and 
solidarity based on sectionalism and how far was this a constraint in its 
survival?  
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The Messenger members had high expectations of the union’s ability to tackle their 
employer. The evidence demonstrates their loyalty to the union was far stronger 
than to their employer.   
Most participants to this research believed that had it not been Shah, it would have 
been another similar employer soon after and probably in printing. NGA members 
believed they had to defend long-standing articles of faith for themselves. Their 
passion for the struggle may have been strong but it was not shared across the wider 
trade union movement. 
Characteristics that gave the union its collective strength proved to be barriers to the 
NGA in considering alternative strategies in handling the dispute and in facing major 
industrial change. The practices used by the NGA were so hard-wired into the 
organisation it proved impossible to change.  
Cockburn argued the period brought home to the unions the damage they had 
inflicted on their own interests by sectionalism (1991: 242). It is true that the 
divisions between the unions in the industry were exploited by the employers who 
wanted none of them. It was wider factors around the ability of employers to use 
new technology to eliminate any form of effective trade unionism and it would be 
wrong to conclude that sectionalism alone was to blame. 
Gender and sectionalism 
The research reviewed the literature around gender, a vital dimension when 
studying a union with a long legacy of male dominance and female exclusion. By the 
1980s women across the workforce, including printing, were increasingly demanding 
equal access to the jobs and rewards open to men (Bradley 1999). New technology 
opened up new routes of entry to the industry, bypassing union regulated 
apprenticeships and training systems. This presented opportunities to be exploited 
by employers. Shah recruited women to operate his equipment creating a further 




Associational power and sectionalism 
In 1980 the NGA acted almost alone in its pursuit of its campaign objectives, 
calculating the employer response and largely ignoring the views of other unions. 
The contrast between the two cases studies demonstrates the relationship between 
positional and associational power. Given the ability to halt production, the NGA had 
little need to appeal for wider support for its 1980 campaign. The union in 1983 
sought support from activists to join the mass picket and wider assistance from the 
TUC. Its need for associational power flowed from its diminishing positional strength. 
But no potential alliance could bring Shah to a resolution and the dispute proved a 
demonstration of the weakness of associational power. 
Union decision-makers were swept along on the rising tide of actions until they 
faced the ultimate bankruptcy of the union. Appeals for wider industrial action were 
weakened by the union’s legacy of isolation within the trade union movement and 
divisions within the TUC. The union’s leadership refused to recognise the changed 
circumstances after the 1983 General Election that gave the Conservatives a big 
mandate. As shown in the testimonies for this study, the leadership and activist base 
rejected the realignment in the TUC towards some form of accommodation with the 
new legislation and they hoped that the mood on the TUC General Council would 
swing behind it in the heat of battle. 
Having spent much of its history as an independent, almost isolated, member of the 
wider trade union movement the new leadership took a strategic decision to 
position the union within the Left of the TUC. Dubbins could see the increasing need 
for allies and ensured that the union gave full support to the various TUC calls for 
action in a manner it failed to do in the 1970s (Gennard 1990). The loss of 
newspapers proved the most visible impact of these campaigns. But perhaps it was 
too late to establish the NGA, a small craft union, within the complex world of the 
TUC after being a semi-detached member for so long. 
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The main feature of the dispute was to protect the closed shop. Most workers, 
however, were not covered by such arrangements and much of the media had been 
running a campaign against the practice. Lloyd (1984: 33) believed that an argument 
over the closed shop was not one a convincing campaign could be based on. The 
practice might serve those inside the closed shop but not those outside it. NGA 
members supported their union’s defence of the closed shop but they had no 
narrative to gain the support of a wider audience. 
The Messenger dispute was a last redoubt for the closed shop and secondary action. 
As such its outcome was a major prize for employers seeking to break a key element 
in the union’s organisational structure. Collective identity, however, is not just 
formed through organisational structures but through the common bond of workers 
and their mutual interests. Changing technology has undermined such linkages but 
not eliminated them and has created new occupational identities. 
The NGA was not accustomed to having to make its case to the wider public. In 1980 
the national printing dispute garnered little media attention, the short conflict was 
more or less over before becoming a news story. In stark contrast, the Messenger 
dispute became the main news of the day for several weeks.  
The study concludes that the NGA were poorly equipped to engage in a publicity 
campaign to back up its cause against Shah. It had not had to defend its practices to 
the wider public and was unaccustomed to the glare of a largely hostile media. The 
NGA produced materials to make its case, clumsy at best, racist at worst, using 
Shah’s birth name of ‘Salim Jehan Shah’.  
Reviewed by this research, the press seemed confused by the strike at first. The 
Daily Mail ran a daily diet dripping with bile against trade union power yet gave a 
reasonably balanced coverage of the Messenger dispute. Shah believes this to flow 
from what he saw as the cowardice of the national press to confront the power of 
the print unions. Perhaps ironically, the Daily Mail was also the newspaper that 
advertised job vacancies within the printing industry and was much read by print 
workers. The Northcliffe Group that owned the Daily Mail also owned the largest 
group of provincial newspapers. It did not join the group of national newspapers that 
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sacked union reps who refused to guarantee normal working during the Messenger 
dispute (Gennard 1990). 
National newspaper owners had a very real interest in the outcome of the 
Messenger dispute but their conflicted role was not straightforward. What is clear 
that after an initial hesitancy, the main national newspapers saw the value for their 
interests in Shah’s defeat of the NGA. There is no evidence to directly link Fleet 
Street employers with Shah, with the exception of the contacts between him and 
Andrew Neil, the then editor of the Sunday Times. Neil hated the print unions and 
despaired at the timidity and weakness of management. He saw Shah as the outsider 
needed to breach their defences.  
The politics of national newspaper ownership were complex and even though 
employers shared the desire to eliminate union power, their self-interests and short-
term demands conflicted with collaborative action. The National Newspapers 
consistently failed to unite in the face of the unions (Lang and Dodkins 2011). 
Goodhart and Wintour said: “If solidarity is food and drink to the chapels, it is 
anathema to management” (1986: 40).  
Rather than militant unions eager to take on the Government’s employment laws, 
this study found the Fleet Street chapels were reluctant to get involved and could 
see greater battles looming for themselves. Dubbins admitted that they stopped 
work for two days, not as a spontaneous reaction as claimed, but after an argument 
and instruction from the union’s leaders. 
 
Contribution to wider debate 
• What contribution do the features outlined above add to the wider debate 
over the future of trade unions? 
It is without doubt that the legal restrictions now placed upon unions, embedded 
after the 1983 Messenger dispute, have limited the options for union leaders. A 
range of tactics once deployed to enforce union power has been outlawed, others 
have become conditional on an extensive matrix of regulation. The 1983 Messenger 
	 286	
dispute highlighted how much the post-1980 employment laws had proscribed union 
actions and the step-by-step process has continued since then during every 
Conservative-led administration. This study concludes, however, that the strike was 
lost due to the NGA’s inability to stop production and not directly because of new 
legislation. To blame the legal framework entirely for the demise of union 
membership and power would be a flawed conclusion. 
The research argues that strong occupational identity and the features that were 
developed from it helped build unions such as the NGA. These have largely been 
jettisoned as amalgamations have taken place. This model of union serves workers 
with a particular and specialist skill or job role. It especially suits those with career 
occupations where the union can develop or build upon training and member 
networks. Occupational identity, however, can still be used to support workers in 
less skilled job roles such as the recent example of the IWGB mobilising delivery 
riders.112 The debate over union strategic choice needs to include options to utilise 
occupational identity and common bonds to fit a modern labour market. 
Leaders of unions with a narrow occupational focus have the ability to be more 
focused and chart a longer-term course developed with the support of grass-roots 
activists. This can be a double-edged sword as they are vulnerable to structural 
change or from a short-term crisis given they lack the ability to spread the risk over 
multiple sectors. 
When the traditional methods of industrial action used by the NGA failed, it turned 
to mobilising support from the wider trade union movement. It had to overcome 
years of indifference by the union to the workings of the TUC. Coalition-building is 
not an easy option and brings challenges when unions try to do it as an adjunct to 
their primary function. Effective coalitions are those developed over a long time with 
reciprocal benefits. They cannot be switched on and off to suit the short-term 
interests of a group of union members in conflict with their employer. Coalition 
	
112 See https://iwgb.org.uk 
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requires a degree of ideological compromise that union leaders may find 
unacceptable or unpalatable.  
Academic debates over mobilisation (Kelly 1998) focus largely upon recruiting and 
organising workers towards collective actions. It has given little attention to how 
best to sustain collective bodies beyond periods of grievance. This research shows 
that sustained collective strength requires high density membership in the 
workplace drawn together by a range of benefits and activities and not all 
dependent upon the relationship with the employer. 
Social movement theories (Holgate 2014) make the case for wider community and 
campaign alliances to bolster union influence. These ideas expand the sense of 
collective identity beyond the boundaries of the job and the workplace. This requires 
a strategic choice by union leaders to allocate the necessary time and resources into 
partnership working and needs relationship-building and policy compromises. This 
research has shown how a sectionalist union, proud of its self-reliance, found such 
activities hard to progress and opted to pursue amalgamation as the strategy for 
survival. 
Since the time of these case studies the printing industry has shrunk and trade union 
membership diminished. There is now little collective bargaining and membership 
density well below the days of the closed shop (Dawson 2014). Joining a much larger 
union promised a stronger political influence, in part to repeal the laws set in motion 
in 1980113. But membership has fallen and government measures to tighten trade 
union actions continues. 
 
In conclusion 
The research highlights the pivotal period when union’s strategy to resist new 
restrictive laws through outright opposition was defeated. The new legislation 
reduced the union capacity to act in the interests of their members in ways they had 
	
113 Amalgamation proposals for the formation of GPMU, Amicus and Unite 
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traditionally operated and were expected. Unions now search for methods to 
restore their position and some believe renewal can only come if the employment 
laws are repealed. This research, however, argues that a proposition that the 
employment laws are the main cause of decline is flawed and will lead unions to rely 
on political remedies without success.  
The rhetoric of challenging or opposing unfair trade union laws is still heard and the 
lessons of this research are worthy of consideration when this course of action is 
raised. Some activists today know little of the experience of the time when outright 
repudiation of the law was the union stance. This study looks afresh at this period 
and draws valuable lessons relevant today. 
The hard truth for the NGA was that its positional power had been removed by 
changing technology and the ability of an employer to recruit non-union workers. 
The dispute demonstrated the weakness of associational power with the failure of 
alliance-building inside the TUC to bring any weight to bear on the employer. 
The lessons drawn from this study provide a useful contribution to the debate over 
union renewal and whether sufficient attention has been paid to the value of strong 
collective identity built through shared occupational interests and the notion of 
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NGA National Council 1-2 April 1980 
Account of wage negotiations 
Copies of letters from SLADE and SOGAT regarding dispute 
NGA Special National Council 24 April 1980 
Account of wage negotiations and national dispute 
NGA National Council 6-9 May 1980 
Account of wage negotiations and national dispute 
Copies of letters from NATSOPA and SOGAT regarding dispute 
NGA Special National Council 13 May 1980 
Copy of circular to all branches regarding settlement with Newspaper Society 
Copy of circular to all branches regarding BPIF dispute 
Copy of letter from BPIF to all its members regarding dispute 
Copy of notice calling on artists not to pay dispute levy 
NGA Delegate Meeting From 27 June 1982 
Verbatim report including report of 1980 BPIF National Wage Agreement, 
trade union legislation, work by-passing the composing room and address by 
Len Murray TUC General Secretary 
NGA Women’s Participation Committee 3 March 1983 
 Megan Dobney elected Chair 
NGA Work By-Passing the Composing Room Committee 17 March 1983 
 Review policy, evidence from US 
TUC Printing Committee – Free Newspapers March 1983 
 Review of growth in free papers, Messenger News mentioned 
NGA National Council May 1983 
Warning of pending dispute with Messenger Newspapers 
Report of meeting between officers and Shah of 16 May 
Report of meeting with Messengers members 29 April 
SOGAT Delegate Conference May 1983 
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 Verbatim report including motion on NGA encroachment on SOGAT areas of 
work 
NGA Executive 13 June 
Report on Messenger dispute – endorsement of dispute pay 
NGA National Council 29-30 June 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute 
Copies of correspondence with Shah 
Report from Stockport Graphical Society from Messenger chapel meeting 
Motion from Liverpool Graphical Society on trade union laws 
NGA National Council 10-11 August 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute, Reed to dispose of shareholding, writ from 
Messenger, agreed to seek TUC advice, report on new laws, agreed to 
maintain opposition 
NGA Executive 1 September 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute, ACAS talks breakdown, doubts over TUC 
support 
Confidential report on first meeting on amalgamation talks with SOGAT 
TUC Annual Congress September 1983 
 Verbatim minutes 
 TUC Annual Report 1983 
NGA National Council 21-22 September 
 Report on Messenger dispute, writ on NUJ 
 Tony Dubbins declared General Secretary Elect 
Financial Report 
Report on relations with Newspaper Society, Project Breakthrough, rise in 
free newspapers 
NGA National Council 13 October 1983 
 Report on Messenger dispute 
NGA National Council 3-4 November 1983 
 Report on Messenger dispute 
NGA Special Delegate Meeting 5-6 November 1983 
 Verbatim report including call for support on Messenger picket-line 
NGA, NUJ and SOGAT Organising Committee 
 Leaflet to welcome people to Messenger demonstrations 
 Notice regarding strike-breakers at Messenger and appeal for support 
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TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee 21 November 1983 
 Debate over support for NGA in Messenger Dispute 
NGA Special National Council 22 November 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute 
Draft agreement 
Notes of legal judgement regarding Messengers Newspapers 
Letter of concern from Manchester Graphical Society 
North West Regional Council of the TUC: letter of support 
Copy of legal advice from Kershaw 
Various messages and motions of support 
Copy of TUC Press Statement 
Maps of Messenger Newspaper plant in Warrington 
Newsletter Dispute Extra – call for mass picket support 
TUC General Council 23 November 1983 
 Report on NGA Messenger dispute 
TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee 28-29 November 1983 
 Debate over support for NGA in Messenger Dispute 
TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee 2 December 1983 
 Debate over support for NGA in Messenger Dispute 
TUC General Council 2 December 1983 
Statement on Messenger dispute 
NGA Special National Council 2 December 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute 
SOGAT Bristol Branch Committee 5 December 1983 
 Motion of support for NGA and details of coaches to the picket 
NGA National Council 10 December 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute 
Circular to all branches on Messenger dispute 
 NGA Press Statements 
Merseyside Trade Union and Labour Campaign Committee 
 Appeal for financial support for those facing fines over Messenger picket 
TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee 12 December 1983 
 Agreed to give support to NGA, later denounced by General Secretary 
NGA National Council 13 December 1983 
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Report on Messenger dispute 
Legal advice on dispute 
TUC General Council 14 December 1983 
 TUC Press Statement 
NGA National Council 15 December 1983 
Report on Messenger dispute 
NGA leaflet ‘Solidarity not Sympathy’ critic of TUC position 
NGA – PRINT journal, January 1984 
TUC Employment Policy and Organisation Committee 6 January 1984 
Report on Messenger dispute 
SOGAT Bristol Branch Committee 9 January 1984 
 Note of financial support to NGA 
NGA National Council 18-19 January 1984 
Report on Messenger dispute 
 TUC circular regarding TUC Strategy 
NGA National Council March 1984 
 Report by Tony Dubbins on New Technology 
NGA National Council 24 April 1984 
 Notice of expulsions of Messenger Newspapers’ management including Eddy 
Shah 
SOGAT Delegate Conference May 1984 
Verbatim report including motion on new technology, NGA and Messenger 
dispute 
TUC Annual Congress September 1984 
 Verbatim minutes 
 TUC Annual Report 1984 including account of NGA Messenger Newspapers 
dispute 
NGA Delegate Meeting 5-9 November 1984 





Conservative Party archives  
 
 
Confidential papers used in this study, held at the Bodleian Library Oxford, now 
available to researchers following the ’30-year-rule- and an application process. 
    
Type Date From To Subject 









Briefing 19.1.78 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Stepping Stones 
Programme 
Memo 4.4.78   What socialism 
really means – 
need to 
recalibrate 
Memo 17.1.79 Utley, Peter 
Daily Telegraph 












News-cutting n/d Sunday Times  Opposition to 
closed shop 





25.7.79 Centre for Policy 
Studies 
 Trade union 
finances 
Memo 26.7.79 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Trade union 
finances 
Briefing 13.8.79 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Role and 
responsibilities 
of trade unions 
Memo 22.2.80 Utley, Peter 
Daily Telegraph 
Howarth, Alan Strikes in 
essential 
industries 
Memo 25.2.80 Shipley, Peter 
Conservative 
Research Dept. 
Howarth, Alan Strikes in 
essential 
industries 
Memo 26.3.80 Conservative 
Research Dept. 





Memo 30.7.80 Shipley, Peter 
Conservative 
Research Dept. 
Howarth, Alan The state of the 
unions 
Transcript n/d   Shrewsbury 
pickets 
Evidence at trial 
Briefing n/d   List of links 
between unions 
and the USSR 







Note n/d Hoskyns, John  Policies to 
outflank union 
leaders 








Briefing 14.3.83 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Green Paper 
Democracy in 
Trade Unions 









Briefing 1.12.83 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Notes on NGA 
Dispute 
Briefing 8.11.83 Conservative 
Research Dept. 
 Trade Union Bill 
Briefing 11.5.84 Conservative 
Research Dept. 





Internal government documents 
 
 
Policing of Warrington Messenger Dispute 
In response to request under the Freedom of Information Act the following 
documents were released: 
    
Type Date From To Subject Comments 
Letter 4.2.80 Nott, John, 












Letter 20.10.80 Nott, John, 































Hansard 23.11.83   Statement on 
















Draft reply to 
Question 
 

















“do not trust 
Shah” 
 



























Memo 25.11.83 Redacted, 
Private 
Secretary 
Redacted Record of 
phone call with 
Mongomery 
MP over Shah’s 
concerns 
 












Memo 28.11.83 Redacted Redacted 
Home Office 


















































Memo 29.11.83 Redacted, 
Home Office 
F4 Division 
Redacted Picketing  







Note 29.11.83 Office of SoS 
Employment 
 Draft statement 
to House 
 





Redacted Reference to 
making letter to 













Note 30.11.83 anonymous  Transcript of 
interview with 
Robin Day and 
Joe Wade, 
World at One 
 
Telex 30.11.83 anonymous  Account of 
comments 


























of picket and 
NGA van 
 




























Memo 2.12.83 Redacted 
Private 
Secretary 
Redacted Concerns over 
Shah’s safety 
 
Memo 2.12.83 Redacted 
Private 
Secretary 
Redacted Prosecution for 
incitement 
 

































Memo 12.12.83 Lord Elton SoS Payment of 
pickets 
 







Memo 12.12.83 Redacted 
F4 Division, 
Home Office 
Redacted Report on 
picket 
 






Notes for PNQs  












Memo 13.12.83 Redacted 
Private 
Secretary 



















Memo 14.12.83 Redacted 
F4 Division, 
Home Office 












to Home Office 
 
Report Nd anonymous  Briefing on 
government 
policy on the 
dispute 
 








































Cost of policing 
of dispute 
 










Note 16.1.83 Redacted 
F4 Division 
Home Office 






Memo 17.1.84 Redacted 
F4 Division 
Home Office 




MP re NGA van 
 
















News coverage of the Messenger dispute  
Headlines 
























Benefactor may pay NGA fine 
Morning Star 




Pickets clash with police 
The Sun 
Jail me if you dare storms union boss 
Morning Star 




Peace moves in pickets dispute 
The Sun 
Minister slams fury on picket line 
Editorial criticising minister – we still have the tyranny of the closed shop 
Morning Star 
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Front page: Printworkers’ big challenge to Thatcher 
Editorial 
Break the chains on the unions 
Anger flares on the picket line 
MPs blast paper’s ‘bully-boy’ boss 




Print Chief’s warning 
Six Fleet Street papers sack printers 
The Sun 
Injured picket is held in cell 
Gloucester Citizen 
Assets of union siezed 
Militant – special issue – defend the print workers 
Front page: Unite! Defeat Tory laws 
The battle lines are drawn 
Join the picket line 
Step up the action 
Morning Star 
Front page: Printworkers give national strike warning 




Front page: NGA crisis talks fail and TUC steps in 
The Sun 
Siege showdown as picket army defy law 
Glad we’re back 
Evening Post – Voice of the West 
Print dispute: union has its say – letter from J Coles NGA FoC  
Morning Star 
Front page: Back the printworkers 
Big lock-out halts six newspapers 
Stand firm on dispute TUC is told 
Let’s ensure Messenger gets message 
It’s now defence of all unions 




Sun and Times not appearing today 
Sacked printers called back 
“I’m not giving up – law is my only defence and I’ll use it” – Shah 
Morning Star 
Front page: Fleet Street bosses climb down 
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All roads lead to Messenger demo 
Editorial: Now for the Stockport Six 
Kinnock blames Tory laws 
Attack on NGA ‘ clear warning’ 
Enthusiastic response to Warrington call 
 
30.11.83 
BBC World at One 
Interview Robin Day with Joe Wade - transcript 
Daily Mail 
Front page: 4,000 pickets defy the law 
The phoney war is over 
Inside siege plant . . . bunks, videos, a freezer full of food 
Pickets and police gather 
Daily Mirror 
Showdown – injuries mount as thousands join print demo 
The Sun 
“This union used its muscle to try to destroy the company by force 
Union Chief hits at Shah 
Think again, says Tebbit 
The Times 
TUC throws its weight behind print union 
Apology for non-appearance 
Daily Telegraph 
Midnight Siege at Warrington 
2,000 police in Shah fight 
The Guardian 
Police confront massed picket at print plant 
Financial Times 
Pressure mounts on all parties in Messenger dispute 
Gloucester Citizen 
Local printer knocked unconscious 
Morning Star 
Front page: Defend the Stockport Six 
Violence to pickets – the grim record 
Employer’s confrontation course 
Press bosses join court attack 




Pickets return and defy threat of more court action 
Brittan condemns picket violence as organised anarchy 
Daily Mail 
Front page: New clash as pickets mass again 
Kinnock is taunted: condemn the union 
The darkest hour on Winwick Quay 
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The Sun 
Biggest demo yet is called 
A night of nerves inside the stainless steel fortress 
Outsiders are blamed for the violence 
Editorial: Mob rule of the rule of law? 
Daily Telegraph 
Editorial: Above the battle 
Financial Times 
Police learn the less of facing up to mass picketing 
Morning Star 
Front page: Tory Thuggery 
Police line-up to back bass 
Police brutality denounced by Labour left 
Fleet Street bosses win court banning 
Hundreds besiege plant 
Police violence at Warrington 
Chanting riot police wade into demo 
Print union asks TUC for urgent practical support 




Front page: On-Off bid for peace 
How Maggie met Shah 
The Sun 
Kinnock lashes at Maggie in NGA row 
The Times 
Reasonable men of the NGA being used 
Role of Official Solicitor 
Morning Star 
Front page: Unions rally around NGA 
Journalists defy High Court 
PM savaged on Shah meeting 
Build-up underway for next mass picket 
Pickets chained together 
Judge with long anti-union record 




Peace talks called in print truce 
The Sun 
Print truce as NGA calls of picketing 
The Times 

















Front page: NGA must win! 
It’s time to start fighting 
The threat to the NGA 
NUJ defy court 
It’s time for the TUC to pay its debts 
Thatcher’s boot-boys 
Tebbits law: catch 22 for the unions 
What Thatcher has in store 
The law against trade unions 
Injunctions galore! 
Editorial: Labour and the law 
Militant 
Front page: NGA Messenger dispute: drawing the balance sheet 
What the TUC should have done 
On the Warrington picket line 
Police tactics to blame for violence 
Liverpool NGA rally 
Class, the press and the law 
Defend the closed shop 
Who owns the press? 
Defend our unions 
Gloucester Citizen 




Front page: Court strips NGA of £675,000 
The Sun 




General Strike threat by the NGA 
Gloucester Citizen 
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Front page: TUC split over print strike 
The Sun 
Scrap strike, judge orders print union 




Murray’s big test on NGA strike call 
Your newspaper reprieved 
The Sun 






BBC poll ‘not rigged’ – Shah in second place 
 
January 1984 
Print – the NGA journal 















Attwill, Steve Unite Regional Organiser was GPMU and NGA official, joined 
Messenger Group picket. Interviewed 12.2019 
Burke, Tony Unite Assistant General Secretary, was President Stockport NGA Branch 
at the time of the dispute. 18.2.2014 
Coop, Owen was West Pennine Graphical Society Branch Secretary, NGA National 
Councilor, Unite National Officer. Interviewed 14.2.2020 
Dobney, Megan Southern and Eastern Region TUC, formerly NGA and GPMU activist, 
Mother of the Chapel and National Council member, joined Messenger Group picket. 
Interviewed 13.8.2016 
Dubbins, Tony was NGA Assistant General Secretary, General Secretary, GPMU 
General Secretary and Unite Assistant General Secretary Interviewed 17.8.2017 
Harris, Peter was NGA South West and South Wales Assistant Regional Secretary 
Interviewed 9.2019 
Field, Anne was SOGAT, GPMU and Unite Officer, joined Messenger Group picket. 
Interviewed 28.8.2016 
Grindley, Mike Chair of the GCHQ unions and one of the dismissed trade unionists. 
Interviewed 2014 
Manning, Alan was TUC North West Regional Secretary Interviewed 8.2018 
Monks, Lord John was TUC official in charge of the Committee responsible for 
industrial action support in 1983, was TUC General Secretary. Interviewed 12.3.2015 
Newis, Chris was NGA National Council member. Interviewed 3.12.2017 
Parkinson, Brendan Unison officer, was NGA activist, joined Messenger Group 
picket. Interviewed 9.7.2015 
Royston, Alan was Father of the Chapel at Messenger Group Newspapers and one of 
the ‘Stockport Six’ sacked NGA members. Interviewed 2014 
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Scott, Vince was NGA activist, joined Messenger Group picket. Interviewed 
24.6.2015 
Shah, Eddy was Managing Director of Messenger Group Newspapers. Interviewed 
7.4.2015 
Slater, John was South Wales NGA Branch Secretary. Interviewed 9.2019 
Williams, Ray was Liverpool NGA Branch Secretary, organised pickets, Messenger 
Group was GPMU President. Interviewed 4.2014 
 




A palette of mobilising, servicing and organising models 
 
 
